The world’s wrongest man, John Mearsheimer, says he was effectively penniless during his recent visit to Russia because the “Russia expert” didn’t know his US credit card wouldn’t work there.
Mearsheimer was in Russia to lecture Russians about Russia, leaving local audiences confused by pro-Russia talking points that he seems unaware are only meant for Western consumption.
@yarotheslav I really hope more Europeans can learn this lesson now - and it extends more widely from economics to other forms of attempted friendship and integration into international institutions. All are seen as weaknesses to exploit when their deterrent mechanisms aren’t believed.
‘Golden arches theory’ is still not aging well, as this McDonalds warehouse burns in Ukraine after a Russian attack.
Let’s talk about this.
Thomas Friedman came up with the Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention in the 90s, arguing that countries with McDonalds don’t fight each other.
More broadly, he argued countries that are economically integrated and codependent won’t go to war, hence the world needs more “McDonalds countries”.
It’s basically a rebranded version of arguments in the 1910s that proved so disastrously wrong before the First World War.
The theory looked prophetic in the 90s only because McDonalds was slowly expanding into countries already stable. The real cause and effect was inverse to the theory.
Friedman’s book on Golden Arches theory was released with darkly comic timing, just after ethnic violence in McDonalds-loving Yugoslavia prompted a military invention by McDonalds-loving NATO countries.
Nevertheless, the theory continued to take hold, especially in thinking around Russia and the West - and from both sides.
Ok, now here’s the really important bit that got missed.
Western and Russian thinking around Golden Arches theory had each taken the exact opposite lessons.
The West thought economic integration restrained aggression, while Russia thought economic integration restrained any response to its aggression.
That’s clear from listening to strategic thinking and commentary on the Russian side from the 90s.
They also saw “McDonalds countries” as Friedman called them, even if they didn’t call them that, but they just interpreted that relationship as weakness that could be exploited.
The lack of a stronger international response to each escalation of Russian aggression, such as after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, and all that nonsense about resetting the relationship just reinforced its perception that it could keep escalating more.
Russia escalates its aggression where it senses weakness. The connections and friendship you try to build with it - like “Russia is not my enemy”, blah blah - can make you a bigger target for that aggression.
The only real deterrence is to always stand firm on your values and be prepared to defend them no matter what.
@BadBalticTakes 💯
The West thought economic integration restrained aggression, while Russia thought economic integration restrained any response to its aggression.
Currently enjoying a rainy weekend in Riga.
It’s impressive how the Latvians have transformed their Victory Park since the removal of the Soviet monument there.
It’s now a real neighbourhood park with playgrounds, cycling and skiing/skating routes, an outdoor gym, basketball courts, table tennis and chess tables, cafes, etc.
Victory Park was named to commemorate Latvian forces who saved Riga in 1919, driving out Bermondt-Avalov’s German-Russian army, leading to Latvia’s victory in its War of Independence.
During the later occupation, the Soviets laid loads of concrete on top of the park and built their own monument, and used the area as a parade ground.
The Latvians have now de-totalitarianised it all with winding paths and ponds and gorgeous landscaping dominating instead.
Just round the corner is this place here, Āgenskalns Market, which you all must go visit too.
It dates back to the 1800s then this building opened in the 1920s too, just after independence. It’s kept its historic character today but it’s also been recently restored.
It’s bustling with such good food and coffee and drinks and more. Right now, there’s a traditional dance class taking place in one of the cafes.
People are just here enjoying life without much of a care for most of the narratives swirling around this site.
So go book a flight to Riga and come see for yourself offline why some of the worst people in the world get so annoyed by the mere existence of this awesome country and its beautiful people!
Proving once again that among the easily conned, the western "Russia experts" are in a league previously reserved only for MAGA and the BBC's 1957 Spaghetti Tree audience.
Someone created a very obvious parody of the ISW, flipping the narrative on Narva, and “Russia experts” are earnestly wondering why the institute has no real address.
https://t.co/1LymjD0h2M
Another key person to follow is @MarekKohv from @ICDS_Tallinn. He’s also in the Times article with important points about how there is still so much low-hanging fruit right now for Europe to counter these threats before more materialise.
That includes restricting the movements of Russian ‘diplomats’ in Europe, and Russian soft power initiatives also used as cover, and either substantially or entirely restricting visas issued to Russian citizens.
Great journalism here in @thetimes from
@olivernmoody, @larisamlbrown, and @marcbennetts1 who listened to a wide range of European security officials and defence ministers.
