Daphear

Overlookin' Globe and Dreaming...

[Daphear @Daphear]

@Johnspi64783237 @dimeliger ΑΧΑΧΧΑΧΑΧΑΧΑΧΑΧΑΧΧΑΧΑΧΑ

[Daphear @Daphear]

@PyrrhocoraxGr @cynaegeirus Χαχαχαχαχαχαχαχαχαχχα

[Moderatus @moderatus_gr]

Ο Ragıp Soylu είναι γνωστός Τούρκος δημοσιογράφος και αναλυτής διεθνών θεμάτων, όπως οι περισσότεροι Τούρκοι καταφεύγουν σε διαστρέβλωση της ιστορίας.

Μετά την κρίση του «Χόρα» το 1976, η ίδια η Ελλάδα προσέφυγε στο Διεθνές Δικαστήριο της Χάγης για την οριοθέτηση της υφαλοκρηπίδας του Αιγαίου.

Η Τουρκία δεν αποδέχθηκε τη δικαιοδοσία του Δικαστηρίου και υποστήριξε ότι το ζήτημα έπρεπε πρώτα να αντιμετωπιστεί πολιτικά και μέσω διαπραγματεύσεων.

Το Δικαστήριο δεν απέρριψε τις ελληνικές θέσεις επί της ουσίας. Απλώς έκρινε ότι δεν υπήρχε επαρκής κοινή συναίνεση ώστε να έχει δικαιοδοσία χωρίς συνυποσχετικό.

Από την αρχή, η ελληνική θέση ήταν ότι η πραγματική νομική διαφορά που μπορεί να λυθεί δικαστικά αφορά την οριοθέτηση υφαλοκρηπίδας.

Η Τουρκία όμως σταδιακά διεύρυνε την ατζέντα πολύ πέρα από την οριοθέτηση υφαλοκρηπίδας:

▪ χωρικά ύδατα,
▪ εναέριος χώρος,
▪ FIR,
▪ SAR,
▪ αποστρατιωτικοποίηση,
▪ και τελικά «γκρίζες ζώνες» με αμφισβήτηση ελληνικής κυριαρχίας σε νησιά και βραχονησίδες.

Η κλιμάκωση και διεύρυνση των διεκδικήσεων είναι κρίσιμη. Η οριοθέτηση θαλασσίων ζωνών είναι ζήτημα που μπορεί να κριθεί δικαστικά.

Η ελληνική κυριαρχία όμως στα νησιά δεν μετατρέπεται αυτομάτως σε «διαπραγματεύσιμη διαφορά» επειδή η Τουρκία το επιθυμεί.

Το ίδιο ισχύει και για το δικαίωμα της Ελλάδας, βάσει του διεθνούς δικαίου της θάλασσας, να επεκτείνει τη χωρική της θάλασσα έως τα 12 ναυτικά μίλια.

Στην πραγματικότητα, η πάγια τουρκική στρατηγική ήταν να μετατρέψει μονομερή ελληνικά κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα και ζητήματα κυριαρχίας σε ευρύτερο πολιτικό πακέτο διαπραγμάτευσης.

Γι’ αυτό ο τουρκικός ισχυρισμός ότι «η Τουρκία θέλει διεθνή δικαστήρια ενώ η Ελλάδα όχι» είναι ιστορικά και νομικά παραπλανητικός.

Η Ελλάδα αποδέχθηκε τη δικαστική επίλυση της οριοθέτησης εδώ και δεκαετίες.

➡️ Αυτό που αρνείται είναι να μετατρέψει την κυριαρχία και τα κυριαρχικά της δικαιώματα σε αντικείμενο διαπραγμάτευσης υπό απειλή χρήσης βίας.

Πηγές:

▪ https://t.co/vgDQaES02D

▪ https://t.co/S04ZtsZDc3

▪ https://t.co/VvbBAiCeYq

Σχετικά άρθρα:

▪ Η οριοθέτηση στο Αιγαίο είναι κατεξοχήν θέμα Χωρικής Θάλασσας
https://t.co/g86miWTUW2
▪ Οι οικονομικές ζώνες υποχωρούν πάντα έναντι της χωρικής θάλασσας.
https://t.co/4JPppaxDYE

▪ Η «ημίκλειστη θάλασσα» του Αιγαίου και η τουρκική προπαγάνδα
https://t.co/A6cRAPzLBW

▪ Η Αρχή της Μη Αναδιαμόρφωσης της Γεωγραφίας στη Νομολογία Οριοθέτησης | Αιγαίο
https://t.co/woGWjcf3Cb

[Qasem Al-Ali @AlaliQasem]

JPMorgan just published the scariest oil chart I’ve ever seen.
World inventories are in freefall.
And when this line hits 6.8 — the global energy system doesn’t slow down.
It breaks. 🧵

[Daphear @Daphear]

@vtchakarova @threadreaderapp unroll

[kache @yacineMTB]

you can outsource your thinking
but you cannot outsource your understanding

[Danny Postel @DannyPostel]

Drop whatever you're doing and read this @newlinesmag article by the political scientist Hussein Banai, which is the single most incisive — and chilling — piece of analysis I believe has been published, anywhere, on this subject of ultimate urgency.

https://t.co/S5pR8ESBYL

[Velina Tchakarova @vtchakarova]

The conflict around the Strait of Hormuz is not a temporary shock. It is the beginning of a fundamental shift in how energy flows around the world, and Europe is not positioned for it.

