A friendly reminder to take your crypto security seriously.
Start doing these things TODAY:
- Keep your long-term holdings offline.
Consider a hardware wallet or an air-gapped wallet on a dedicated offline device.
If you don't want to buy a hardware wallet, air-gapped storage is an alternative.
- Never use one wallet for everything.
Keep separate wallets for long-term holdings, trading, DeFi, airdrops, and unfamiliar protocols.
@Rabby_io and @phantom are the only wallets I use.
- Don't keep your entire portfolio in one place.
Avoid concentrating all your funds on a single CEX, hot wallet, protocol, or device.
- Don't use public Wi-Fi for crypto activity.
If you work from cafes or coworking spaces, use your phone's personal hotspot instead of connecting to public Wi-Fi networks.
- Protect your seed phrases.
Never store them in screens, cloud storage, emails, or password managers connected to the internet.
If your seed phrase has ever been stored on an internet-connected device - migrate to a fresh wallet NOW!
- Keep secure offline backups.
Store recovery backups somewhere safe, preferably with protection against fire/water and unauthorized access.
I recommend getting a fire-resistant and water-resistant document bag.
- Use a dedicated device for crypto.
Keep your hot wallets and high-value transactions on a separate device.
Don't use it for random downloads, gaming mods, unknown software, or everyday browsing.
- Use a separate browser for wallets.
Keep your wallet browser dedicated to trusted crypto activity.
Avoid unnecessary extensions and random websites.
- Never install cracked software on crypto devices.
Pirated applications, fake installers, and malicious updates can contain wallet-stealing malware.
If you need to run untrusted software, keep it completely isolated from your crypto environment.
- Keep your devices updated.
Update your OS, browser, and wallet software through official sources.
- Remove unnecessary browser extensions.
Even legitimate extensions can become dangerous after a compromised update or ownership change.
Keep only what you absolutely need.
- Stop using Google Search to find crypto websites.
Fake websites and malicious sponsored results can look almost identical to legitimate ones.
Use independently verified official links from bookmarks instead.
- Don't open random links from X or Telegram.
Especially not in the browser where your wallets are installed.
Never!!!
- Secure your CEX accounts.
Use passkeys or hardware security keys where supported.
Enable withdrawal address whitelists and avoid relying on SMS 2FA.
- Consider getting a YubiKey.
A physical security key can help protect your email and exchange accounts against phishing.
Buy only from the official manufacturer sellers.
- Review your Google-connected crypto accounts.
Check which crypto services use Google Sign-In.
Never disconnect your only login method without setting up an alternative first.
- Revoke unnecessary token approvals.
Use @RevokeCash to review and remove permissions you no longer need.
Disconnecting a wallet from a dApp does NOT revoke its token approvals.
- Avoid unlimited token approvals.
Whenever possible, approve only the amount you actually need.
Unlimited allowances can expose much larger balances if a spender is compromised.
- Review Permit2 permissions.
Permit2 signatures can authorize token transfers without a normal on-chain approval transaction.
Review existing allowances and permissions. Some malicious signatures can be exploited long after they're signed.
- Never blindly sign messages.
A signature doesn't need to cost gas to be dangerous.
Never get distracted while signing transactions. Either finish your transactions first or take care of everything else before you start.
Make this a rule.
- Be careful with custom RPC endpoints.
Don't add/delete now unknown RPC URLs.
Use trusted providers and verify network settings independently.
- Understand EIP-7702 authorization risks.
On supported networks, account delegation can grant powerful capabilities to other code.
Never approve an account delegation you don't understand. (That's why Binance was hacked)
- Never copy addresses blindly from transaction history.
Address poisoning attacks can place lookalike addresses in your transaction history.
Verify the full destination address against a trusted source.
- Watch out for clipboard malware.
Malware can replace a copied wallet address with an attacker's address.
Always verify the entire destination address after pasting, preferably on an independent trusted display.
- Verify token contracts and networks.
A familiar ticker or logo doesn't prove a token is legitimate.
Check the contract address and make sure the receiving platform supports the exact asset and network.
- Test large transfers first.
