@CeranMathis@AleMartnezR1 Same honestly, though I have a tendency to use my own terminology which probably doesn’t help with communicating such a complex topic.
@CeranMathis@AleMartnezR1 The issue is bridging the gap of possibility to actuality. If not grounded in necessity it is in some way brute. And considering you can only derive an ought from another ought, not an is, the two choices are some necessary requirement of an ought or brutely existent oughts.
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@CeranMathis@AleMartnezR1 It seems whenever you refer to the “phenomenological x” you are essentially talking about the possibility/concept of x.
If so then I would agree that all that is possible (including the boundaries on identities) is necessarily defined.
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@AleMartnezR1@CeranMathis This argument fails.
It can be the case a person necessarily must always exist yet that person themselves *individually* not be necessary.
(Not that I agree with the personal argument.)
@CeranMathis@AleMartnezR1 Fundamentally my critique is that a *necessary* prescription is required to grant moral authority thus, making *all* prescriptions necessarily *contingent* on something is nonsense.
@CeranMathis@AleMartnezR1 Ex) I say it’s not necessarily true to draw a square with 4 sides. You reply that squares necessarily have 4 sides. I reply that you could simply not draw the square thus, not drawing a square with 4 sides.
We are talking as to an actual agent having an actual prescription.
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@CeranMathis@AleMartnezR1 A better version of the argument would claim morality as being part of the identity of the supposed person/s.
However, the OP specifically claims a *causal* relationship between the person and morality which voids this possibility.
@CeranMathis@AleMartnezR1 You are mixing up hypothetical necessity with ontological necessity.
Ex) *If* morality exists it necessarily is prescribed but if morality didn’t exist it wouldn’t be prescribed as it wouldn’t exist.
The OP says morality is contingent and so could fail to exist.