This is quite impressive, altho there are many questions about the seed generation remaining.
Generally, when generating “random” seeds that will be used by other people in cryptographic settings, you want to soothe their suspicions that you somehow chose the seed in such a way as to weaken the cryptography, giving the seed generator some secret advantage.
Typically this is done by choosing some commonly known number, like pi or e, and using that as a seed. “Nothing up my sleeve”. There are, of course, still decisions to be made that affect the output of the seed. For example, if you used pi, how did you encode it and how many bytes of pi did you use?
The reason this matters is rejection sampling, where someone randomly samples something until the output satisfies some criteria, rejecting all others.
In this case, timestamps were used for part of the seed, but we can see that some rejection criteria was applied because the immediate output was not taken. Each seed is taken from some apparently arbitrary index. Not all byte sequences produce valid seeds, so that is one likely criteria, but Anthropic notes that some valid seeds were passed over, which strongly suggests some unknown criteria in the rejection sampling.
Instead of calling this case closed, I would suggest investigating the curves produced by the rejected seeds for any unusual properties. It might give clues pointing to previously undiscovered weaknesses.
There is also the curious social context. NSA providing seeds to NIST without explanation is not a nothing-up-my-sleeve behaviour. Many people suspected a backdoor and they still never revealed the method. The “rumour” (created by an NSA employee) that it was produced by hashing a silly phrase turned out to be false. It would be quite strange for the agency itself to not know how the seeds were generated, and if it were something innocuous then it seems odd not to share it.
The truth is powerful, even the devil will use it if it benefits him.