When sending funds to a new destination, start with a small test transaction.
- Ignore unexpected tokens and NFTs.
Random assets appearing in your wallet may contain phishing links or fake reward claims.
Don't interact with them just because they appeared in your balance.
- Don't trust unexpected job offers or collaboration requests.
Fake interviews, partnership offers, and test applications can be used to distribute wallet-stealing malware.
Never run unfamiliar software on your crypto device just to qualify for an opportunity.
- Never run terminal commands you don't understand.
Fake troubleshooting guides, verification pages, and job interviews may ask you to copy and paste commands into your terminal.
One malicious command can compromise your entire device, including your wallets.
- Never trust a QR code blindly.
QR code can contain a malicious website, payment request or an attacker's wallet address.
Avoid scanning unknown QR codes with devices that contain your crypto wallets or other sensitive data.
- Understand bridge and DeFi risks.
Before depositing significant funds, check contract upgradeability, admin privileges, timelocks, and bridge security assumptions.
Audits are useful, but they don't guarantee safety.
- Secure your multisig properly.
If you use @Safe or another multisig, keep signer keys on independent devices.
Review owners, signing thresholds, modules, and guards.
A malicious module may bypass normal multisig approval requirements.
- Monitor your wallets.
Set up alerts for unexpected transfers, approvals, and other sensitive activity where supported.
Use Codex/Claude to vibe-code a simple TG-bot that notifies you whenever something happens in your wallets.
- Have an emergency recovery plan.
Know what to do if a wallet, seed phrase, device, or exchange account is compromised.
If your seed phrase is exposed, move your assets to a new wallet generated from a fresh seed on a trusted device.
Revoking approvals alone won't fix a compromised private key.
- Keep your crypto holdings private.
Avoid publicly revealing wallet balances, screenshots of large portfolios, or details of your security setup.
Don't make yourself an easy target for social engineering or physical theft.
- Protect yourself from SIM swapping.
Attackers can hijack your phone number and intercept SMS verification codes.
Use authenticator apps, passkeys, or hardware security keys instead of SMS wherever possible. Secure your mobile carrier account too.
- Don't blindly trust familiar contacts.
A message from someone you know doesn't mean their account is still under their control.
Verify it through another channel first.
- And one last thing:
You don't need to be paranoid.
You just need to make it much harder for someone to steal what you've spent years building.
Protect your capital before you think about growing it.
Bro, you know what shook me when I was Muslim?
Psalm 22. It is A song written by King David a thousand years before Jesus.
It opens: “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” Of course, these are the exact words Jesus cried from the cross.
But it keeps going, and it describes a scene David never lived:
“They have pierced my hands and my feet.”
“All my bones are out of joint.”
“I can count all my bones - people stare and gloat over me.”
“They divide my garments among them and cast lots for my clothing.”
We know that David was never crucified. Crucifixion didn’t even exist in David’s time. It wouldn’t be invented for centuries.
So how does a man describe such a specific death by piercing hands and feet, and soldiers gambling for his clothes, a thousand years before it happened to Jesus exactly as written?
This was basically a photograph taken a thousand years early. Pierced hands and feet. Gambling for the garments. Mocking crowds. Bones out of joint from hanging.
Every detail, at the foot of the cross, fulfilled.
Islam told me to doubt the crucifixion. Yet, David described it in HD ten centuries before it happened.
The Quran can’t erase an event that was prophesied in that much detail!
🔴 CVE-2026-98432 | Linux Kernel – Critical UAF
Linux çekirdeğinde TCP/IPv4 bağlantı işleme sürecini etkileyen, uzaktan istismar potansiyeline sahip bir Use-After-Free (UAF) açığı tespit edildi.
