Cards are made in China 🙂

[Cards are made in China 🙂 @AhBoard]

@MichaelOngRisk Eat it Malaysian style. With hot local Kopi-O

[Cards are made in China 🙂 @AhBoard]

@ShoahUkraine Fucking barbarians!

[Stephen Wertheim @stephenwertheim]

Also in the war you pushed.

[Seth Abramson @SethAbramson]

Hey can anyone explain to me why corporate media in the United States is breathlessly reporting on a deal that literally does not exist and whose terms no one agrees on, I mean I understand corporate journalism wants to lick the ball sweat off POTUS but this is getting ridiculous

[Cards are made in China 🙂 @AhBoard]

@SCMPNews As a citizen of a country in Southeast Asia that suffered greatly from the cruel and evil Japanese occupation, I am uneasy as fuck what Japan is becoming of late.

[Cards are made in China 🙂 @AhBoard]

@EdwardMoser1 @StevenCheung47 I thought the freedom you so strongly tout allows and encourages me to say, “fuck trump” and “fuck pompeo”?

[Cards are made in China 🙂 @AhBoard]

@IngrahamAngle “ Free press” 😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😭😭😭😂😭😂😂😂😂😂😂😂 Good over

[Cards are made in China 🙂 @AhBoard]

@PLURguy87 @Megatron_ron The strait was free flowing before February 27 😂😂😂😂

[Hoho Chan @HohoChan657]

💔➡️😭➡️😡➡️🤬🤬🤬

[Responsible Statecraft @RStatecraft]

“Right now we're doing a pause [on arms to Taiwan] to make sure we have the munitions we need for Epic Fury,” Cao told Sen. Mitch McConnell.

https://t.co/79HW8FCkWK

[StarBoySAR 🇭🇰 🇨🇳 🥭 @StarboySAR]

Elbridge Colby’s Beijing Mission: How an Overstretched Empire Tries to Buy Time from China

SCMP https://t.co/DRb0VEGA4t reports that the Pentagon plans to send a high‑level delegation to Beijing “within weeks,” led by Elbridge Colby, US Undersecretary of WAR for policy and key architect of the 2026 US National Defense Strategy. Officially, the purpose is technical: prepare arrangements for Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth’s follow‑on visit, after he broke an eight‑year gap as the first US defence chief to set foot in China and the first to accompany a sitting president on a state visit since normalisation in the 1970's

On the surface, this looks like “stabilization” and “guardrails” after several tense years in the Western Pacific. But if you read this move alongside Wess Mitchell’s Strategic Sequencing, Revisited—published at Colby’s own Marathon Initiative Think Tank—plus the 2026 NDS, a different picture emerges

Most likely Colby’s mission is not a sign of genuine détente. It’s a tactical pause by an overstretched hegemon that needs China to sit still while Washington struggles with Russia, Iran and a still‑unfinished alliance build‑up in Asia

The Real Problem in Washington: Too Many Fronts, Not Enough Power

Mitchell’s sequencing paper admits in unusually blunt language that the US cannot handle simultaneous high‑intensity confrontations with China, Russia and Iran. The American defence industrial base is overtaxed, munitions are limited, and political will is finite. His answer is a neat academic formula: sequence the enemies

The ideal script looks like this:

Engineer a “strategic defeat” for Russia in Ukraine on a faster timeline than China’s Taiwan window

Force Europe to take over more of its own defence so US forces and money can shift to Asia

Use that breathing space to rebuild the US defence industrial base and harden the alliance system in the Indo‑Pacific

Only then confront China in a more decisive manner over Taiwan and regional order

The 2026 NDS—where Colby’s fingerprints are obvious—mirrors this logic. It openly ranks threats and theatres: China is the “pacing challenge,” Russia is secondary, the Middle East and others are risk‑accepted sideshows but necessary to contain China. In theory, sequencing gives Washington a way to manage decline while still defending a US‑led order

The problem for the US: reality didn’t cooperate. Russia cannot be “defeated on schedule” in Ukraine, Iran refuses to surrender, and China kept shifting the balance in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea in its favour. The neat sequence schedule broke down

When the Sequence Breaks, the Hegemon Looks for a Pause

Colby’s sudden importance as an envoy makes sense only against this background of strategic overload.

The US now faces:

A grinding, inconclusive Russia–Ukraine war of attrition that still consumes too many resources and political oxygen.

An Iran war with uncertain outcome which can drag on for years and end in the destruction of the GCC, petrodollar and permanent global energy supply shock

A PLA that is rapidly modernizing closing the US military capability gap especially around 1st and 2nd Island Chain while upgrades to US alliances and basing in Asia are still mid‑construction

Mitchell’s model assumed the US could “deal with” Russia and stabilize secondary theaters before Taiwan became truly dangerous. Instead, Washington is being squeezed from all three directions at once.

Under those conditions, sending the architect of the NDS to Beijing to talk “guardrails” is not a gesture of friendship; it is a defensive move. The empire needs to slow one front down—China—so it does not get dragged into a three‑front crisis it cannot win

“Strategic Stability” as Cover for a Harder Denial Strategy

The key to understanding Colby’s mission is the 2026 NDS itself. Publicly, the document is full of soothing words: “strategic stability,” “responsible competition,” “guardrails,” “crisis communication.” But the operational core is a denial strategy along the First Island Chain: reorganise US forces and allies to prevent a rapid PLA fait accompli against Taiwan or decisive gains in the Western Pacific.

