When U.S. President @realDonaldTrump said to every country that submits to him, including Taiwan, that they “kissing my ass,” I have to say to #Trump, “FUCK YOURSELF.”
Taiwan's Swift Capitulation in US Trade Dispute Raises Questions About Strategic Autonomy
In a surprising development that has international trade analysts questioning Taiwan's strategic positioning, Foreign Minister @chia_lung confirmed that #Taiwan has been included in the list of 75 countries receiving a 90-day tariff reprieve from the @realDonaldTrump administration. This confirmation comes as mounting evidence suggests Taiwan may have made significant concessions to secure this temporary relief, potentially compromising its economic sovereignty in the process.
Taiwan's Hasty Concessions Reveal Negotiating Weakness
Taiwan's approach to the U.S. tariff threat appears to reflect a position of weakness rather than strategic partnership. President @ChingteLai quickly published a "roadmap for deepening U.S.-Taiwan economic relations" in @Bloomberg, outlining five major concessions to the U.S. These include reducing all tariffs between Taiwan and the U.S., expanding purchases of American energy, agricultural, industrial, and military products, increasing investment in the United States, eliminating non-tariff trade barriers, and addressing U.S. concerns about high-tech export controls and transshipment issues.
The speed and comprehensive nature of these offers suggests Taiwan immediately adopted a conciliatory posture rather than standing firm in negotiations. Unlike other economic powers that might have leveraged their position, Taiwan preemptively offered significant economic benefits to the U.S. without securing guaranteed reciprocity.
Questionable Negotiating Position: "On the List" But to What End?
While Foreign Minister Lin confirmed Taiwan is among countries receiving temporary relief, the actual negotiating position remains concerning. Deputy Chief Trade Negotiator Yen Hui-hsin revealed Taiwan had merely "signed up" for negotiations a few days prior, suggesting Taiwan was not prioritized in America's strategic calculations.
Taiwan's eagerness to emphasize that they've "made preparations" and "established communication channels" with the U.S. indicates they're negotiating from a position of desperation rather than mutual respect. When legislators inquired about Taiwan's negotiating order within the 90-day window, Yen acknowledged that America would determine priority based on its own interests and the size of trade deficits, effectively admitting Taiwan lacks negotiating leverage.
Energy Concessions as Taiwan's Primary Bargaining Chip
Taiwan appears to be relying heavily on energy investments and purchases as its primary negotiating card. Lin specifically highlighted Taiwan's intention to purchase natural gas from Alaska and mentioned that CPC Corporation has signed a memorandum of cooperation for exploration with Alaskan companies.
This over-reliance on energy concessions suggests Taiwan lacks a comprehensive negotiating strategy beyond simply increasing purchases to reduce its trade surplus with the United States. While energy cooperation may benefit both sides, placing such emphasis on a single sector reveals the limited options available to Taiwan's negotiators.
The Navarro Factor: Zero Tariffs May Not Be Enough
Although Taiwan has proposed a zero-tariff framework similar to Vietnam, the reception from key U.S. trade officials should give Taiwan pause. White House trade advisor Peter Navarro has publicly dismissed similar zero-tariff offers from other countries, stating that "non-tariff cheating" remains a critical concern.
While Navarro's comments were primarily directed at Vietnam, they reflect a broader administration perspective that mere tariff elimination is insufficient. His emphasis on issues like transshipment, intellectual property theft, and value-added taxes as forms of "non-tariff cheating" indicates Taiwan's simple zero-tariff proposal may face significant skepticism.
Before departure, my plans suddenly changed—from Izu to Lake #Kawaguchi—and I ended up stumbling upon the #FireworksFestival 🎆! Braving the cold wind and standing on a bridge at -3°C, I managed to capture this rare and unforgettable scene.
The last time I visited #Kyoto, I wanted to stop by #Kinkaku-ji, but unfortunately, I couldn’t make it due to its relatively remote location, far from subway and train stations.
This time, I unexpectedly found a chance to take a bus to see Kinkaku-ji, a gleaming golden Buddhist temple located at the foot of Kyoto’s Kitayama mountains. Officially named #Rokuon-ji, Kinkaku-ji was built in 1397 by the order of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, the third shogun of the Muromachi shogunate. Originally intended as his retirement villa, Yoshimitsu incorporated elements of classical Chinese garden design into its construction, making the temple a masterpiece of Heian-era architectural aesthetics.
After Yoshimitsu’s death, the villa was converted into a Zen Buddhist temple and renamed Rokuon-ji, symbolizing his devotion to Buddhism. The temple’s main hall, known as the Golden Pavilion (Shariden), got its popular name “Kinkaku-ji” due to its exterior being covered in gold leaf.
