Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has appointed Brig. Gen. Mohamed Mohamud Hassan (Garabey) as Commander of the Somali National Army (SNA). Garabey previously served as Somalia’s military attaché in Ankara, a position that required close coordination with Turkish military and defense officials and reflected his deep familiarity with one of Somalia’s most important security partners.
Beyond consolidating his influence over the military establishment, the move is likely to further institutionalize Turkey’s role as Somalia’s principal external security partner.
The decision also comes amid growing political tensions surrounding Hassan Sheikh’s presidency. Since his return to office in 2022, and particularly amid disputes over governance and mandate extension debates in 2026, critics have accused the administration of consolidating power through loyalist appointments, favoring particular clan networks, and using security sector restructuring to marginalize rivals in ongoing disputes with federal member states and opposition actors.
In an expanded strategic policy brief, ADISS examines Türkiye’s expansion across Africa through the interconnected pillars of security cooperation, port access, trade corridors and political Islam. Built on Neo-Ottoman foundation to convert historical ties and geography into political, commercial, and security advantages across Africa and the Red Sea.
https://t.co/vXg18eiv4t
The Quintet (AU, IGAD, LAS, EU, UN) issued the statement following consultations with Sudanese political and civilian stakeholders in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 3-5 June 2026 to establish a Preparatory Committee for dialogue. The statement stresses confidence-building, respect for Sudan's sovereignty and unity and rejection of parallel governing structures that risk further fragmentation amid the ongoing conflict.
Ethiopia is hosting high-level diplomatic training for South Sudanese diplomats.
In mid-May, Juba ordered the closure of an Egyptian military-linked outpost in Pagak (near the Ethiopian border).
South Sudan has also joined the Nile CFA and deepened security/economic links with Ethiopia.
Despite talks of possible Saudi investment in ports in Eritrea, the Saudi Ports Authority (Mawani) has added the new “SRS” shipping service by Emirates Shipping Line connecting Jeddah Islamic Port with India and Djibouti - boosting the Kingdom’s connectivity to global markets with 2,144 TEU capacity.
The connectivity strengthens Red Sea–Indian Ocean trade links, boosting Djibouti’s position as a key East Africa logistics hub, and supports Saudi Vision 2030. For Ethiopia, dependent on Djibouti for 90-95% of its trade the corridor link provides access to Saudi petrochemicals/food and Indian goods (pharma, machinery, etc.)
https://t.co/bAIGTzE0hU
In an aide-mémoire addressed to diplomatic missions and international partners on 3 June, the TPLF warned that a return to catastrophic conflict was no longer a hypothetical risk and could carry significant regional consequences. The document called on foreign governments and international organizations to intervene, cautioning that “failure to act cannot be regarded as neutrality. It would amount to acquiescence in the further deterioration of an already intolerable situation and increase the likelihood of a return to full-scale war.”
The warning came as the TPLF leadership aligned with Debretsion Gebremichael moved to replace the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) and restore elements of the pre-war governing structure, a step widely viewed as a violation of the political transition framework established under the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) signed in Pretoria, South Africa.
In latest maneuver, TPLF approved senior appointments, naming TPLF deputy chairman Amanuel Assefa as vice president and head of the Justice Bureau. ADISS in its strategic publication covered how TPLF systematically replaced TIRA authorities and what it means for COHA (Pretoria Agreement) -Read.
In an unprecedented case of foreign electoral interference, Eritrean and Turkish-aligned networks amplified narratives focused on insecurity, insurgency, and political distrust while portraying Ethiopia’s election as illegitimate regardless of voter participation.
Coordinated amplification across state-linked, proxy, and diaspora accounts created an information environment resembling gray-zone influence operations rather than ordinary foreign commentary.
ADISS has collected credible evidence of coordinated foreign influence operations targeting Ethiopia’s electoral process, including disinformation campaigns, covert political influence, cyber activity, and efforts to undermine public confidence in state institutions. Such activities fall within the mandate of Ethiopian security and intelligence institutions to investigate.