This is the Fourth Systemic Risk-driven global crisis (after GFC, Covid and Russia‘s war on Ukraine) and it will hit global economy like a tsunami due to physical scarcity and supply-shock induced multiplicative cascading effects.

This is not just about higher gas bills. It is about whether European farms can grow food next year. Whether European factories and industries can keep running. Whether European governments can hold together when people cannot heat their homes or afford bread.
Here is what must be done immediately:

1. Protect fertilizer production before the upcoming planting season
Natural gas is the raw material for fertilizers. No gas → no fertilizers → harvests collapse within two seasons. Europe came dangerously close to this in 2022. There is still no law preventing it from happening again.
Governments must guarantee that fertilizer plants get gas first before any other industrial use. This is the fastest path from an energy crisis to a food crisis, and it is entirely preventable.

2. Turn political promises into real contracts
Europe has signed countless “energy partnership” declarations with like-minded countries the US, Canada, and Australia. Declarations do not keep the lights on.
Binding, long-term supply agreements (real commercial contracts) need to be finalised within the year. Canada must get its act together and boost production ad hoc. Asian buyers are already moving faster.

3. Drill, produce, and refine more: at home
Europe is sitting on significant untapped energy. Romania’s Black Sea gas fields. Norway’s next generation of Arctic reserves. The UK’s North Sea. Western Balkan deposits that have barely been explored.
These are not long-term dreams. With fast-tracked permits, EU co-financing, and political will amid the worst crisis, first volumes can come online sooner rather than later. Every barrel and cubic metre produced at home is one less purchased from an unstable or hostile source.
The same logic applies to petrochemicals. Europe’s industrial base in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, etc. depends on gas and oil-derived inputs. Keeping that production alive and competitive is not an environmental debate. It is a national security question first and foremost.

4. Buy gas together, not separately
When 27 countries compete for the same molecules on spot markets, prices spike and smaller members lose out. Europe proved during Russia‘s war that collective purchasing works and it needs to apply the same logic to gas, permanently.
A standing EU joint gas purchasing mechanism (the platform still exists), next to negotiating long-term contracts as a bloc, would give Europe the market weight to secure better prices, longer terms, and more reliable supply than any single country can achieve alone.

5. Use Ukraine’s gas storage as a European buffer
Ukraine has the largest underground gas storage network in Europe. Much of it is accessible. And it is sitting underused as a European emergency reserve.
A simple protocol between Brussels and Kyiv could fix this within months. It needs political will, not new pipelines.

6. Stop treating the UK and Western Balkans as outsiders
Britain’s North Sea, the Balkans’ pipelines and mineral deposits: these are part of Europe’s energy future whether the politics are tidy or not. Brexit and slow EU accession processes cannot be allowed to create gaps in European energy security.

Europe has the resources, the allies, and the technology to get through this. What it keeps lacking is the willingness to act before the crisis arrives, not while it is already burning.
That window is still open. But not for long.

[Elizabeth Hagedorn @ElizHagedorn]

NEW: Here's the communiqué from Iran's Foreign Ministry approving the passage of "non-hostile vessels" in the Strait of Hormuz

[Velina Tchakarova @vtchakarova]

https://t.co/wdbTDI0vyj

[Velina Tchakarova @vtchakarova]

SIMULTANEITY THESIS ACTIVATED: The defining condition of a systemic crisis under my system risks concept of the Simultaneity Thesis is that multiple co-constitutive stressors compound faster than any single actor or institution can respond. Using my simultaneity thesis on the ongoing war in Iran which is defined as systemic risk, no single actor - US Navy, US Treasury, IEA, Federal Reserve, IMF, OPEC+, China or Russia can address more than one or two of the six dimensions (energy supply, fertiliser supply, chip supply, maritime logistics, sovereign fiscal capacity, and central bank policy space) simultaneously.
Hormuz closure is the single geographic source of all six simultaneity dimensions. Iran, by maintaining Hormuz closure, has created a single-point, multi-dimensional lock on the global system. This is the decisive strategic leverage of the current escalation conflict phase. No escalation de-escalation ladder exists that addresses fewer than all six simultaneously. Iran's strategic innovation: maximum systemic impact at minimum kinetic cost.
The Iran war is no longer primarily a military conflict between the US-Israel axis and the Iranian regime. It is a simultaneity event - a systemic lock on the global economy whose resolution requires a single political act (ceasefire + Hormuz reopening) that none of the principal actors currently has sufficient incentive to deliver. Iran's new leadership has institutionalised the closure. Israel has declared no time limit. The US has not resolved the war aims gap with Israel. Russia profits from continuation. China is insulated. The global system bears the cost. This is the defining geopolitical and economic moment of 2026 and beyond.
The Cold War 2.0 bifurcation documented in my the DragonBear Framework is accelerating from structural tendency to functional reality and the US-China summit bears the only hope for 'managing the confrontation' by opening the most existential global choke point in Hormuz. Russia collects revenue while enabling the crisis. China insulates itself while the Western-aligned Global South absorbs cascading shocks without institutional support. The political conditions for anti-Western realignment - across Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America - are being created at this moment, not in some theoretical future. The (at least) 50–60 million additional people facing severe poverty under the cascading effects from the future systemic crisis in the global economy are not an abstraction: they are the political constituency for Cold War 2.0's second-order structural shift.

