A question about Zama’s neutrality: if a third-party protocol uses Zama to build fully private transfers — hiding counterparties as well as amounts — would Zama’s Coprocessor/KMS operators still serve it normally? Or can operators refuse computation/decryption requests based on the application’s privacy/compliance model? In short: is “programmable compliance” entirely app-defined, or do infrastructure operators retain a veto?
Ampleforth Governance Risk Alert — Urgent Review and a Higher Approval Threshold
@AmpleforthOrg@brandoniles@aalavandhan84
I’m raising an alert about a potential governance attack against FORTH DAO and asking core contributors and active delegates to review the situation promptly.
Based on my observations, the following addresses have been accumulating FORTH using funding linked to Tornado Cash:
•https://t.co/gHIIgQRzJB
•https://t.co/X2QU3qQwix
These purchases warrant scrutiny to determine whether the addresses are accumulating tokens and delegated voting power to advance proposals affecting treasury assets or core protocol permissions.
Separately, two proposals submitted to the governance contract within the past 24 hours appear highly suspicious:
1. Proposal #54
https://t.co/NJqzenNFXP
Requests a one-time transfer of 2.5 million USDC to the proposer’s address, described as a retrospective grant for completed work.
2. Proposal #56
https://t.co/294jiKkrqR
Would authorize a Safe to spend 3.5 million USDC and 3.5 million FORTH, and designate that same Safe as AMPL’s monetary policy address — an important permissions change that is not clearly disclosed in the proposal description.
These observations do not yet establish a connection between the purchasing addresses and the proposal authors, but they warrant urgent investigation.
I urge core contributors and active delegates to:
1. Investigate the addresses’ purchase history, current holdings, delegation relationships, and any links to governance proposals.
2. Quickly raise the affirmative-vote threshold required for proposals to pass.