Congratulations New-Syria.
This report of the young girl was dismissed by all Syrian-Activists as propaganda - they even claimed that a Syrian Government Official (Hind Kabawat, minster of social affairs) has visited her.
Months later, this child has given birth to another child - still begging on the streets.
As I said, outside of what the sphere of Jolani supporters present to the world - Syria is in a horrible state of affairs.
@NuhAlKurdi Amberin is actually one of the very few credible journalists that have issued very good pieces on Rojava for years. Wouldn’t put her into the same basket as some random Al Jazeera/Hobby Journalists.
@LobstarWilde Hi Lobstar, could you lend me some USD for a week? Unfortunately, I wasn’t able to pay my rent and am a little behind. Next Monday, I will receive my salary and will return the funds to your wallet. I’m also willing to do a little extra task! Your support would mean a lot! =)
@RojavaNetwork The irony of going on a public lynching spree on Newroz, when a Kurd did it to Syrian Arabs desecrating their own flag in public just a couple of weeks later, is comical.
@Zilananm But again, while there will always be threats in this region, the biggest priority now is stability, education, and economic development. These should be the top three priorities that the Kurds should loudly demand.
@Zilananm I also believe that Kurds have never been this united. This should accelerate things. The Kurdish keyboard warriors on X, writing daily about doomsday scenarios (I hope they get paid for spending all day on X instead of with their families 😂), only exist in the digital world lol
But it is important to note that the Kirkuk governor rotation is not new, as some reports suggest. Here are 2024 reports indicating that the Talabani-Halbousi agreement stipulated a two-year rotation:
https://t.co/U0Y5YYoJmm
https://t.co/KHsgEBSe5b
Kirkuk’s Governorship Rotation Is About Turkey, but It Is Also Part of a Broader Emerging Alliance Reshaping Iraq
On the Kirkuk governorship rotation, this is not actually a new development. Under the power-sharing agreement reached around mid-2024 between the PUK and Muhammad al-Halbousi, the PUK received the governorship for two years, on the understanding that it would then rotate to Halbousi’s side for the following two years. That means the transition due in June is part of the original deal, not a new concession.
Under that arrangement, the PUK is expected to hand over the governorship while getting the presidency of the provincial council and pushing to secure the qaimaqam posts of Dibs, Daquq, and central Kirkuk district, as well as the position of Kirkuk police chief, as part of the same bargain. What now appears to be changing is not the principle of rotation itself, but how Halbousi’s two-year share is being re-allocated with one year going to a Turkmen figure and one year to an Arab figure.
The Turkmen Front, after all, boycotted the local government when it was first formed by the PUK and Muhammad al-Halbousi. Bringing them in now, and even giving them the governorship for a period, is therefore politically significant. It suggests this is being used as a gesture toward Turkey, since the Turkmen Front is effectively Ankara’s main semi-proxy in Kirkuk.
That matters even more given how the regional context has changed. When the Kirkuk government was first formed, the PUK’s relations with Turkey were still deeply strained because of its cooperation with the PKK. At the time, Turkey had effectively sanctioned Sulaimaniyah airport and was openly linking that to the PUK-PKK issue. Now, however, with the Turkey-PKK peace process underway, there appears to have been a reset in PUK-Turkey relations, and both sides seem interested in deepening that opening. In that context, giving the governorship first to the Turkmen Front, despite its original boycott of the same administration, looks like a goodwill gesture to Turkey by the wider bloc behind the Kirkuk arrangement.
In fact, it may be even more of a gesture from Halbousi, since his side appears to be giving up the post for a year to the Turkmen. His meeting yesterday with the Turkish ambassador to Iraq also suggests this may be part of an effort to draw Turkey closer and, at the same time, take the Turkey card away from the KDP.
But there is another more important layer: it was there that a broader political alignment first began to take practical shape. The alliance linking Bafel Talabani, Muhammad al-Halbousi, Qais al-Khazali, Rayan al-Kildani and others first emerged in concrete form through a local power-sharing deal, with Khazali and Kildani serving from the outset as guarantors backing the arrangement. From there, the same understanding expanded beyond Kirkuk. It later extended to Salahaddin, where the same camp also secured the governorship, with figures such as Sudani and increasingly Ammar al-Hakim joining or aligning with it. From there, it moved further into Baghdad, where it ultimately helped deliver the Iraqi presidency to the PUK without the KDP.
@SarhozT @theracistkurd @iyor_doniyor Yes, coming from the same folks that brought Saddam to Hewler to execute hundreds of PUK Pesh‘. If killing Kurds was a national sport, a certain group would take every gold medal by a mile🥇 lol