In 1950, the Shariden was completely destroyed in an arson attack by a young monk. This incident shocked Japanese society and inspired Yukio Mishima’s iconic novel The Temple of the Golden Pavilion. Through the protagonist’s extreme obsession with beauty, the novel explores profound human contradictions and destruction, while reflecting the spiritual crisis of postwar Japan. Kinkaku-ji was rebuilt in 1955 and underwent a major restoration in 1987, during which its gold leaf was reapplied.
前回 #京都 を訪れた際、#金閣寺 を見に行きたいと思っていましたが、残念ながら地下鉄や鉄道の駅から距離があり、行くことができませんでした。
今回は偶然にも時間ができ、バスで金閣寺を訪れることができました。この寺院は、京都の北山の麓に位置する金色に輝く仏教寺院で、正式名称は #鹿苑寺(ろくおんじ)です。金閣寺は1397年、室町幕府第3代将軍・足利義満の命によって建設されました。当初は義満が隠居後に余生を過ごすための別荘として建てられ、中国の古典的な庭園設計の理念が取り入れられたことで、平安時代の建築美学の代表的な作品となりました。
義満の死後、この別荘は禅宗の寺院に改築され、「鹿苑寺」と命名されました。この名前には、義満の仏法への追求が込められています。寺院の中心的な建物である舎利殿は、その外壁が金箔で覆われていることから「金閣寺」と呼ばれるようになりました。
1950年、舎利殿は若い僧侶による放火で全焼しました。この事件は日本社会に衝撃を与え、三島由紀夫の名作小説『金閣寺』の創作のきっかけともなりました。この小説は、主人公の美への極端な追求を通じて、人間の矛盾や破壊を深く掘り下げると同時に、戦後日本社会の精神的危機をも反映しています。金閣寺は1955年に再建され、1987年には全面修復が行われ、再び金箔が施されました。
上一次到京都時,就想到金閣寺來逛逛,很可惜地,因為位置方向距離各個地鐵與火車站都較遠,最終沒能看到。
這次也是意外地突然可以撥空搭乘公車去看金閣寺,這是一座在京都北山腳下金光閃閃的佛教寺廟,正式名稱其實是鹿苑寺。金閣寺建於1397年,由室町幕府第三代將軍足利義滿下令修建,原是他退隱後安享晚年的別墅。義滿將中國古典園林設計理念融入其中,使這座寺廟成為平安時代建築美學的代表作之一。
義滿去世後,這座別墅被改建為禪宗寺廟,並命名為鹿苑寺,意在寄託其對佛法的追求。寺廟的核心建築——舍利殿因外牆覆蓋金箔而得名「金閣寺」。
1950年,舍利殿因一名年輕僧侶的縱火而被完全焚毀,這場火災震驚日本社會,也成為三島由紀夫經典小說《金閣寺》的創作靈感。這本以金閣寺為名的小說,透過探討主人公對美的極端追求,深掘人性深處的矛盾與毀滅,同樣折射了戰後日本社會的精神危機。金閣寺於1955年被重建,並在1987年進行了全面修復,重新貼上金箔。
This is my second trip to #Kyoto. My first stop was #Kiyomizu-dera, one of the attractions I missed out on last time. However, this time my Kyoto experience wasn’t very pleasant. Compared to the Kyoto I visited right after COVID-19 restrictions were lifted, the number of tourists now is even more staggering—so much so that the temple feels less like a tranquil spiritual site and more like an entire commercial district.
From the various food stalls lining both sides of the temple to the upscale beauty shops and chain stores along Sannenzaka and Ninenzaka, there’s a constant buzz in multiple languages. Everyone is busy snapping photos in hopes of going viral on social media.
When I met up with my friends in Kyoto, I couldn’t help but complain, “If I lived here, I’d be completely fed up with the quality of these tourists. They have no interest in understanding our culture or respecting the proper etiquette for visiting temples and shrines—they’re selfishly parading their own culture and trampling all over our traditions.”
Such tourists aren’t uncommon even among visitors from developed countries. All I can say is that when we travel abroad, we’re not just representing ourselves; others see us as representatives of our home country, and our every action can shape local perceptions of that nation.
During my two days in Kyoto, I found myself missing the tranquility and serenity of Hiroshima—the kind of peaceful state that allows one to truly settle one’s mind.
