Breachrr

Credential exposure monitoring for companies that can't afford to get breached. We find what attackers already have.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

We built Breachrr to answer one question: what do attackers already know about your company?

The free audit at https://t.co/SgIIaeHiwO scans your domain against breach databases, public code repositories, and certificate transparency logs. Real findings. Real risk score. No account required.

Here’s what it looks like. 👇

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

Yes…with the right understanding of what biometrics actually protect against. Biometrics solve the authentication problem. They don’t solve the credential exposure problem. Your fingerprint doesn’t get leaked in a breach database, but the session token generated after you authenticate does. For organizations: biometrics are one layer, not the whole answer.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

The cloud account compromise is the credential story here. Hijacked AWS, GCP, and Azure instances don’t appear from nowhere, someone’s access keys or service account credentials were already exposed.
The email proxy network is what they built with the access. The credential theft happened first.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

The vulnerability class matters more than the specific tool here. AI agents processing untrusted content, issue bodies, PR descriptions, comments and having access to CI/CD secrets is a trust boundary problem that applies across every agentic workflow, not just this one. Prompt injection as a secret exfiltration vector is going to be a recurring theme as more pipelines add AI agents. The mitigation pattern, restricting what the agent can access, is the right instinct but hard to enforce at scale.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

The most dangerous credential isn’t the one that was just stolen. It’s the one that was stolen two years ago, never rotated, and is still valid today.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

The dependency chain problem in one sentence: you don’t have to trust the attacker, just one package that trusts them. The AI angle is real but secondary. The fundamental issue is that most organizations have no visibility into what their dependencies are actually doing at install time. Lower barriers to malicious package creation just increases the volume of a problem that was already hard to defend.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

Most companies don’t know what attackers already have on them. A credential from 2021 that’s still valid. A password reused across a personal and corporate account. An API key pushed to a public repo six months ago.

Quiet exposure. Real risk.
That’s the gap we close.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

The security stack your clients have and the security posture they actually have are two different things.

Antivirus. EDR. Email filtering. Backup. All ticked. And somewhere in a breach database, the CFO’s credentials from a 2022 LinkedIn scrape are sitting next to their corporate email address. Tools don’t find that. Monitoring does.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

Magento stores hold payment data, customer credentials, and order history. Unauthenticated RCE means an attacker doesn’t need a foothold, they walk straight in. CISA’s June 6 deadline isn’t a suggestion. If you or any of your clients are running Mirasvit Cache Warmer, patch today. KEV listings mean active exploitation is already confirmed.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

NTLMv2 hash capture isn’t just a stepping stone to the password. In relay attacks the hash itself is the credential, it can authenticate to other systems on the network without ever being cracked. A malicious link, a leaked hash, lateral movement across the internal network. No malware required.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

Hugging Face API calls as exfiltration infrastructure. Legitimate endpoint, expected traffic pattern for ML workloads, nearly invisible in standard monitoring unless you know what you’re looking for. The defender callout is the most actionable thing here: unexpected huggingface[.]co/api calls from non-ML processes are the tell. That’s a detection rule worth adding today.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

The average startup has credentials in more places than anyone on the team can name.
GitHub repos. CI/CD pipelines. Third-party APIs. Contractor laptops. Slack messages from 18 months ago. The .env file someone committed by accident and “fixed” with a new commit.

Fixing the commit doesn’t rotate the credential.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

Non-expiring refresh tokens are the credential that keeps giving. Unlike passwords, they survive password resets. Unlike session tokens, they don’t time out.
29,000 weekly downloads over a month. Every developer who installed 0.1.82 or later should assume their Codex auth is compromised and revoke immediately, not reset their password, revoke the token.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

The @redhat-cloud-services supply chain attack in real time. Socket’s scanner flagging 0% supply chain security on tsc-transform-imports, known malware, install scripts, confirmed compromise. This is the same campaign Microsoft flagged earlier today; preinstall hooks harvesting npm tokens, GitHub credentials, AWS keys, and SSH keys across 90+ packages. If this namespace is anywhere in your dependency tree, rotate credentials now. Don’t wait for a full audit to start rotating.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

npm tokens, GitHub credentials, AWS keys, SSH keys, all four leaving through a preinstall hook before the package even finishes installing. The self-propagating element is what makes this serious beyond the initial 90 packages. Every infected package becomes a new delivery mechanism. If any of these touched your environment; assume compromise, rotate everything, in that order.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

Most SMBs treat a data breach like a weather event. Something that happens to other people, until it happens to them.

The difference between companies that recover quickly and those that don’t usually isn’t the breach itself. It’s whether they knew what was exposed before it happened.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

The interview task lure works because it has a legitimate reason to ask you to run unfamiliar code. “Clone this repo, check out this branch, install these dependencies” is normal onboarding language. That’s what makes it effective. Developers: any interview task that requires installing specific packages or checking out non-main branches deserves the same scrutiny as an unsolicited email attachment.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

An authentication bypass on VPN infrastructure is a credential problem without the credential. Attackers don’t need a stolen password if the authentication layer fails entirely. For MSPs managing PAN-OS deployments across multiple clients: patch or mitigate before the end of the day. Active exploitation means the window is already closing.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

Takedowns are good news. But 17 million infected devices means 17 million credential harvesting events that already happened. The botnet is offline. The credentials it collected aren’t. Dismantling the infrastructure doesn’t rotate the passwords and tokens that left during the infection window.

[Breachrr @Breachrr]

Dependency confusion works because package managers trust scope names that look internal. The packages don’t need to be sophisticated, they just need to install before the real one does. Environment variables and developer context leaving on first install. API keys, tokens, and internal endpoint URLs collected before anyone notices the wrong package ran.