There is consensus that Russia is stepping up “sub-military activities” across all of Europe in an attempt to weaken support for Ukraine (which will actually rebound into stronger support for Ukraine), but they “see no reason whatsoever to believe that Putin is preparing any kind of ground attack on the Baltic states nor any other part of Nato”.
@markomihkelson points out that the root problem is the reluctance of some European countries to “articulate a clear strategic objective to help Ukraine achieve victory and push back Russian aggression”.
Some other key quotes:
“What is unhelpful is the assumption that Baltics are Russia’s primary, almost a natural target, that they are small, not very capable countries, easily crushed by even the smallest of disruptions,” said @LiisMure, a former Estonian defence official who is now a senior policy fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) @ICDS_Tallinn think tank in Tallinn.
“This very much reflects the Russian framing of the Baltics, and is also incorrect. If you look at the track record, the Baltics have been not just very resilient to all manner of Russian meddling but also the most proactive in taking real actions to address the threat.”
Raivis Melnis, Latvia’s defence minister @AizsardzibasMin), concurred. “Latvia and Nato currently face no direct military threat,” he said. “The overall threat situation has not changed significantly in recent weeks and we currently have no information indicating an imminent military attack against Latvia or Nato … There is no reason to create unnecessary fear.”
“We must call things what they are: Russia is carrying out acts of terrorism,” says Lithuanian Defence Minister @robertas_kaunas (@Lithuanian_MoD). “And it will not change because Russia is desperate. Russia is not winning in Ukraine the way it planned. Instead of stopping the war and negotiating peace, Putin has chosen more aggression and intimidation. He is looking for other ways to put pressure on us, but he is not succeeding.”
💯 🎯
Go follow all those people and read the whole thing here: https://t.co/wQe36PXDVQ
And ICYMI, here’s a bit of a deeper dive into Narva.
Just one thing should be corrected on the post below. The idea that there is a low but growing risk of an attack on NATO doesn’t reflect what Baltic intelligence assessments are seeing and, as mentioned above, the CIA appears to have revised that down in line with them now.
That Danish intelligence report is broadly in line with what the Baltics are saying. The threat assessment is unchanged here.
Russia increasingly seeks to escalate its so-called hybrid attacks on the West, while a more conventional military strike on a NATO country - possibly as a false flag - is a low but real possibility.
What happened in Leipzig shows though that this is definitely not just a story about the Baltics.
All of Europe is threatened. Russia will escalate wherever it senses weakness.
The really crucial bit in the intelligence is that Russia still wants to keep everything below the threshold of triggering a military response.
And the purpose is to deter us from supporting Ukraine.
A couple of things have confused the public perception of all this.
Firstly, El Mundo released a story just before about CIA warnings of military drone strikes across Spain, France, and Italy. Macron made clear later that wasn’t true. The clue is that would pretty obviously trigger a strong, united European response - exactly what Russia wants to avoid - so that threat only works for Russia as a story about what Putin might do.
Also, the Institute for the Study of War recently released a plausible-sounding analysis about how a Russian incursion into Estonia at Narva might unfold. Not too plausible to a lot of people who live there though, especially those in the Estonian Defence League.
The analysis was based on a number of flawed assumptions about local dynamics, which hugely overstate Russian capabilities, including inside the town of Narva itself, and hugely understate Estonian capabilities in their own country.
I was writing about that yesterday when the Danish report came through so decided to put it all together in this one article.
TL;DR: We spend a lot of time arguing about what Putin will do next. But the future of our nations can never be dependent on the whims of one adversary.
What really matters is ensuring our countries are secured against any adversary who would seek to harm us.
Despite what “Russia experts” on here will tell you, Russia’s calculations about whether and how to escalate are not predetermined. They are constantly calculating the strength of our resilience.
Narva is actually a great example of that resilience, exemplifying the whole-of-society approach to defence across Estonia and the Baltics and especially in Finland.
People who live in Narva are not background actors waiting to take their cue in Russian narratives. It is an Estonian town, home to a lot of people who are trained and ready and proud to defend their country, Estonia, against any adversary and every day prove themselves to be capable of disrupting those who would harm their town.
And that whole-of-society approach to defence goes much deeper, including through education on media literacy, for example, or how to spot attempts at grooming assets, and involving all civic society in crises exercises.
Frankly, to all our fellow Europeans and to all fans of a rules-based world of sovereign nations, stop pitying Narva and start learning from them.
And remember the best defence is to stand firm on our values and support Ukraine.