這是我第二次到 #京都。第一站就前往了 #清水寺,這也是我上次沒有機會遊覽的景點之一。然而,這次的京都體驗並不好,比起上一次COVID-19疫情剛解封時的京都,這次的遊客人數更嚇人,與其說這是一間寺廟,不如說是一整片的商業區。
從寺前兩旁的各種美食攤位,到三年坂、二年坂的高規格服務的保養品、連鎖品牌的商家,嘰嘰喳喳的,全是各種語言的此起彼落。大家舉著相機,拼命地拍出各種能在社交平台上爆紅的照片。
當和我在京都的朋友見面時,我忍不住抱怨,「如果我是這裡的居民,我肯定對於這樣的遊客素質感到厭惡。你們根本沒有想要了解我們的文化,也沒有尊重我們進寺廟或神社的各種禮儀,只自私地帶著自己國家的文化來這裡四處『踐踏』」。
這樣的遊客不乏來自先進發達國家的遊客們。我只想說,當我們出國在外,代表的不只是自己,別人也不會把你當作個個體,你代表的是你所來自的國家,你的一舉一動都可能足以影響當地人對這個國家隊看法。
在京都的兩天裡,我更懷念廣島的寧靜與幽靜,那種可以沉澱自己心靈的狀態。
これは私の京都への2回目の訪問です。最初の目的地として清水寺に向かいましたが、これは前回訪れる機会がなかったスポットの一つです。しかし、今回は、COVID-19の規制が解除された直後の京都と比べると、京都での体験はあまり良いものではありませんでした。今回の観光客の数はさらに衝撃的で、寺院というよりも、まるで一帯の商業地区のように感じられます。
寺の前の両側には様々なグルメ屋台が並び、三年坂や二年坂には高品質の化粧品店やチェーン店が軒を連ね、あちこちでさまざまな言語が飛び交っています。皆、カメラを手にして、SNSでバズるような写真を必死に撮っています。
京都で友人たちと会った際、つい口にしてしまいました。「もし私がここに住んでいたら、こんな観光客の質に本当にうんざりするだろう。皆は私たちの文化を理解しようともしないし、寺院や神社に入る際の礼儀も守らない。ただ自分の国の文化を持ち込んで、ここで勝手に『踏みにじる』だけだ」と。
こうした観光客は、先進国からの訪問者にも少なくありません。海外に出る際、私たちは単に個人としてではなく、自国を代表しているのだということを改めて感じます。あなたの一挙手一投足が、現地の人々にあなたの国に対する印象を大きく左右する可能性があるのです。
京都での2日間、私はより一層、心を落ち着かせることができる広島の静寂と穩定さを恋しく感じました。
This is my second visit to #FushimiInariTaisha. The last time I came, it was close to dusk, so I only managed to wander around the entrance. This time, however, I had enough time to climb all the way up. As many of my friends know, I really hate climbing stairs—I always ask in advance if there will be many steps when hiking. Yet this time, I was able to ascend from the base, camera and video recorder in hand, passing through thousands of torii gates ⛩️ until I finally stopped when I was about 10 minutes from the summit. By then, it was already 5 PM and the sky was darkening, so I had to rest briefly before descending along the same route. This was probably the greatest physical challenge I’ve faced in recent times.
這是我第二次來到伏見稻荷大社,上一次由於時間接近傍晚,因此我只有在門口晃了晃,這次則有時間一路往上爬。熟悉我的朋友都知道,我非常討厭爬樓梯,只要是爬山,我一定提前先詢問有沒有很多階梯。然而,這一次我卻能一路從山底爬著階梯,甚至帶著相機與攝影機,穿過千百個鳥居⛩️,直到距離山頂剩10分鐘路程時才停下來。那時,已是傍晚5時,天色漸暗,只好休息片刻後,原路下山。這大概是這陣子以來,在體力上突破最大的一次。
これは私が #伏見稲荷大社 に来たのは二度目です。前回は夕方に近い時間だったため、境内の入り口辺りだけを散策するに留まりましたが、今回はしっかりと登る時間がありました。私をよく知る友人はご存じの通り、私は階段を登るのが本当に嫌いで、山に登る前には必ず「階段がたくさんあるか?」と確認します。しかし、今回は山の麓から階段を登り、カメラとビデオカメラを持って何百もの鳥居⛩️をくぐり抜け、山頂まであと10分のところでようやく止まりました。その時にはすでに午後5時になり、空がだんだん暗くなってきたので、しばらく休憩した後、同じ道を下山しました。これが、ここ最近で最も体力的に大きな挑戦だったと思います。
On this trip to #Japan 🇯🇵, #Uji was an unexpected stop—I hadn’t planned to visit, and I only booked it the night before because it happened to be on the JR Nara Line.
