@sahilsinghop@FinestYew This is not my view. Composite view derived from sidebar briefing by FOEM (last Jan) that has been busy figuring out how to use its 4+ gen jets (not Rafale) against stealth and background talks with our side.
GAN is not the ultimate arbiter of force requirements. The entire package has to be viewed, familiarity has to be considered, level of sovereign control too. Unlike us (myself included), the IAF does not look at just one attribute and then try and fit everything around it (we are not talking about non-negotiables like flight safety). The Rafale will remain contemporary. The ones we are getting more so.
Absolutely. For the electronic brain of a missile, with a finite FOV once near target (if the missile has some form of radar or EO sensor — challenge with hypersonics), yes. One needs to get it close enough. Hitting the water won’t do much good. If you’re off by a few km, and carriers aren’t that slow (top speed 34.5+ mph or 56+ km/h), you’re not going to acquire target, much less hit it. Basically you need a space based surveillance network capable of providing the required PNT, which the Chinese have, and which we are enhancing (starting this year).
The ambitious hope is that by the time the AMCA enters series production after 2035, a substantial portion of the 4.5 gen backbone will already be in place. Hope that clears up the rationale, not just behind the Rafale but all other 4.5/4++ jets the IAF will be looking to fly for decades to come.
Now back to comparison. Depends on the role. You want effect on the ground, at the tactical level, and this is term is doing the heavy lifting here, the Rafale or its contemporaries are better than the J-20. And here, effect on the ground means serious punch, not a small diameter bomb. You want to enter contested space to create pure air dominance, the J-20 will do better, with the likes of the Rafale at best being able to counter if they come with serious man-unmanned pairing and net centric tactics, and it will still at best be a threat, not a solution.
Exactly. Which means what, sir? That advanced 4.5 gen aircraft are still needed. Hence the Rafale. Our 5th gen solution is the AMCA, barring any stop gaps. Outright import, even with local assembly, will not work for 5th gen due to inherent characteristics. It would essentially be a black box largely cut off from the rest of the Air Force. The question of “comparison” (in the way it is usually done) does not arise, as they are meant for different roles. We need a 4.5 gen backbone — thus Rafale and in the future, the Mk2 and upgraded Sukhois. Without them, the AMCA cannot, by itself, deliver effect on ground. Give some credit to the defence planners.
Which is why I asked, sir, for which purpose? Which purpose does one want to assess superiority in? If the role is delivering significant payload on target without increasing platform count, for example, then the latest AESA radar and stealth won’t help given the magazine depth limitation of current stealth tactical platforms. That’s one example. And please remember, none of us live in the air. We try to dominate it to have effect on the ground. There are many criterion that need to be considered. The Rafale, despite all types of commentary, and selective quoting of serving personnel (or often said personnel trying to give short quotes), is not being bought to be a peer of any stealth platform, though with the right tactics, it will pose a non-trivial threat to them too.
Let me put it in perspective. I published one article with the concerns of the pvt sector on AMCA execution model after the July meeting with stakeholders, and the next day a high MoD official was on record for another article answering every single concern raised and assuring support. Unprecedented speed. And when I followed up in January, those concerns had been met.
@Indrani1_Roy@manojzxc@OvertlyStoic@jaiswal_sh4296 @Booggy800 @FinestYew Some of that is happening. The whole idea of a second combat jet maker is meant to facilitate just that. Hence the AMCA execution model and the criteria that seemed designed to keep HAL out (order book to revenue ratio penalty)
@sahilsinghop@FinestYew If you say so, sir. Stealth has inherent limits, because stealth has inherent preconditions. I can think of one off the top of my mind this late in the day — weight of action of both aircraft.
The TEDBF’s fate is linked more to IAC-2 and when it will come and what will follow than anything else. Given that the Navy will not possess three carriers at the same time for a long time to come (no, we are not going to be a three-carrier Navy anytime soon), that is the real risk to TEDBF.
@ParthVa53135321 Being around it is an experience. Once you realise that you can literally walk under its belly, all the way up to most of the nose cone. Had the privilege of seeing one up and close at HAL Nashik. Such a beauty!
@manojzxc@Indrani1_Roy@OvertlyStoic@jaiswal_sh4296 @Booggy800 @FinestYew That specific? No idea. If I could predict CCS, I would become a billionaire predicting the stock market. 🙏🏽 Consider that we have a notion of CCS for 114 Rafale, even though it could come as fast 8-9 months, still it’s a notion and not confirmation.
@Indrani1_Roy@manojzxc@OvertlyStoic@jaiswal_sh4296 @Booggy800 @FinestYew Not really. AMCA and Mk2 are the goalposts for now. There should be no dilution of effort to get them going. If they succeed, TEDBF and all follow on projects become easier.
@Indrani1_Roy@manojzxc@OvertlyStoic@jaiswal_sh4296 @Booggy800 @FinestYew A TESBF would cannibalise Mk2 under the current projected force mix, if intended for series production, or divert relatively limited sources, if it is a science project. There is not much appetite for it.
Yes, but even that is not going to happen. There is simply no capacity. It took everything, and the kitchen sink, to get the Mk1A to where it is. Right now you will see a doubling down on Mk1A, Mk2 and especially AMCA. Sources in the know are sticking to their end 2028-2029 first flight for AMCA, that itself is ambitious will take some doing. The weakness you are seeing in India’s MIC is, not surprisingly multi-causal, with the biggest one being the overall lack of depth of the general IC. There are specific issues with specific platforms but those can be sorted or ameliorated. Some appear to be design constraints, given that they have not been fixed in over a decade (yes, “trust me bro”, but more details are not possible). But overall, things are chugging along. Hold tight for DcPP decision and the race to first flight to start. Directional indicator will be if you see defence R&D component rising at CAGR greater than rate of growth of overall defence outlay.