If you like maps and arrows and, especially, arrows on maps, then here’s a great retelling of the Estonian War of Independence. 🇪🇪
And who doesn’t love a bit of history at the weekend?
https://t.co/vcYHQSfXtE
And here’s a longer deep dive about Narva ICYMI.
One correction to the post here is that the “low but growing” assessment of a military attack on NATO is not correct. It was never in Baltic intelligence assessments and the CIA have revised that as mentioned above.
That Danish intelligence report is broadly in line with what the Baltics are saying. The threat assessment is unchanged here.
Russia increasingly seeks to escalate its so-called hybrid attacks on the West, while a more conventional military strike on a NATO country - possibly as a false flag - is a low but real possibility.
What happened in Leipzig shows though that this is definitely not just a story about the Baltics.
All of Europe is threatened. Russia will escalate wherever it senses weakness.
The really crucial bit in the intelligence is that Russia still wants to keep everything below the threshold of triggering a military response.
And the purpose is to deter us from supporting Ukraine.
A couple of things have confused the public perception of all this.
Firstly, El Mundo released a story just before about CIA warnings of military drone strikes across Spain, France, and Italy. Macron made clear later that wasn’t true. The clue is that would pretty obviously trigger a strong, united European response - exactly what Russia wants to avoid - so that threat only works for Russia as a story about what Putin might do.
Also, the Institute for the Study of War recently released a plausible-sounding analysis about how a Russian incursion into Estonia at Narva might unfold. Not too plausible to a lot of people who live there though, especially those in the Estonian Defence League.
The analysis was based on a number of flawed assumptions about local dynamics, which hugely overstate Russian capabilities, including inside the town of Narva itself, and hugely understate Estonian capabilities in their own country.
I was writing about that yesterday when the Danish report came through so decided to put it all together in this one article.
TL;DR: We spend a lot of time arguing about what Putin will do next. But the future of our nations can never be dependent on the whims of one adversary.
What really matters is ensuring our countries are secured against any adversary who would seek to harm us.
Despite what “Russia experts” on here will tell you, Russia’s calculations about whether and how to escalate are not predetermined. They are constantly calculating the strength of our resilience.
Narva is actually a great example of that resilience, exemplifying the whole-of-society approach to defence across Estonia and the Baltics and especially in Finland.
People who live in Narva are not background actors waiting to take their cue in Russian narratives. It is an Estonian town, home to a lot of people who are trained and ready and proud to defend their country, Estonia, against any adversary and every day prove themselves to be capable of disrupting those who would harm their town.
And that whole-of-society approach to defence goes much deeper, including through education on media literacy, for example, or how to spot attempts at grooming assets, and involving all civic society in crises exercises.
Frankly, to all our fellow Europeans and to all fans of a rules-based world of sovereign nations, stop pitying Narva and start learning from them.
And remember the best defence is to stand firm on our values and support Ukraine.
The CIA revised down its assessment of Russia’s threat to NATO, reports @michaeldweiss on The Bulwark (@BulwarkOnline).
Despite a lot of “clickbait bullshit” this week, the CIA is aligned with European intelligence agencies, including in the Baltics.
They all see Russia seeking ways to escalate its campaign of sabotage and so-called hybrid attacks across Europe, although not a direct military attack on NATO.
Russia does not want to trigger a strong response. It much prefers trying to create panic.
This whole episode, hosted by 26-year CIA veteran @Mpolymer, is really informative and a nice antidote to much of the coverage elsewhere this week.
They also discuss why “hybrid warfare” is a terrible term, and why a strong response shouldn’t wait.
Find ways to listen here: https://t.co/ey5ZrvN0Z8
Great journalism here in @thetimes from
@olivernmoody, @larisamlbrown, and @marcbennetts1 who listened to a wide range of European security officials and defence ministers.
There is consensus that Russia is stepping up “sub-military activities” across all of Europe in an attempt to weaken support for Ukraine (which will actually rebound into stronger support for Ukraine), but they “see no reason whatsoever to believe that Putin is preparing any kind of ground attack on the Baltic states nor any other part of Nato”.
@markomihkelson points out that the root problem is the reluctance of some European countries to “articulate a clear strategic objective to help Ukraine achieve victory and push back Russian aggression”.
Some other key quotes:
“What is unhelpful is the assumption that Baltics are Russia’s primary, almost a natural target, that they are small, not very capable countries, easily crushed by even the smallest of disruptions,” said @LiisMure, a former Estonian defence official who is now a senior policy fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) @ICDS_Tallinn think tank in Tallinn.