Before heading off to see Nara’s annual Yamayaki festival, I had the chance to experience the charm of this matcha city. The matcha here is far superior to what you’d find at chain stores; it turns out that, like good coffee, quality #matcha 🍵 isn’t bitter at all! And the set isn’t expensive either—it’s around 800 to 1000 yen.
這次的日本🇯🇵之旅,宇治是個意外,原本沒有預計的行程,前一天晚上才訂的,因為剛好在JR奈良線上。
在去看奈良一年一度的燒山祭前,體驗了這個抹茶🍵之城的魅力。這裡的抹茶品質比起連鎖店好太多了,原來好的抹茶和好的咖啡一樣,是不苦的!這樣一個set也不貴,約800-1000日圓左右。
今回の #日本 🇯🇵 旅行では、#宇治 は予期せぬ訪問先となりました。もともと予定しておらず、前の晩に急遽予約しただけなのですが、ちょうどJR奈良線沿いにあったからです。
奈良で開催される年に一度の山焼祭に行く前に、この #抹茶 🍵の街の魅力を体験しました。ここの抹茶は、チェーン店のものと比べるとはるかに質が高く、良い抹茶は良いコーヒーと同じく、苦くないことが分かりました。そして、このセットも決して高価ではなく、約800~1000円ほどでした。
Tsai Ing-wen Gets Trump on Her Side?
Former President of the Republic of China Tsai Ing-wen (@iingwen) recently claimed in an exclusive interview with Britain’s @TheTimes, “I led #Taiwan for eight years — this is how I kept Trump on my side,” which even became the headline of the report. What the media — who have lauded her as an “international negotiation expert” — failed to mention was how she weakly handled relations with the United States, whether during Trump (@realDonaldTrump) ’s first term or under Biden.
Tsai Ing-wen’s Apprehension in Speaking with Trump
In December 2016, then-President Tsai Ing-wen, who had been in office for just over six months, stated that she had called the newly elected U.S. President Trump to congratulate him on his victory. This phone call, lasting over ten minutes, marked the first direct dialogue between the leaders of Taiwan and the United States in 37 years, and it instantly became an international hot topic. However, at the end of August 2018, Stephen Yates (@steveyates) — then an advisor to Trump’s transition team and former deputy national security adviser under former U.S. Vice President Cheney — revealed some behind‑the‑scenes details in an interview. He mentioned that Tsai’s government was extremely panicked when faced with that call, not even knowing how to respond at first, and ultimately delayed connecting for two weeks.
Yates stated that during that U.S. presidential election, both Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and Republican candidate Trump had their teams receive call invitations from various countries, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China was no exception. Trump’s aides believed that a call with Tsai could bring both benefits and risks, so they sought Yates’s opinion. From a business perspective, given that Taiwan is an important buyer of American weapons and high-tech products, Yates argued, “When a customer sends their congratulations, you naturally have to answer the phone!” Therefore, he advocated for supporting the call. However, in order to avoid attracting too much media attention, Trump’s aides ultimately attributed the decision to Yates’s personal judgment. Yates emphasized that although the “Trump–Tsai call” was not solely brokered by him, without his influence this historic conversation might never have taken place.
Yates also mentioned that the Taiwanese authorities had not anticipated that Trump would accept the invitation. Having long been accustomed to being rebuffed, Tsai’s government was completely caught off guard when faced with this invitation. Ultimately, Taiwan’s officials in the U.S. had to repeatedly consult with Taipei’s top leadership, and this hesitation resulted in the call being delayed by a full two weeks.
The Negotiations with the U.S. and the @WTO That Cost Taiwan Its Advantage
Tsai Ing-wen’s weakness in negotiations with the United States can actually be traced back to the late 1980s. At that time, Taiwan was facing trade negotiation pressures from administrations ranging from Reagan to George H. W. Bush. The United States, citing rampant piracy in Taiwan, invoked Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act to impose trade sanctions and economic pressure on Taiwan. According to data from Yazhou Zhoukan, in 1984 Tsai Ing-wen became the chief legal advisor for the International Economic Organization of the Executive Yuan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, and she served as the chief negotiator for Taiwan’s accession to both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) for fifteen years — a fact also cited by @DeutscheWelle.
In 2021, Tsai Ing-wen posted photos from over 30 years ago on Twitter and said, “These are my colleagues who sat at the negotiating table beside me more than 30 years ago, who dedicated everything for Taiwan on the international stage. Looking back, I am very grateful that I once served as a trade negotiator, creating a more prosperous future for the country.”
