Felix Hayu

[CHIEF @tailorMARIQUE]

I want you to watch this; this man broke down why housing is expensive in Accra and what can be done to fix it and then compare it to the one who went on that podcast to tell us ‘find a way to make more money’….

[Chipo Dendere @drDendere]

And also thanks to African governments who have refused to invest in HIV medication. There is absolutely no reason why nearly 30 years later African governments are not equipped to deal with HIV.

[Felix Hayu @FelixHayu]

@Maabena_ Beer

[Felix Hayu @FelixHayu]

@skinnyrabbito Sheygey 🤣🤣🤣🤣

[𝙒𝙢. @excusewilliam]

Instead of doctors and health workers sewing their lab coats and scrubs together to make one big mat for the patients to lie on, they are asking for the government to do its job.

How foolish and entitled of them.

[Simon Thazhigilla Simon🇳🇬 @Thazhigilla_]

That exact moment you step out of the OSCE station and realize you just confidently diagnosed a 65-year-old man with an ectopic pregnancy😹🚶🏾‍♂️

[Felix Hayu @FelixHayu]

@yaron__zango @af_ia_blue Panafricanism

[Felix Hayu @FelixHayu]

@skinnyrabbito Massa Massa

[Felix Hayu @FelixHayu]

@skinnyrabbito Oh snap….soft soft hard launch😛

[Michael Justus @mhjrad]

Did it hurt? When you memorized every brachial plexus branch and then never used that information once?

[Evan @EvanWritesOnX]

Whether this is true or not, one thing is very clear.

The traditional way you manage a hostile regime transition, is you degrade the hardline infrastructure over time.

Sanctions erode the economy,

proxies get picked off,

popular legitimacy collapses,

pragmatists gain leverage,

and eventually the regime negotiates from weakness or fractures internally.

What's being attempted here is a compression of that entire arc into weeks.

You don't water down the hardline IRGC establishment. You kill its leadership in a single operation, and then you dictate who fills the vacuum by eliminating everyone you don't want in it.

You kill the candidates you don't want. The ones left standing are, by definition, the ones you're willing to deal with.

The succession isn't being wiped out. It's being curated through internal elimination.

Who survives tells you who was meant to survive.

Pezeshkian is alive. Araghchi is alive. Larijani is alive.

The people with the phone numbers to call
Washington and the disposition to use them are all still breathing.

Meanwhile, the hardline clerical and IRGC command structure above them has been physically removed.

This is the most internally engineered succession I have ever seen in my lifetime.

[Felix Hayu @FelixHayu]

@Maabena_ Smh can’t even have a good thing.

[Felix Hayu @FelixHayu]

@yaron__zango Look at this dumb f£&k

[Peter Hague @peterrhague]

It’s called “review bombing”

[ThatPortharcourtBoy aka Nnukwu Nmanwu @ThatPHCBoy]

someone literally died from a snake bite the other day and you are talking about air defence systems. surely you jest

[Felix Hayu @FelixHayu]

@Maabena_ E over am🤣🤣🤣

[Felix Hayu @FelixHayu]

@skinnyrabbito Eeei is that so?🤣🤣🤣

[Felix Hayu @FelixHayu]

Ato is explaining.

[Cassiel Ato Forson (PhD) @Cassielforson]

CAUSES OF THE SITUATION AND THE WAY FORWARD

8. The current situation is largely driven by the unwillingness of buyers to purchase Ghana’s cocoa because it has become uncompetitive.

9. Cocoa from other producing countries is now selling at prices, significantly lower than the producer price of Ghana.

10. Meanwhile, COCOBOD did not have the liquidity to purchase cocoa from farmers and stock for hedging or other trading decisions. This was due to the financing model invented in 2024/25 when the syndicated loan failed. Under that model, the buyers (off-takers) financed the purchases.

12. By 2022, COCOBOD's finances had deteriorated badly. It defaulted and restructured the Cocoa Bills in 2023.

13. For the first time, in 2023, the annual syndication suffered significant delays due to loss of confidence in the Ghanaian economy. The first tranche was received on 22nd December 2023, four months after the commencement of the season.

14. COCOBOD projected an output of 800,000 tonnes, and committed 786,672 tonnes in contracts in the 2023/24 crop season. However, actual production was 432,145 tonnes, a deviation of 45% from the projected output.

15. Variations in crop forecasts typically vary between 5% to 15%. Hence, a deviation of 45% was unprecedented. This resulted in huge rollover contracts of 333,767 tonnes at an average price of US$2,661 per tonne.

16. This resulted in a loss of over US$1 billion which would have gone to cocoa farmers and other stakeholders.

17. In 2024, COCOBOD could not pay the final tranche of the syndicated loan which was due in July 2024, and received a US$70 million bridge financing from the Ministry of Finance to avert a default.

18. Despite a commitment to repay the US$70 million bridge finance owed to the Ministry of Finance, COCOBOD defaulted, highlighting the dire financial straits of the organization at the time. This debt has since been inherited by the current management of COCOBOD.

[Michael A. Arouet @MichaelAArouet]

Dubai real estate agents after the UK and France introduce a wealth tax.