على مدار 200 سنة مضت لم يحظى نظام حكم بشعبية وتفويض شعبي كما حظي به نظام 2014، ومنذ محمد علي باشا حتى اليوم لم يحصل حاكم مصري على سلطة حكم مطلقة متحررا فيها من الدستور والقانون والمؤسسات والأعراف والتقاليد وكل شيء سوى رأس النظام الحالي. فعلياً منذ أخناتون لم يحصل حاكم مصري على سلطات شبه إلهية كما حدث منذ 2014، ولم يحصل نظام حكم في تاريخ الجمهورية المصرية في وقت محدود على هبات ومساعدات مالية كما حصل النظام الحالي، الكل أراد بلا استثناء لهذا النظام أن ينجح وفوضه بشكل كامل وشامل ومنحه سلطة بلا أي عقبات!
🇮🇱🇺🇸 Netanyahu got caught on tape working to kill his own war crimes warrant
The New York Times reviewed recorded calls from October 2024 where Netanyahu and the late Senator Lindsey Graham cooked up a plan to stall the ICC arrest warrant closing in on him.
The move was to weaponize sexual misconduct allegations against ICC prosecutor Karim Khan. Netanyahu called it "the great cloud" that could justify pausing everything, telling Graham the stain "has to be removed" and pushing him to get senators to send a letter.
On a second call that day Graham said "we got them both," meaning Democrats Blumenthal and Cardin were on board, then joked, "pay me for all this."
The letter went out November 1. It didn't work, and the ICC issued the warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant three weeks later.
The twist is that Khan was actually forced out as prosecutor last week over those same allegations, so the cloud they wanted finally did the job, just a year too late.
Source: NYT / Daniyal
Today's deadly clash in the West Bank began when about 30 settlers, including armed men and minors, entered Tell, a Palestinian village that Israelis are not allowed to enter, using a "hike" as cover. They did not coordinate with the IDF, even though it is required. The incident ended in a gunfight that killed two Israelis and four Palestinians, and the IDF sent five more companies to the area to contain the situation the settlers had started.
None of this excuses the Palestinian who seized a weapon and killed an Israeli officer. That is a crime in its own right, and two Israeli families are grieving tonight. But it does not change how the events began, or who set them in motion.
This is exactly how the Smotrich model is meant to work: it encourages "settlement/outpost pioneers," as he describes them, to move into Palestinian land that is off-limits, challenges anyone to intervene, and when violence breaks out, punishes the village and sets up another outpost in its place. This is not just my opinion; it is what he demanded today — evacuate Tell's residents, "clean" the village, make it "look like the refugee camps in Nablus," and transfer the land from Area B to Area C to build a new settlement on it.
One of the Israelis who was killed, Benayahu Mellet, was praised by Kahane's grandson for refusing to recognize the line between Area C and Area B, which separates what is legal from what is not.
This situation did not happen by accident. It happened by design.
One of the enduring mysteries of October 7 is why Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, chose not to join in. When Hamas’s Nukhba forces flooded into the south, Hezbollah’s Radwan forces were poised for a similar push in the north—but the order never came.
A newly published set of internal Hezbollah documents, analyzed by researchers at the Amit Institute for Terrorism and Intelligence Research, sheds light on years of coordination between the two Iranian tentacles in the run-up to the attack and why Nasrallah ultimately didn’t pull the trigger.
The alliance faced its first real test two years earlier, during the May 2021 conflict, Operation Guardian of the Walls. Internal Hamas documents reveal that during the operation, a joint intelligence war room was established in Beirut, staffed by Hamas, Hezbollah and the IRGC. Through this channel, Hezbollah supplied Hamas with intelligence on request. Khaled Ghanem, then head of Hamas’s overseas military intelligence, wrote in an internal report that the war room was operational from the second day of fighting through the day after it ended, and that Hamas had requested—and received—information on Israeli military deployments, aerial intelligence activity and fighter jet movements.
That wasn’t the only intelligence Hezbollah seemingly had access to.