In the same year (1986) that Tsai represented the then Lee Teng-hui administration in trade negotiations with the United States, under pressure from the U.S., the Lee Teng-hui administration abolished the “Regulations on the Import Management of Foreign Films” issued by the Presidential Office in 1954, effectively lifting restrictions on the importation of foreign films. This move was tantamount to opening the door to Hollywood, and the number of foreign films imported into Taiwan began to increase — from 462 films in 1986 to 532 in 1987. This series of chain reactions eventually resulted in foreign films accounting for over 70% of Taiwan’s box office market by 2005, while the average production cost of domestic films was only about 1% of that of Hollywood films.
During the same period of negotiations, also under pressure from U.S. trade demands, McDonald’s was permitted to enter Taiwan in 1984. According to former Minister of Economic Affairs Yin Chih-ming, in 1984 U.S. exports to Taiwan accounted for as much as 48.8% of Taiwan’s total exports, with a U.S. trade surplus of 9.8 billion dollars, and the American side demanded a reduction in this deficit. At that time, the U.S. Deputy Trade Representative was none other than Robert Lighthizer, who later became the U.S. Trade Representative during Trump’s first term and initiated the trade war against China.
After 2000, Tsai Ing-wen was recruited by the Chen Shui-bian government — following a change in the ruling party — to serve as the head of the Mainland Affairs Council, and she continued to lead the negotiations for Taiwan’s accession to the WTO. In 2002, Taiwan became the 144th member of the WTO under the name “the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.” However, after Taiwan joined the WTO, the agricultural liberalization policies led to a series of problems. Initially, adjustments in rice import quotas and market opening posed potential impacts on the domestic rice industry, which in turn affected farmers’ willingness to produce, leaving some farmland idle. Subsequently, fluctuations in the market prices of agricultural products and rising credit risks for agricultural associations reflected challenges in the production and marketing system. Later, government efforts to facilitate a shift to organic farming did not meet expectations, and the scale of organic agriculture remained very small. Ultimately, this resulted in a vicious cycle of “policy liberalization — small farmers exiting — land hoarding.”
According to a report by Storm Media, Huang Weiji, Secretary-General of the Textile Expansion Association, stated, “After we joined the WTO, it took us a hard-earned decade to negotiate consultations with various countries. We originally thought we could face a completely liberalized market competition, only to discover that there were many loopholes — for instance, the United States and Central American countries had signed Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that allowed for zero tariffs on exported goods.” In terms of regional economic integration, the influence of certain trade organizations even surpassed that of the WTO. For example, in Europe, economic integration driven by the European Union (EU) has been notably effective; in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN Economic Community facilitates intra‑regional trade; in North America, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has achieved economic integration; and in Africa, the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) has strengthened regional cooperation. In recent years, with the implementation of new trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), these regional economic alliances have played an increasingly significant role in promoting trade and investment among their members.
From TSMC’s U.S. Plant to the Importation of Ractopamine Pork, Tsai Ing-wen’s Floundering Negotiations
Tsai Ing-wen’s involvement in or leadership of failed trade negotiations does not end there. Since assuming office as President of the Republic of China in 2016, Tsai Ing-wen has made “strengthening Taiwan–U.S. relations” a core objective of her foreign policy. However, beginning in 2019 the Trump administration pressured TSMC to build a plant in the United States, and in May 2020 forced TSMC to officially announce plans to establish a new facility in Arizona. Media reports even identified then-President Tsai Ing-wen as the person behind the scenes.
Even before the Arizona facility was established, in 1996 TSMC, through a joint venture with Philips and other investors, founded WaferTech in Camas, Washington (near the Oregon border), later renamed TSMC Washington. This $1‑billion plant began producing 0.35‑micron chips in 1998 using technology transferred from Philips. However, the plant’s specific financial performance has never been disclosed, suggesting that it may face profitability challenges. Subsequently, TSMC’s operations in Arizona are currently facing production costs that are 30% higher than those at its facilities in Taiwan.
In Taiwan, TSMC is regarded as the “guardian deity” of the nation. As the global leader in semiconductor foundries, TSMC’s advanced processes — such as 5‑nanometer, 3‑nanometer, and even future 2‑nanometer technologies — account for over 90% of the world’s advanced chips. These chips serve as the core components in key products including smartphones, computers, automobiles, artificial intelligence systems, and defense systems. Consequently, governments around the world and major technology companies heavily rely on TSMC’s capacity and technological prowess, creating a deterrent of “economic national defense.” Moreover, TSMC’s steadily rising revenues and profits have not only established Taiwan as a critical hub of the global semiconductor industry but have also generated substantial tax revenues for the government. With robust financial performance — its gross margins often hovering around 50% — TSMC serves as a stabilizer in Taiwan’s economy, a veritable “economic bedrock” among private enterprises.
