Very timely and thought-provoking analysis. High expectations for further elaboration in subsequent work @federica_paddeu@WaibelM09 (3/3)☟
https://t.co/ekSNkR77Fv
🚨 New Blog! 🚨 @DFacilides examines key shifts in the FfD4 Outcome Document's paragraph 50 on sovereign debt. Discover what it means for global finance. Read more via link in comments👇 #FfD4#DevelopmentFinance#Legislation#Finance
@Otto_Fricke@TillMansmann Zw 1949 und 1960 lag der Anteil öff Investitionen in der BRDtl insges auch schon mal bei 30%. Transformationsprozesse, so wie damals der Wiederaufbau und heute die Umstellung von Energie-, Verkehrs- und TK-Infrastruktur, gehen halt typischerweise mit höherem Staatsanteil einher.
@michaelxpettis@FT By now, the disagreement is not so much on the debt brake (which most people accept as flawed) but on how much social benefits the Germany on can/should afford.
@PhilippaSigl@pkrohn1@DezernatZ Vielen Dank für‘s Kommen - jetzt sind wir nochmal mehr gespannt, ob und wie sich die Schuldenbremse aus den Fängen der Juristerei wird befreien können ;-)
Compelling case for enhanced use of domestic currency debt by emerging market borrowers 👇
#3. could be further expanded to using domestic currency debt as a simplified form of VRIs in sov debt restructurings. That wld also address concerns expressed in https://t.co/JXqzEi5cDX https://t.co/kPLXyxfHJ7
Heading into New York's 2025 legislative session, it's a good time to review what we learned during the 2023 and 2024 sessions about sovereign debt reforms at the state level.
@HarvardBizGov
https://t.co/N6BakeRPuT
Well, it’s always been a legal right, just subject to a higher threshold.
But NY lawmakers should indeed take note: If they want to proceed, they should follow the lead of the UK Debt (Dev Cts) Relief Act, which essentially enforced CoT & applies irrespective of governing law.
Not surprising, given the twists and turns of NY sovereign debt bills. Shows that any such legislation must apply irrespective of governing contract law as a matter of public policy to have a real impact.
https://t.co/VUErcuwB76
Sri Lanka Eurobond restructuring update: "A mechanism to change the governing law of the New York law governed new securities to English or Delaware law with the consent of a supermajority of bondholders ..."
Favorite quote from a new favorite episode of C&C:
‚Having creditors being able to move first and remove [the] sequential aspect that's been plaguing the sovereign debt restructuring process is another argument that we need some more clarity on the comparability assessment.‘
Had loads of fun geeking out with Mitu and Mark on Zambia and comparability of treatment -- bit of a fanboy moment joining Clauses & Controversies as a long-time listener
https://t.co/09f7Thspak
If VRIs are here to stay, the most simple and market-friendly arrangement would be to convert part of the old foreign debt to local currency (possibly still under NY/English law to improve liquidity) and allocate it pro rata to ensure CoT. That should tick all the boxes.4/4
In a nutshell, Lee & @GMakoff propose value recovery through mandatory prepayment of restructured debt in inverse order of maturities.
As VRI becomes the new normal, this looks like a win-win bc prepayment reduces creditors’ exposure while freeing up fiscal space.
Yet… 🧵1/4
Sovereign debtors, creditors, and IMF staffers: Are you getting tired of overly complicated value recovery mechanisms?
Lee Buchheit and I propose a simpler—and more beneficial—alternative to use next time.
Just up on SSRN.
@HarvardBizGov@CIGIonline
https://t.co/x0AYBin1QC
Also, the proposal doesn’t seem to address the core issues identified by @Brad_Setser@RivettiDiego et al.: how to define the trigger, how to calibrate the extra free cash and how to address asymmetry if benchmark data deteriorate vs DSA assumptions. 3/4
Parallel negotiations with different creditor groups now look like a realistic idea to improve the sovereign debt restructuring process. Here’s how a set of rules for the #CoordinatedFramework proposed by Sean Hagan and @Brad_Setser might read. 🙏🙏@RobinWigg and @FTAlphaville
@lutzmache@PhilippaSigl Deformation professionelle - trotzdem finde ich, dass er hier in der Sache Recht hat: die Schuldenbremse war ein Fehler, den diejenigen korrigieren sollten, denen wir das gegenwärtige Schlamassel verdanken.