@timgproject Joseph McBride is the best researcher on JD Tippit & his knowledge is 10 X what this guy says and McBride blows this guys story outta the water.
Let me state the exact point at where the LBJ did it people are at. I'm not disputing that Johnson was capable. I've granted that repeatedly. The question was never capability, it was whether the evidence establishes the act, and character-plus-capacity-plus-influence is exactly the combination that courts exclude for the specific reason that it produces confident conclusions without proof.
You've made a coherent case for suspicion. But "it's not a great leap" is doing the work that evidence is supposed to do, and that's the leap I won't take, not because I can't connect dots, but because I can see exactly where the connection stops being supported and starts being assumed.
Under this inference, Johnson would not have recruited shooters, chosen a location, or issued an operational plan. He would have indicated to one or two trusted intermediaries who already possessed both motive and access that the existing obstacles had been lifted and that the aftermath would be managed. The rapid institutional closure that followed—the Belmont memorandum, the Katzenbach directive, the retention of key officials, and the public lone-assassin narrative—would then have served as the protective layer. The operational compartment would have remained outside his direct control, consistent with every other sensitive matter he handled.
The inference does not rest on a primary record of an order. It rests on the observation that Johnson’s established style and relationships made such an order unnecessary. He was positioned to give a deniable signal and to control the political consequences. Whether he did so remains outside the primary record. The capacity itself follows from the methods he used in every other domain.
How Johnson’s strengths interacted with discontent over Kennedy
Johnson’s political strengths were institutional and personal rather than popular. They allowed him to operate effectively inside the existing centers of power where dissatisfaction with Kennedy was already concentrated, even while Kennedy himself retained broader public support.
• Senate mastery and the “Johnson Treatment.”
Many of the senators and senior committee chairmen who felt sidelined or overridden by the Kennedy White House were men Johnson had long cultivated. His detailed knowledge of their individual interests, and his willingness to apply direct personal pressure, let him keep those relationships intact.
When Kennedy’s legislative agenda stalled or when Southern and Western Democrats grew resentful of civil-rights pressure and of what they saw as Eastern dominance, Johnson remained the figure who could still deliver or withhold Senate cooperation. That positioned him as the natural intermediary for anyone inside the party who wanted relief from Kennedy’s style without an open break.
• Coalition maintenance across factions.
Johnson had spent years balancing Southern conservatives, Texas oil and business interests, and enough Northern liberals to pass selected measures. Kennedy’s administration sharpened tensions inside that coalition (oil-depletion threats, accelerated civil-rights enforcement, perceived neglect of Texas and the Southwest). Johnson’s pre-existing network meant he did not have to create discontent; he only had to remain available to the factions already feeling it. His strength was that those factions still regarded him as someone who understood their requirements and could act on them.
• Institutional rather than charismatic authority.
Kennedy’s appeal was largely personal and rhetorical. Johnson’s was operational. In an atmosphere in which parts of the congressional party, the business community, and elements of the national-security bureaucracy felt that decisions were being made by a small White House circle they did not trust, Johnson’s reputation for knowing how the machinery actually worked made him a plausible alternative center of gravity. He did not need to campaign against Kennedy; the institutional friction itself enlarged the space in which his particular skills were valued.
In short, Johnson’s strengths did not generate the discontent with Kennedy, but they made him the figure best placed to receive and channel it inside the institutions that mattered for governing. The same abilities that had made him an effective Majority Leader allowed him to sit at the intersection of the very groups that felt most aggrieved by the Kennedy style, without requiring him to articulate a public opposition.
Lyndon B. Johnson’s documented political method supplies the basis for a limited inference. He exercised power through intermediaries, reciprocal obligation, detailed personal knowledge of individuals, and the deliberate avoidance of any explicit written or spoken order that could be traced to him. He did not build new structures; he sat at the center of existing ones and removed restraints or signaled that interference would not occur.
Applied to the national-security bureaucracy, the same method would have allowed him to convey a desired outcome without directing its execution. The relevant relationships already existed: long-standing ties to Texas oil and business figures who opposed Kennedy’s depletion-allowance proposals; continued access to senior senators and committee chairmen who resented White House pressure; retention of CIA and military officers who had felt constrained by Kennedy’s handling of Cuba and Vietnam; and the appointment of Allen Dulles—removed by Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs—to the Warren Commission. These were not relationships Johnson created in November 1963. They were relationships he had cultivated for years and that remained intact.
@nickchiosa@flea333 Instead of paying $200 Ifor the ticket I wish I brought a bottle of JD and put on their CD at home, I would have had a better time. 1/10! 💩
Top Tier (start here)
1. JFK and the Unspeakable — James W. Douglass
2. The Last Investigation — Gaeton Fonzi
3. Destiny Betrayed (2nd edition) — James DiEugenio
4. Accessories After the Fact — Sylvia Meagher
5. Breach of Trust — Gerald D. McKnight
High Priority
6. Deep Politics and the Death of JFK — Peter Dale Scott
7. The Devil’s Chessboard — David Talbot
8. On the Trail of the Assassins — Jim Garrison
9. False Mystery — Vincent Salandria
10. Crossfire — Jim Marrs