However, in the negotiations led by Tsai Ing-wen, she too readily accepted U.S. pressure to build a plant in the United States — contrary to establishing domestic facilities — merely to align with the “America First” principle. Meanwhile, the Taiwan she represents has reaped no tangible benefits from this arrangement, such as a Taiwan–U.S. free trade agreement, accession to the CPTPP, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the United States, or Taiwan’s inclusion in international organizations… and so on.
Moreover, at the end of Trump’s first term, the Tsai administration attempted to reopen negotiations for the Taiwan–U.S. Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) by opening the market to U.S. pork containing ractopamine (commonly referred to as the “ractopamine pork policy”), emphasizing that this move was “based on the overall national economic interest” and aimed at “deepening Taiwan–U.S. economic and trade relations.” This policy was interpreted as a response to long-standing U.S. pressure on Taiwan to open its markets and an effort to trade food safety risks for U.S. support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations (such as the CPTPP). However, the announcement of the policy triggered strong public backlash, with the populace widely questioning the legitimacy of the government “trading food safety for diplomacy.”
Despite the Tsai administration’s claim that opening up to ractopamine pork was meant to pave the way for restarting TIFA negotiations, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) subsequently did not significantly accelerate bilateral economic and trade talks. It was not until June 2021 that Taiwan and the U.S. convened a TIFA meeting after a five‑year hiatus, and that meeting focused on technical issues (such as intellectual property rights and drug approval processes) without addressing a free trade agreement (FTA) or providing substantive support for Taiwan’s accession to the CPTPP. In other words, the “progress” in Taiwan–U.S. relations obtained by taking on food safety risks amounted to little more than symbolic dialogue, lacking concrete results.
The ractopamine pork policy provoked a strong public outcry. Although the “anti‑ractopamine pork referendum” held in December 2021 did not pass, it still garnered 4 million affirmative votes (accounting for 41% of the total votes), reflecting widespread public distrust in the policy. Furthermore, local governments (such as those in Taipei and Taichung) independently set “zero-detection” standards, resulting in conflicts between central and local regulations and exposing deficiencies in policy communication and support measures. The Tsai administration’s allocation of a “10‑billion pig industry fund” to quell the controversy was also criticized as a vote‑buying tactic that failed to fundamentally address the industry’s challenges.
Taiwan has long promoted “high‑standard food safety” as a key element of its international image, yet the decision to open up to ractopamine pork is seen as a unilateral concession to the United States, thereby undermining Taiwan’s authority to insist on “adhering to scientific standards” in international negotiations. For example, following the issue of lifting the ban on Fukushima food in Japan, some commentators questioned, “If Taiwan can sacrifice food safety for the United States, why can’t it, by the same logic, accept Japan’s nuclear‑contaminated food?” This contradiction, in turn, undermines Taiwan’s consistency in international economic and trade negotiations.
Another point of contention came during the debate over the ractopamine pork referendum. Li Chun — then the senior deputy executive director of the WTO and RTA Center at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, who represented the Tsai administration in supporting the import of ractopamine pork (later serving as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and currently as Taiwan’s Ambassador to the EU and Belgium) — stated that “if Taiwan decides not to open up to ractopamine pork, it would be like taking a step backwards and breaking its promise, making accession to the CPTPP even more difficult.”
Ironically, the Tsai administration pinned its hopes for participating in the CPTPP on U.S. support, yet during Trump’s term the U.S. withdrew from the precursor to the CPTPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which significantly diminished America’s influence within the CPTPP. Even though the Biden administration has declared its intention to “re-engage in the Asia‑Pacific,” its policy focus has been on the Indo‑Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) rather than on the CPTPP. In other words, Taiwan’s reliance on the United States for its CPTPP hopes was a misjudgment of the international economic and trade landscape. Moreover, while the Tsai administration claimed that “opening up to ractopamine pork is to comply with international standards and secure accession to the CPTPP,” the process for joining the CPTPP requires consensus among all member states, and major members such as Japan, Australia, and Canada base their support for Taiwan not solely on a single issue (such as U.S. pork) but also on the strategic balance of their relations with China. For instance, although Japan is favorable toward Taiwan’s accession to the CPTPP, it also must consider Sino‑Japanese economic interests, making it difficult to fully endorse Taiwan.