One of the most striking disclosures involves the Israeli military’s “Metro” operation—a deception designed to lure Hamas fighters into their tunnel network by making them believe a ground invasion was imminent so Israeli forces could then strike underground. According to the same Hamas intelligence report, it was Hezbollah that tipped Hamas off, roughly two hours before the ground assault began, that the operation wasn’t a real invasion at all but a ploy to draw fighters into the open and build a target bank—effectively exposing the Israeli bluff before it worked. A senior Israeli security official who helped command the operation later confirmed to Army Radio that Hezbollah did indeed play a significant role in unraveling that ruse.
The documents also reveal that Hezbollah helped Hamas avoid the targeted killing of Ahmad Ghandour, commander of the northern Gaza brigade (later killed during the current war), by detecting a buildup of Israeli intelligence surveillance over his location in the Jabaliya refugee camp and warning Hamas roughly two hours in advance that an assassination attempt on a senior figure appeared imminent.
Despite this support—along with tacit approval for Palestinian factions in Lebanon to fire rockets into Israel from Lebanese territory—Hamas came away from the operation disappointed. In one exchange, a senior Hamas official abroad pressed Hezbollah’s response coordinator to push for greater involvement in order to tie down Israeli forces in the north, complaining that Hezbollah’s support so far had been limited.
A year later, in May 2022, a pivotal meeting took place in Beirut: senior Hamas officials sat down with Nasrallah and a senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard general. The Hamas delegation argued conditions were ripe for expanding the conflict with Israel into a full-scale, multi-front campaign—pointing to a wave of terror attacks then sweeping the West Bank and Israeli cities, Israel’s fragile political standing at the time (the meeting came just two days after the ruling coalition shrank to 59 Knesset seats and two months before the Bennett-Lapid government collapsed), and a wave of regional normalization that Hamas wanted to derail.
Surprisingly, Nasrallah didn’t embrace the idea. He told the Hamas delegation the concept was sound in principle and worth discussing, but insisted any campaign first needed clearly defined objectives. Did Hamas expect this confrontation to force a complete Israeli withdrawal? Or was the aim something more limited, like simply preventing Jews from entering the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound—a modest goal, he noted, that wouldn’t require war at all? In effect, Nasrallah was asking Hamas to define its strategy and war aims before he’d commit Hezbollah to anything.
Hamas reported back to Sinwar that they hadn’t yet defined clear war objectives and that Nasrallah remained hesitant. Sinwar responded with his plan.
The most ambitious scenario—internally called “The Second Promise” (later renamed the “Jericho Wall” plan behind October 7)—envisioned Hamas striking with full force in a surprise, multi-front war aimed at toppling Israel. Sinwar called it the preferred option, tying its timing to a Jewish holiday—Passover, most fittingly. This is the first evidence that he didn’t originally target October 7 at all; he was initially eyeing Passover 2023. He also sketched softer scenarios involving partial Hezbollah participation, but in every version treated the Jordanian border as key, envisioning guerrilla forces infiltrating from Syria and Jordan.
Nasrallah responded favorably, calling it a realistic scenario, and said he’d bring it to Khamenei for final approval.
By June 2023, Sinwar appeared confident that Hezbollah and Iran were coming around. Addressing Hamas’s political bureau in Gaza, he said recent efforts had succeeded in pulling both out of what he called their lingering psychological trauma from the 2006 Second Lebanon War, and that they were now highly prepared to form an alliance with Hamas for a future campaign.
Two months before the attack, in August 2023, Sinwar addressed Hamas’s Shura Council, sounding even more certain, telling members that if the great strategic campaign broke out, multiple fronts would open against Israel.
Not everyone inside Hamas shared his confidence. An internal military intelligence document from around that time referenced a lingering “psychological barrier” on Hezbollah’s part, along with hesitation within Hamas’s own ranks about how reliable that support would really be.