ADISS is prepared to support credible investigative efforts and share relevant findings and evidence with appropriate authorities.
https://t.co/YgWiF637iy
Mogadishu is experiencing heightened political and security tensions ahead of planned opposition-led protests scheduled for 4 June 2026. Opposition and presidential guards were seen moving in Mogadishu, with heavy weapons visible. Civilians were seen fleeing as guns erupted in a brief engagement between government forces and militia loyal to opposition figure Hassan Ali Khaire.
Today (June 3, 2026), Metropolitan Anthony, head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s external relations department arrived in Addis Ababa at the invitation of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Holy Synod with the blessing of Patriarch Kirill. He also met President Taye Atske Selassie.
Relations between the two countries and churches date back centuries, from 14th century contacts between Russian pilgrims and Ethiopian monks in Jerusalem, to the travels of Afanasy Nikitin in the 15th century, the rise of “Orthodox internationalism” in the 19th century, and formal diplomatic relations established in 1898 under Menelik II and Tsar Nicholas II. Both countries share traditional Christian values.
IMF staff and the Ethiopian authorities have reached staff-level agreement on economic policies to conclude the fifth review of the four-year US$3.4 billion ECF arrangement. Once approved, Ethiopia will gain access to about US$468 million. According to IMF, Despite sharp increases in the price of key imports caused by the war in the Middle East, Ethiopia’s economic activity remains robust, with only modest impacts on output growth and consumer price inflation.
https://t.co/s4pMbyJyAk
A two-day conference beginning Wednesday in Addis Ababa will bring together, for the first time, factions aligned with SAF and groups supportive of the RSF, as Sudanese political groups confirmed participation in a diplomatic summit organized under the international five-party mechanism to launch a Sudanese-led dialogue process.
https://t.co/CzzNqdfqlJ
Yet millions of Ethiopians rejected that outcome through participation itself. They voted under conditions of insecurity and political tension while parts of the country remained exposed to insurgent violence and continuous information pressure. Their participation demonstrated that large numbers of Ethiopians still believed political participation carried value despite coordinated efforts to convince them otherwise.
The Ethiopian government entered the election without an effective communication strategy to counter the massive information campaign surrounding the vote. Official responses came late, remained fragmented and mostly reacted after narratives had already spread across digital platforms. That vacuum allowed external actors and politically aligned media networks to shape much of the information environment during the election period.
https://t.co/bWdRfdBkud
In an unprecedented case of foreign electoral interference, Eritrean and Turkish-aligned networks amplified narratives focused on insecurity, insurgency, and political distrust while portraying Ethiopia’s election as illegitimate regardless of voter participation.
Coordinated amplification across state-linked, proxy, and diaspora accounts created an information environment resembling gray-zone influence operations rather than ordinary foreign commentary.
ADISS has collected credible evidence of coordinated foreign influence operations targeting Ethiopia’s electoral process, including disinformation campaigns, covert political influence, cyber activity, and efforts to undermine public confidence in state institutions. Such activities fall within the mandate of Ethiopian security and intelligence institutions to investigate.
ADISS is prepared to support credible investigative efforts and share relevant findings and evidence with appropriate authorities.
https://t.co/YgWiF637iy
Sudan peace talks in Addis Ababa, set for this week under the #Quintet (AU, IGAD, Arab League, EU, UN), face likely delay. Disputes over delegate numbers & which political blocs (incl. Tasis Alliance) can participate are stalling progress toward a Sudanese-led process to end the SAF-RSF war. Another setback for civilians caught in the crisis.
https://t.co/L7snLJ3VHj
In an internal MEMO circulated, the US is cutting visa processing from ~50 embassies/consulates in Africa down to just 20 “hub” cities starting June 2026. From now on, applicants from many countries will have to travel (sometimes across borders) to one of these hubs for interviews.
Full list of hubs: Abidjan, Accra, Addis Ababa, Cape Town, Dakar, Dar es Salaam, Djibouti, Johannesburg, Kampala, Kigali, Kinshasa, Lagos, Lomé, Luanda, Malabo, Monrovia, Nairobi, Port Louis, Praia, Yaoundé.