“This very much reflects the Russian framing of the Baltics, and is also incorrect. If you look at the track record, the Baltics have been not just very resilient to all manner of Russian meddling but also the most proactive in taking real actions to address the threat.”
Raivis Melnis, Latvia’s defence minister @AizsardzibasMin), concurred. “Latvia and Nato currently face no direct military threat,” he said. “The overall threat situation has not changed significantly in recent weeks and we currently have no information indicating an imminent military attack against Latvia or Nato … There is no reason to create unnecessary fear.”
“We must call things what they are: Russia is carrying out acts of terrorism,” says Lithuanian Defence Minister @robertas_kaunas (@Lithuanian_MoD). “And it will not change because Russia is desperate. Russia is not winning in Ukraine the way it planned. Instead of stopping the war and negotiating peace, Putin has chosen more aggression and intimidation. He is looking for other ways to put pressure on us, but he is not succeeding.”
💯 🎯
Go follow all those people and read the whole thing here: https://t.co/wQe36PXDVQ
Excellent post. Deterrence, deterrence and once more deterrence.
The countries bordering Russia are swiftly building up their military capabilities and cooperating with each other on a much higher level than before
Sweden and Finland joining NATO has also been a game changer
That Danish intelligence report is broadly in line with what the Baltics are saying. The threat assessment is unchanged here.
Russia increasingly seeks to escalate its so-called hybrid attacks on the West, while a more conventional military strike on a NATO country - possibly as a false flag - is a low but real possibility.
What happened in Leipzig shows though that this is definitely not just a story about the Baltics.
All of Europe is threatened. Russia will escalate wherever it senses weakness.
The really crucial bit in the intelligence is that Russia still wants to keep everything below the threshold of triggering a military response.
And the purpose is to deter us from supporting Ukraine.
A couple of things have confused the public perception of all this.
Firstly, El Mundo released a story just before about CIA warnings of military drone strikes across Spain, France, and Italy. Macron made clear later that wasn’t true. The clue is that would pretty obviously trigger a strong, united European response - exactly what Russia wants to avoid - so that threat only works for Russia as a story about what Putin might do.
Also, the Institute for the Study of War recently released a plausible-sounding analysis about how a Russian incursion into Estonia at Narva might unfold. Not too plausible to a lot of people who live there though, especially those in the Estonian Defence League.
The analysis was based on a number of flawed assumptions about local dynamics, which hugely overstate Russian capabilities, including inside the town of Narva itself, and hugely understate Estonian capabilities in their own country.
I was writing about that yesterday when the Danish report came through so decided to put it all together in this one article.
TL;DR: We spend a lot of time arguing about what Putin will do next. But the future of our nations can never be dependent on the whims of one adversary.
What really matters is ensuring our countries are secured against any adversary who would seek to harm us.
Despite what “Russia experts” on here will tell you, Russia’s calculations about whether and how to escalate are not predetermined. They are constantly calculating the strength of our resilience.
Narva is actually a great example of that resilience, exemplifying the whole-of-society approach to defence across Estonia and the Baltics and especially in Finland.
People who live in Narva are not background actors waiting to take their cue in Russian narratives. It is an Estonian town, home to a lot of people who are trained and ready and proud to defend their country, Estonia, against any adversary and every day prove themselves to be capable of disrupting those who would harm their town.
And that whole-of-society approach to defence goes much deeper, including through education on media literacy, for example, or how to spot attempts at grooming assets, and involving all civic society in crises exercises.
Frankly, to all our fellow Europeans and to all fans of a rules-based world of sovereign nations, stop pitying Narva and start learning from them.
And remember the best defence is to stand firm on our values and support Ukraine.
The commenter in that Boston Globe story who said “I hope your venue gets firebombed” was not a regular customer but rather just a terminally online vatnik.
The profile is like a parody of an online activist.
They’ve made “ethnically Irish” a key part of their identity (despite not being an Irish citizen, not living in Ireland, or seeming to know anything about Ireland) and yet at the same time don’t think Ukrainians deserve their real national identities.
I thought the Globe story was great journalism, although they shouldn’t have omitted the first part of that quote, which was “I don’t even live in your town,” which would have made it clear that this is not just a story about the local community but about online mobs.
When you’re so anti-imperialist that you think only Westerners have agency.
Greetings from the Baltic countries, by the way, @owenjonesjourno.
Do us next.
In that same period, the Baltics achieved some of the highest levels of human freedoms and fastest growth in the world.