None of that seems to have shaken Sinwar. At 6:29 that morning, having caught Israel completely by surprise, he sent a letter to Nasrallah apologizing for the lack of advance warning and urging him to join the fight immediately, asking for a concentrated rocket barrage and a major ground offensive. He was met with silence.
In the hours that followed, Sinwar himself appears to have been stunned to find Hezbollah wasn’t joining him. Only a full day later did any assistance arrive—and even then, it was relatively symbolic in scale.
Had Hezbollah joined the fight as Sinwar expected, October 7 would have been incalculably worse. In the end, it was Nasrallah’s hesitation—not Israeli preparedness—that spared the Galilee from a similar fate.
ليلة صعبة على كل دعاة الانعزالية الفاشية النص لبة في المنطقة الذين لا يمثلون سوى أقلية الأقلية لكن صوتهم العالي المزعج في العالم الافتراضي يجعل البعض يتخيل أن لهم قيمة حتى يسحق الواقع عالم الافتراضي الزائف!
Third world communists are the enemy. They've taken over our greatest American city. They're taking over one of our two major political parties. They hate this country. They hate white people. They hate our heritage and traditions. This is the fight. Get in the game or go away.
اكثر ماكرهته الفترة الماضية هو الخرا اللي دار بسبب الجهلة واللي كان أوشك انه يمحي اكتر من ١٠ سنوات من التآخي بين السوريين والمصريين في مصر
الشعب المصري استضاف السوريين والسوريين كانوا ضيوف نموذجين وفعالين في المجتمع
رغم كل جهود المليشيات الإلكترونية لإثارة الكراهية والبغضاء عبر وسائل التواصل الإجتماعي التي أرادت تحويلها لوسائل تباغض عربي لكن مع أول أزمة أو فرحة ولو في مباراة كرة قدم يغلب التضامن العربي عامة ومع مصر خاصة من المحيط إلى الخليج.
مصر ليست بحاجة لشعبويات سردية على غرار "كانت مصر ثم جاء التاريخ"، ولا ثقافة انعزالية كأنها كائن ضعيف مذعور، ولا ادعاءات بالعظمة قائمة على الانتقاص من نفسها عبر أشقائها ومحيطها، ولا مليشيات ولائية، ولا استدعاء لعثمانية جديدة متوهمة، ولا استرضاء الغرب لقبولها، ولا الصراع لأجل دور أو ادعاء تأثير لا وجود له، فقط تحتاج أن تعرف من تكون لتدرك ماذا تريد، وتخلق نموذجها الجمهوري الصحيح بعدما فشلت خلال 73 سنة من التحول من نظام لدولة مؤسسات، ويقع عليها نتيجة هذا الفشل 90% من فشل الجمهوريات العربية التي شائت أم أبت لا تجد سوى النموذج المصري تتمثل به، وعندما تقدم هذا النموذج وينهض مجتمعها في كافة المجالات ستشهد كل المنطقة نهضة مماثلة ومتنوعة يكمل كل طرف فيها الآخر لينتج التكامل المطلوب.
الإصلاح وأول الطريق وبدايته من القاهرة وعبر إصلاح المنزل من الداخل لا من مكان آخر، وهذه مهمة الأجيال القادمة بعدما فشل جيلنا وما سبقه من أجيال، ولكن هذه الأجيال بحاجة لفكرة تستند إليها قائمة على المصارحة قبل كل شيء، والابتعاد عن أدبيات الماضي وأساطير دولة محمد علي باشا بأشكالها المختلفة: إيالة، خديوية، سلطنة، مملكة، وأخيراً جمهورية يوليو لخلق مجتمع جديد مدرك لحقيقة بلده لا الأسطورة التي صنعها الفرنسيين وتسمى "المدرسة الوطنية المصرية" القائمة على الاستنساخ الركيك من النموذج الفرنسي المختلف!