● CVSS 3.1: 9.8 (Critical)
● Ağ üzerinden istismar
● Kimlik doğrulama gerektirmiyor
● Bellek güvenliği ve sistem kullanılabilirliği riski
Sistem yöneticileri, linux dağıtımlarının güvenlik duyurularını takip ederek yamalı sürümlere geçmelidir.
https://t.co/OumHFjqTXx
الباحث j4ck3lsyn اللي نشر ثغرة PHP، نزّل تغريدة يوضح فيها موقفه بعد الانتقادات،
وخلاصتها: (دزوا أمها)
باختصار يقول: ما سويت شي غير قانوني، وما عندي أي عقد ولا اتفاق مع أي برنامج أو منصة، والعقود الاجتماعية ما لها قيمة في زمننا هذا.. فدزوا أمها.
وهذي بالضبط هي السالفة. الرجّال نشر ثغرة تنفيذ كود عن بعد في PHP، أداة تشغّل نص مواقع الإنترنت، وبكل برود يقول لك أنا ما وقّعت على شي ولا ملزم بشي. ومن الناحية القانونية صح، ما فيه قانون يجبره ينسّق قبل لا ينشر. بس الإفصاح المنسّق (responsible disclosure) ما كان يوم قانون، هو عُرف المجتمع الأمني عشان الجهة المتأثرة تطلّع تحديث قبل لا يصير الاستغلال متاح للكل.
Our IT guy warned us about a critical PHP vulnerability two years ago.
He submitted a report explaining that hackers could potentially take over our servers.
The CTO said there was no proof anyone could exploit it.
Finance rejected the $12,000 security budget.
We closed the ticket.
Yesterday, researchers announced a critical PHP vulnerability.
The CEO demanded to know why nobody saw it coming.
Daniel from IT forwarded his original report.
I immediately opened a disciplinary investigation.
If Daniel knew about the vulnerability for two years, why did he allow the company to remain exposed for two years?
He's now suspended without pay pending investigation.
The CTO received a $25,000 crisis management bonus.
We reward people who solve problems not predict them.
>junior dev at a mid startup
>wednesday morning
>just want to push a minor bugfix to our php app today
>open laptop, check slack
>company group chat is an absolute warzone
>CTO typing in all caps about php2shell
>fucking php
>whatever, server hasn't blown up yet, I just need to get my code in
>open gitlab to merge the PR
>forced emergency logout because of a critical gitlab security patch release
>fucking gitlab
>pipeline fails because of some weird regex compiler bug
>spend 40 minutes fighting CI/CD
>i can just use AI to help debug
>fire up opencode
>api keys nuked because they were breached
>fucking opencode
>i’ll just get fresh LLM api keys from our corp proxy, LiteLLM
>it won’t connect? It’s down?
>look up LiteLLM news: supply chain compromise
>fucking litellm
>cold sweat forming
>slack alert: db connection error
>check our database connection
>we host on TiDB Cloud
>they just announced a security breach, unauthorized access via stolen service account credentials, data copied
>fucking tidb cloud
>full panic attack incoming
>figure fuck it, just ship the container to Railway and go home
>open Railway dashboard
>bright red banner: "Security Disclosure: Rotate all environment variables immediately. All builds paused."
>fucking railway
>try to open the app URL in browser to see if anything is even working
>NET::ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID
>eMudhra intermediate certificates compromised
>4
>instantly untrusted by every major browser
>fucking emudhra
>stare blankly at mac screen for 10min
>random pop-up
>restarting in 10min to fix a critical vulnerability
>fucking macos
>close laptop
>leave office
>never come back
The big question being asked in cyber security circles right now?
"Was eMudhra intentionally keeping their keys within a small numerical range in order to keep them easy to exploit, so that they could then sell access to backend systems secured by eMudhra as a darkweb service?"
We can call it Black October for the security breaches:
Oct 21:
• PHP2Shell
• Railway
• Node.js
• LiteLLM
• GitLab
• SBI
• eMudhra
Oct 20:
• Plex2Shell
• SiteGuard
• Siemens
Oct 19:
• OVHcloud CLI
Oct 17:
• Opencode
Every Indian needs to know about this because it is a massive deal for how we trust anything on the internet.
Let me explain.
When you open your bank's website, there's a small padlock next to the web address. That padlock means two things.
First, that you're talking to your real bank.
And second that nobody can read what you type, like your password.
So how does your browser know the website is real?
It checks the website's certificate. Think of it like an ID card for a website.
