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@coingecko remove
https://t.co/anQQG8mUDe
this coin from your list. The biggest UniswapV4 pool what you track uses a hook, and the hook try to send a fee to an EOA, but the EOA has an EIP-7702 code, and reverts when the address is not in the whitelist.
WSTAR honeypot: the mechanism
Addresses:
Token (WSTAR): 0x160a8a73059d54f68d77ac1626c08425ec2ec0e0
PoolManager (Uniswap v4): 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90
Hook: 0x0A1f63e8a62E6aeCeAf488B6Ef9D1626414a2145
Creator (EIP-7702 EOA): 0xaAceaFE839DB105b948d041eE3883a01F868DC70
Delegate code: 0x08bf3aa11cf3063ae49c9383e74eb72b3329aa24
The trap has two parts, and neither looks suspicious on its own.
1. The hook
The hook on the Uniswap v4 ETH/WSTAR pool looks like a 0% "creator fee" hook. Pool ID: 0xc262a95ca99580f9eec06fd814cb2dfc6fe907a4921fbc33cd03abe12eb6e524. The hook calls the creator in two cases: on every sell that returns ETH, and on every liquidity removal that pays out ETH. Each time it calls poolManager.take(ETH, creator, 0). The fee is 0, so the call sends 0 ETH. For native ETH, though, the PoolManager always makes an empty-calldata call to the recipient. The hook is immutable and has no setters.
2. The creator address
The creator is an EOA delegated via EIP-7702 to the delegate code. On empty calldata, the delegate's fallback only lets the call through if tx.origin is whitelisted; otherwise it reverts. Only the EOA itself can change the whitelist, it emits no events, and the owner can re-delegate to new code at any time.
The result
Buying: always works, because the hook never calls the creator.
Selling: always reverts for addresses that are not whitelisted. Size, mode (exact-in or exact-out) and route (router, aggregator, multi-hop, custom contract) make no difference, because tx.origin is always the signer.
Exiting through liquidity: doesn't work, because removing the liquidity reverts the same way.
Workarounds: the calldata cannot be changed, because it is hardcoded as empty in the PoolManager. Only dust swaps that return 0 ETH get through.
Why it goes unnoticed
The hook source looks harmless; the trap is in the creator address.
Real-looking sells appear on-chain, but they come from whitelisted addresses.
A second pool exists with no hook, a 60% fee and almost no liquidity. Pool ID: 0x33aac18fbed3ed674aae78c7a35fe6c3b724ab553f4802920c457cd7c1465ffa. Selling there works but loses nearly everything: on a fork, 0.1 ETH worth of WSTAR returned about 0.0033 ETH.
@coingecko remove
https://t.co/anQQG8mUDe
this coin from your list. The biggest UniswapV4 pool what you track uses a hook, and the hook try to send a fee to an EOA, but the EOA has an EIP-7702 code, and reverts when the address is not in the whitelist.
WSTAR honeypot: the mechanism
Addresses:
Token (WSTAR): 0x160a8a73059d54f68d77ac1626c08425ec2ec0e0
PoolManager (Uniswap v4): 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90
Hook: 0x0A1f63e8a62E6aeCeAf488B6Ef9D1626414a2145
Creator (EIP-7702 EOA): 0xaAceaFE839DB105b948d041eE3883a01F868DC70
Delegate code: 0x08bf3aa11cf3063ae49c9383e74eb72b3329aa24
The trap has two parts, and neither looks suspicious on its own.
1. The hook
The hook on the Uniswap v4 ETH/WSTAR pool looks like a 0% "creator fee" hook. Pool ID: 0xc262a95ca99580f9eec06fd814cb2dfc6fe907a4921fbc33cd03abe12eb6e524. The hook calls the creator in two cases: on every sell that returns ETH, and on every liquidity removal that pays out ETH. Each time it calls poolManager.take(ETH, creator, 0). The fee is 0, so the call sends 0 ETH. For native ETH, though, the PoolManager always makes an empty-calldata call to the recipient. The hook is immutable and has no setters.
2. The creator address
The creator is an EOA delegated via EIP-7702 to the delegate code. On empty calldata, the delegate's fallback only lets the call through if tx.origin is whitelisted; otherwise it reverts. Only the EOA itself can change the whitelist, it emits no events, and the owner can re-delegate to new code at any time.
The result
Buying: always works, because the hook never calls the creator.
Selling: always reverts for addresses that are not whitelisted. Size, mode (exact-in or exact-out) and route (router, aggregator, multi-hop, custom contract) make no difference, because tx.origin is always the signer.
Exiting through liquidity: doesn't work, because removing the liquidity reverts the same way.
Workarounds: the calldata cannot be changed, because it is hardcoded as empty in the PoolManager. Only dust swaps that return 0 ETH get through.
Why it goes unnoticed
The hook source looks harmless; the trap is in the creator address.
Real-looking sells appear on-chain, but they come from whitelisted addresses.
A second pool exists with no hook, a 60% fee and almost no liquidity. Pool ID: 0x33aac18fbed3ed674aae78c7a35fe6c3b724ab553f4802920c457cd7c1465ffa. Selling there works but loses nearly everything: on a fork, 0.1 ETH worth of WSTAR returned about 0.0033 ETH.
Starting around 20:00 UTC on Nov 20, CAD pairs on Kraken saw heavy selling pressure that pushed prices well below other markets. Our platform processed every order correctly, and our security teams found no sign of a breach or compromised accounts. Executed trades stand.