Although Trump enacted several pro‑Taiwan laws during his first term (such as the Taiwan Travel Act and the Taiwan Assurance Act), his core foreign policy centered on “America First,” and his support for Taiwan was driven by a “cost–benefit” calculation. For example, while U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have become routine, their prices have repeatedly reached record highs (such as the sale of 66 F‑16V fighter jets in 2020, with a total value of NT$62 billion), leading to accusations that Taiwan is being treated as an “arsenal ATM.” The Trump administration demanded that Taiwan open its markets to U.S. pork and beef, yet made no commitment to support Taiwan’s accession to international organizations, indicating that it views Taiwan–U.S. relations as a “one‑way transfer of benefits” rather than an equal partnership.
The Tsai administration has framed its foreign policy around a pro‑U.S., anti‑China stance, yet it has neglected the importance of diversified diplomacy. For instance, negotiations for an investment agreement (BIA) between Taiwan and the European Union have stalled, and the “New Southbound Policy” targeting Southeast Asia has yielded little in the way of concrete results. This strategy of “betting on a single major power” leaves Taiwan vulnerable in a rapidly changing international environment. Taiwan has attempted to exchange market liberalization for international support, but it has not simultaneously enhanced its industrial competitiveness. For example, while the semiconductor industry is a cornerstone of Taiwan’s economy, its over‑reliance on contract manufacturing leaves it at a disadvantage in areas emphasized by the CPTPP, such as digital trade and the liberalization of services. Without the development of a diversified industrial structure, Taiwan risks being marginalized in regional economic integration.
When Trump chose to shout “America First,” Tsai Ing-wen did not have Trump on her side; rather, she followed along like a little sister, waving the flag with him.
除了較好的薪資待遇外,我認為2000年後出生的世代,特別注重對於一間公司是否能帶給自己成就感,以及我是否以代表這間公司的自豪感。獲得肯定與成就,且與公司形成雙贏模式,才是新型態的工作職場環境必備的,而不是需要天天忍受主管不穩定的情緒,以及來自上頭亂無章法的命令。
Beyond better salary packages, I believe that the generation born after 2000 places significant emphasis on whether a company can provide a sense of accomplishment and whether they can feel proud to represent it. Earning recognition, achieving personal fulfillment, and fostering a win-win relationship with the company are essential elements of the modern workplace. It’s no longer acceptable to endure supervisors with unstable emotions or deal with chaotic, disorganized directives from management.
在社群平台上,我們往往總是喜歡與人分享自己最好的一面,而不是自己最糟糕與最脆弱的一面。我們利用了平台宣傳自己,包裝自己,但不是赤裸的自己。而後者只有與你產生「深度關係」的人才會知道。
On social media platforms, we often prefer to share the best versions of ourselves rather than our worst or most vulnerable sides. We use these platforms to promote and package ourselves, but not to reveal our true, unfiltered selves. The latter is something only those with whom we share a “deep connection” truly get to know.
Does Trump’s Shift from Opposing to Supporting Cryptocurrency Align with Hayek’s The Denationalization of Money?
U.S. President-elect @realDonaldTrump began recognizing the growing popularity and potential of cryptocurrencies around 2022. By mid-2024, he had fully embraced a pro-cryptocurrency stance, actively courting the crypto community and incorporating it into his campaign platform. However, during his first presidential term in 2019, Trump expressed skepticism about cryptocurrencies, labeling them as “not money” and warning that they could facilitate illicit activities. He underscored the importance of the U.S. dollar as the sole legal currency.
Since Bitcoin’s introduction in 2009, incumbent financial institutions and regulatory bodies have largely been skeptical of such digital assets. The decentralized and minimally regulated structure of cryptocurrencies meant they often operated in a legal gray area. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a strict stance, categorizing many cryptocurrencies as securities and subjecting them to regulation. This led to legal challenges from crypto companies seeking clear regulatory frameworks. In 2023, federal agencies, including the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), issued a joint statement emphasizing the risks associated with crypto assets for banking institutions. While banks were not outright prohibited from engaging in crypto-related activities, they were required to comply with stringent safety standards and consumer protection laws.
Decentralized Cryptocurrencies as a Threat to Dollar Hegemony
Since World War II, the U.S. dollar has symbolized global financial dominance, underpinned by a gold-exchange standard established under U.S. leadership. This system linked various national currencies to the dollar, with the dollar pegged to gold at a fixed rate of $35 per ounce. Cryptocurrencies, with their decentralized and unstructured nature, pose a potential challenge to the dollar’s central role in the international financial system. They provide a means to bypass traditional financial networks and U.S. sanctions. For example, stablecoins and other cryptocurrencies have been viewed as tools that could undermine dollar hegemony by facilitating sanction evasion.