[Dr. Dale Wen @dale_wen]

Germany Energiewende in numbers.

After more than 500 billion subsidies and 20 plus years, how does the German Energiewende work?
Let’s look at some numbers. First let’s compare Germany in 2025 to itself in year 2000.
Year 2000
Total electricity generation: 576-577 TWh
Residential (household) electricity price: 0.14–0.16 €/kWh
Industry price: 0.08 €/kWh
Year 2025
Total generation: around 501 TWh, including self generation.
Residential (household) price: 0.3835 €/kWh
Industry price: 0.15-0.25 €/kWh
So after 25 years of energy transition, there is 13% less electricity generation, while the price has more than doubled for both residential and industrial users. No wonder the German industry base is shrinking.

Now let’s look at carbon emission per KWh electricity generation, after all, to reduce carbon emission is the stated goal of Energiewende. The numbers of France, Germany and EU average tells you the reality the German media normally does not report on.
France: ~30 gCO₂eq/kWh
Germany: ~330 gCO₂eq/kWh
France's grid is about 10 times cleaner than Germany's on average. Not only that, Germans intensity is higher than the EU average (~200–220 g/kWh in recent years) due to remaining coal use,

Energiewende is a total complete failure, on both economics and its stated environmental goal. Numbers don’t lie.

[Velina Tchakarova @vtchakarova]

SIMULTANEITY THESIS APPLIED: The defining condition of a systemic crisis is that multiple co-constitutive stressors compound faster than any single actor or institution can respond. In the context of the ongoing war in Iran, this condition is activated across six dimensions simultaneously: 1) energy supply, 2) fertiliser supply, 3) chip supply, 4) maritime logistics, 5) sovereign fiscal capacity, and 6) central bank policy space. All six are constrained simultaneously and all six share the same geographic origin point (the Strait of Hormuz) — meaning they cannot be resolved sequentially; only a single geopolitical resolution (ceasefire + Hormuz reopening) can address all six at once. This is the structural reason why standard crisis management frameworks are inadequate: they are designed for single-shock sequential resolution, not systemic risks with multiplicative effects of the scale of the ongoing war in Iran.

[Velina Tchakarova @vtchakarova]

https://t.co/MVBy3xjeYa

[Heather Exner-Pirot @ExnerPirot]

Italy calls for suspension of carbon price in major attack on EU climate policy

The ETS mechanism, as currently designed, is nothing more than a tax, a levy on energy-intensive companies," Italian Industry Minister Adolfo Urso told reporters.
https://t.co/mzcwFuH48L

[Velina Tchakarova @vtchakarova]

Completely uncharted water scenario for the Strait of Hormuz right now.

[Velina Tchakarova @vtchakarova]

Belgian PM Bart De Wever confirms in an interview a scenario I‘ve been outlining for the last few years: in the strategic trilemma between reindustrialization, defence boost and decarbonization, the priorisation will be put on saving industrial base first.

[Daphear @Daphear]

@GreekAnalyst Skynet will come for you as well...

[El Mapa del Inversor 🗺️ @ElMapaInversor]

It is the definition of a 'Thermodynamic Spread'.

The market has efficiently priced the Demand (Nvidia/Google CapEx), but it suffers from extreme latency in pricing the Physical Constraint (Grid Capacity).

AI is effectively 'Tokenized Electricity'. You cannot deploy $180B in compute without triggering a massive Baseload Shock.

We are transitioning from a 'Chip Shortage' to an 'Electron Shortage'. Physics is the ultimate regulator, and it dictates that Utilities and Uranium are mathematically mispriced against this CapEx wall.

[Daphear @Daphear]

@GreekAnalyst Excessive trade deficit (2007 at its highest) which led to excessive fiscal deficit. Erosion of the production capacity along with incentives that fortified imports.. these are the reasons of the Memoranda that actually contributed negatively to the overall macro picture.