Your Aadhaar is trusted because the government issued it. A website's ID card is trusted because a certificate authority issued it.
A certificate authority, or CA, is a company that browsers like Chrome, Firefox and Safari already trust. If a CA says "yes, this really is this bank's website," your browser believes it and shows the padlock.
eMudhra is an Indian CA. It's a big one, with more than 60 million certificates issued over the years.
So how does a CA sign these ID cards?
Every CA has a secret number called a private key. It uses that number to put a stamp on each certificate.
Your browser checks the stamp to confirm it really came from that CA.
The whole system only works if that number is impossible to guess.
For the type of key in this story, it's supposed to be around 116 digits long.
Every computer on Earth working together for billions of years wouldn't be able to guess a number like that, just because of the sheer combinations that exist.
But here's what happened.
On October 17, Mozilla got a report that the private keys behind eight eMudhra certificates had been compromised.
The report came through a person called Wayne on Google's Chrome team.
The keys weren't 116 digits long.
All eight keys were smaller than 256. Security researcher Scott Helme found that one of them was just the number 4. Others were 66, 155, 156, 230 and 237.
So anyone could break them by trying 256 numbers. A basic laptop does that in less than a second.
Mozilla didn't need to know how Wayne did it. Its own team recovered the keys within two hours. Since then, several other people have found them on their own too.
To understand the gravity of the problem, a bad actor could make fake ID cards for any website they want.
Your bank, your email, a government portal.
Browsers that trusted eMudhra would have checked the fake stamp and shown the padlock like everything was fine.
If someone could get between you and the internet, say on public Wi-Fi, they could show you a fake site with a real-looking padlock and read or change what you send.
eMudhra says a script used during its key creation process back in April 2025 had a flaw. It made a second, much weaker set of keys, and those were used by mistake to create the certificates.
That means these weak keys were there for about a year and a half before anyone caught it. eMudhra says the person who found it may have used AI-assisted techniques.
The good news is that the response was fast.
Mozilla received the report at 8:06 pm UTC on October 17 and had pushed a block to Firefox users by 10:59 pm.
Google, Apple and Microsoft have also blocked these certificates for their users.
eMudhra revoked all eight the next morning and stopped issuing new certificates from the affected root.
Mozilla is now removing that root certificate from Firefox's trusted list altogether.
But there's still a lot of clean-up to do.
Browsers are mostly covered. But plenty of apps, servers and backend systems don't check these block lists. They need software updates to stop trusting the bad certificates, and some of those updates are still pending.
Real websites that used eMudhra are also affected. Yash Kadakia, founder of Security Brigade, estimates around 30,000 legitimate certificates will need to be moved over. A lot of those are likely Indian businesses and services.
See, we're moving our whole lives online, UPI, banking, tax filing, DigiLocker, government services.
All of it rests on this invisible layer of trust.
So, when an Indian company that's trusted by every major browser makes a mistake this basic, it hurts how the world sees Indian digital infrastructure.
This has happened before, and it went very badly.
In 2011, a Dutch CA called DigiNotar was hacked, and fake Google certificates were used to spy on people in Iran.
Browsers stopped trusting it completely, and the company shut down soon after.
For now, here's what you can do. Keep your browser and apps updated on your phone and laptop.
Be careful on public Wi-Fi. Type your bank's website address yourself instead of clicking links.
eMudhra still owes India a clear, public explanation of how a key that protects millions of people ended up being the number 4.
I think Muslims need to understand something uncomfortable.
Non-Muslims do not owe Muhammad their respect. They do not believe he was a prophet, and some do not even consider him a good man. You can disagree with them, but you cannot demand that they see him the way you do.
Your reverence for someone does not create an obligation for the rest of the world to revere him.
So, are we going to kill everyone who insults Muhammad, or are we going to learn to practise our religion in a world where not everyone shares our beliefs?
Because the world is not going to become Muslim just to protect our feelings.
We have two choices: learn to live with our differences or spend our lives fighting a world we cannot control.
You cannot force people to love your prophet by making them afraid to criticise him. You can only teach them to fear those who claim to love him.