The U.S. government has used unilateral sanctions and financial regulations to curb cryptocurrency development, reflecting its intent to protect the dollar’s international status and the integrity of the financial system. There is concern that cryptocurrencies could weaken the foundation of U.S. financial sanctions, thereby eroding global financial dominance. Following events like the collapse of FTX, regulators have intensified their oversight of cryptocurrencies, issuing clearer guidelines on how banks can engage with crypto assets. Statements from the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) now require banks to implement appropriate risk management measures, highlighting a cautious approach to direct cryptocurrency involvement.
The Republican Economic Ideals and Cryptocurrencies
As a right-leaning party, the Republican economic platform has long championed free markets and liberalism, be it classical or neoliberal. These principles are closely tied to the thought of Friedrich von Hayek, a key figure of the Austrian School of Economics. Beyond his well-known business cycle theory and integration of classical economics with philosophical anthropology, Hayek’s later work, The Denationalisation of Money, introduced a groundbreaking idea.
Hayek posed a critical question: If market competition can efficiently allocate goods and services, why not extend the same mechanism to currency? He argued that government monopolies on money issuance lead to inflation and economic instability. Thus, he advocated abolishing this monopoly, allowing private entities to issue currencies. In his vision, multiple currencies issued by various institutions would compete in the marketplace, optimizing stability and value while giving individuals the freedom to choose the currency that best meets their needs.
Hayek traced the government monopoly on money to historical conventions rather than practical necessity, asserting that such a monopoly was a political construct rather than a market-driven outcome. He acknowledged that public acceptance of competitive currencies would require time but maintained that the efficiency and stability brought by this model would be recognized in the long term.
In this competitive currency framework, the survival of a currency issuer would depend on the stability and reliability of their currency. If a currency depreciated or became excessively volatile, the public would shift to alternatives. Competition would enforce discipline among issuers, as failure would lead to market exit. This mechanism could suppress inflation and prevent policy errors. Hayek believed that denationalizing money could curb inflation, enhance economic stability, and grant the public the freedom to choose the currency that best suited their needs.
Citing historical examples such as Scotland’s free banking system, Hayek argued that monetary systems managed by private entities outperformed government monopolies in terms of stability. Competition among banks would incentivize improved currency issuance and management, reducing systemic risk caused by monopolistic control. Decentralization, he argued, would make the financial system more resilient.
In his time, Hayek was particularly opposed to supranational currencies, such as the single European currency later adopted by the European Union. He warned that such centralization could lead to broader economic crises, advocating instead for currency competition as a more effective route to economic stability.
However, while Hayek’s vision for decentralized and unstructured monetary systems aligns with American conservative ideals, it challenges U.S. global dominance. Denationalizing money would threaten the dollar’s singular authority, a cornerstone of U.S. power. Moreover, technical challenges have hindered the realization of Hayek’s ideas, and his vision remained largely theoretical at the time of his death.
Trump’s Shift on Cryptocurrency and Its Implications
In his current campaign, the cryptocurrency industry has become a significant source of Trump’s campaign funding. His embrace of crypto appears driven by the potential financial support from industry leaders, as evidenced by his interactions with Bitcoin mining executives and his family’s launch of a crypto venture, World Liberty Financial. Trump has gone further, pledging to establish a more crypto-friendly regulatory environment to foster market competition. This stance partially aligns with Hayek’s theory of monetary competition, which advocates for the removal of government monopolies on money in favor of market-driven currencies.
Trump’s promises to “deregulate” and ease the regulatory burden on the cryptocurrency sector resonate with Hayek’s opposition to excessive government intervention in markets. His support for accepting cryptocurrency donations and decentralized finance reflects an openness to a pluralistic monetary system, consistent with Hayek’s vision of a “multi-currency framework” where market participants freely choose and use competing currencies.
Despite these parallels, Trump’s motivations warrant scrutiny. His pro-crypto stance appears largely driven by political strategy and financial backing rather than a principled commitment to free-market ideals. Hayek envisioned currency competition as a market-driven phenomenon, free from political influence or exploitation for electoral gain. Trump’s proposals to establish a “Federal Bitcoin Reserve” and a “Cryptocurrency Presidential Advisory Council” suggest a continued role for government intervention in monetary matters, diverging from Hayek’s vision of a fully denationalized monetary system.
Moreover, Trump’s shift from opposing to supporting cryptocurrencies reflects an opportunistic response to market sentiment and voter preferences rather than a steadfast adherence to economic theory or long-term principles. This pragmatic approach contrasts sharply with Hayek’s scholarly commitment to monetary liberalization.
Whether Trump’s financial policies in office will align with Hayek’s later ideas remains to be seen.
@mattgaetz After being asked for comment for this story, @MattGaetz announced he was backing out as President-elect @realDonaldTrump’s attorney general nominee.
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