طلعت مجرمة بنت مجرمين وابوها اللوا اركان حرب قائد الفرقة التامنة دفاع جوي عبدالمنعم شاهين
عشان كده طلعت منها زي الشعرة من العجين ولبسوا قضية الدهس للشاب
الله يلعنك ويلـ ،عن ابوكي ويلعـ،ن نسلك الوsحْ
My ancestors built those wonderful things. I am a Coptic Christian. You are descendants of the invaders who came to Egypt and replaced the original inhabitants with desert dwellers.
אני רוצה לשתף אתכם במאחורי הקלעים של עולם ההסברה.
מאז שהתפוטרתי ממערך ההסברה (הרקע הפוליטי כבר ידוע לכולם) אני מנהל מיזם חברתי שנלחם על שמה הטוב של ישראל בתקשורת העולמית. ה״דוברות האזרחית״ נשענת על עשרות אזרחים מוכשרים שמנדבים את זמנם להתראיין בחו״ל, תורמים פרטיים, ואולי הכי חשוב - רכבת אווירית של יהודים צעירים מהתפוצות שבאים להתנדב. הם רואים את השנאה בעולם, יודעים כמה היא לא מוצדקת ומסכנת את חיינו, ובאים לנסות להציל אותנו.
היום בקבוצה של העבודה, קיבלתי את ההודעה הזו מאחת המתמחות שלנו, בחורה מקסימה מארה״ב שעלתה לארץ ממש לאחרונה.
תקראו ותפנימו. האזרחים הנהדרים שקמו ולקחו אחריות בשבעה באוקטובר כשהמדינה קרסה ממשיכים להילחם, בעוד גורמים בממשלת שבעה באוקטובר פוגעים ומחבלים במדינה שלנו בכוונה.
אין פה מה להסביר. באנגלית אומרים שאי אפשר לשים אודם על חזיר, ובתרגום לעברית: אי אפשר להכשיר את השרץ. ופה יש חזיר שמחבל בעם ישראל. מבצע פיגוע מכוון במעמד הבינלאומי שלנו. ובנשמה שלנו. הכל למען תעמולת בחירות.
מה אני צריך לענות לאותה המתמחה שנידבה מאות שעות עבור ההסברה הישראלית, ורואה ששר הבט״פ מרבה שנאה נגד ישראל ובכך מסכן את המשפחה שלה בארה״ב? ומה אני צריך לענות לה בתור עולה חדשה, שהעיניים עוד נוצצות מהחלום הציוני שעוד נבנה פה מדינה מתוקנת ומתורבתת, ארץ יפה וטובה? מה היא צריכה למסור לחברים שלה בארה״ב, היהודים והלא-יהודים כאחד, שרואים את הפוליטיקאי הישראלי הכי מפורסם (אחרי ביבי) תולה שלט ״ברוכים הבאים לישראל״ מעל הזוועה הזאת?
בקרוב תהיה לנו הזדמנות לפתוח דף חדש ולגרש את החרפה הזו לפרק בהיסטוריה שעדיף שנשכח.
سوريا يجب أن تقف على مسافة واحدة
من مصر وإثيوبيا.
لذلك،
زيارة أسعد الشيباني إلى القاهرة
يجب أن تتبعها خطوة موازية:
إما زيارة إلى أديس أبابا،
أو دعوة دولة الرئيس آبي أحمد إلى دمشق.
هذا سياسياً.
أما من زاوية المصالح…
فما يجمع #سوريا بـ إثيوبيا
أكبر بكثر مما يجمعها بـ مصر.
أثيوبيا دولة صاعدة،
لديها تجارب تنموية ناجحة،
وسوق أفريقية واعدة.
في المقابل،
تواجه مصر أزمات اقتصادية متراكمة،
واعتماداً متزايداً على المساعدات والديون.
الخلاصة:
التوازن يُحافظ على العلاقات…
لكن المصالح تحدد الاتجاه.
بعد وصوله للقاهرة ولقاءه وزير الصناعة المصري ورئيس الهيئة العامة للاستثمار والمناطق الحرة
وزير الاقتصاد والصناعة نضال الشعار، يصدر قرار بتشكيل مجلس الأعمال السوري - المصري 🇸🇾 🇪🇬