That means:

More forward fires and logistics positioned in Japan and the Philippines

Increased integration and interoperability of US‑Japan‑Philippines forces

A defence industrial base rebooted around long‑range munitions and maritime/air denial in the Western Pacific

“Strategic stability” is not a counterweight to this project; it is the lubricant. Crisis hotlines and military‑to‑military mechanisms are meant to make aggressive US operations near China’s coast less risky for Washington, not to reduce the underlying pressure on China

So what does Colby probably wants from this visit?

1⃣ Buy time
Washington wants to avoid major escalations over Taiwan and the South China Sea while the US finishes stabilising the Russia–Ukraine front, manages the Iran problem, and builds out its Asia alliance architecture. The message probably will be: “We accept rivalry, but let’s not collide—yet!”

2⃣ Codify “rules” that favour US operations:
The mil‑mil talks, hotlines and crisis protocols are about setting patterns: how close US aircraft and ships can operate, how incidents are managed, how quickly senior leaders talk when something goes wrong. If the US can get China to normalise high‑tempo US presence just outside its red lines, the strategy of denial becomes cheaper for Washington

3⃣ Calm allies while hardening them:
Australia, Japan and the Philippines are being asked to accept more US access, more deployments, and more risk. Colby can tell them: “Don’t worry, we have guardrails with Beijing.” Stability with China is a sales pitch to make US‑led militarisation more palatable domestically in allied capitals and for AUKUS members

This is not peace‑making. It’s risk management for the stronger side in the short term, and coalition consolidation for a more intense confrontation later.

China remains the “pacing challenge” and primary focus of long‑term denial planning in the NDS

Taiwan Island is the unspoken centre of US force‑planning, even if the word is carefully downplayed in the unclassified text

The entire purpose of sequencing is to defend a US‑led order more efficiently, not to accept a truly multipolar system where China, Russia and others have equal strategic agency.

This combination is dangerous: a declining hegemon that still refuses to accept multipolarity, but is now smart enough to manage its decline tactically

From an armchair strategist's perspective like me, the implications for Taiwan and the South China Sea are unsurprising but sobering.

Washington wants to prevent a “Russia‑style surprise” in the Taiwan Strait, where the PLA moves faster than Western politics and logistics

It probably will therefore quietly accelerate arms, planning, and denial capabilities around Taiwan while using “strategic stability” language to keep things calm

If Colby succeeds in locking in crisis‑management mechanisms, US decision‑makers may become more willing to take risks near China’s red lines, believing they can control escalation

Expect more US and allied presence in and around the South China Sea, backed by new infrastructure in the Philippines and expanded roles for Japan

“Guardrails” will not reduce the tempo; they will normalise it. The waters and skies around China will be busier, but with better telephone lines

For China, this is still encirclement—just with better customer service!

The US is not suddenly reasonable; it is simply overextended. “Stability” with China will be a tool to save a failing sequencing plan, not a recognition of China’s legitimate security interests

For now I would draw three practical conclusions:

US engagement is tactical and reversible. Once Washington judges that Russia is “under control,” Iran is contained, and Japan/Philippines are fully wired into the First Island Chain, the US will likely feel freer to take more escalatory steps against China

The current window—when the US is asking for guardrails—is actually a window of relative leverage for China. This is the moment to deepen partnerships with Russia and the Global South, strengthen its own deterrent, and push for a multipolar architecture that will outlast any single US administration

ASEAN and other regional states should be sceptical of US claims that guardrails equal safety. What Washington really wants is a more predictable environment for its own forward deployments. Stability, in US usage, means “we can pressure China without stumbling into war by mistake”

For now, Colby probably will arrive in Beijing as the polite face of this strategy: smiling, talking about “responsible competition” and “avoiding the Thucydides Trap,” while carrying a doctrine that still treats China as the main obstacle to a US‑centric order.

The question for Chinese policymakers is not whether to meet him, but how to use this pause to ensure that when Washington’s sequencing clock runs down, the balance of power looks very different from what the Marathon Initiative crowd expects

[AndrewT500 @CourierBoyUK]

Why were RAF Jets wasting taxpayers’ money prowling about the Black Sea in the first place?

[Cards are made in China 🙂 @AhBoard]

@theblindisciple @Reuters @specialreports Who started this?

[Cards are made in China 🙂 @AhBoard]

@Reuters @specialreports Thank you, America. Passage through the SoH was free and unrestricted before US/Israel carried out the illegal attack on Iranian soil!

Never forget!

[Cards are made in China 🙂 @AhBoard]

@Sino_Market Another example Comrade Donald "Jianguo" Trump making China greater!!!

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@straits_times Estonia! 😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂

[Cards are made in China 🙂 @AhBoard]

@TripInChina They must be Australians.

[Cards are made in China 🙂 @AhBoard]

@rphkg Who the flying fuck is Steve Vines?

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@The_Real_Solyad @gan_ji56755 @KobeissiLetter 😂😂😂😂 the only things that the US leads China are war crimes and copium 😂😂😂😂😂

[Cards are made in China 🙂 @AhBoard]

@The_Real_Solyad @KobeissiLetter This post gives out the same vibes as how Elon Musk famously laughed at BYD 11 years ago