Organizations shld not be scared of infiltration. It is part of life. You plan for it. You build an organization that is robust, malleable & fluid. Those of us in tech understand redundancy - duplication with the intent to avoid a single point of failure.
You are not going to beat the state at spycraft. They have perfected it and they have institutions dedicated to just doing that. CIO, MID etc they wake up every day thinking about how to destroy you & your organization. On the other hand, we run our organizations on a part-time basis.
Instead of fearing infiltration, you embrace it. You make it a game. You master the art of deception but most of all you make sure you do what is necessary to protect the organization. You implement Defensive Counterintelligence programs, you periodically do internal threat proofing.
The advantage we have over the state is the ability to adjust, adapt and move fast. The state is always dragged back by the inertia of bureacracy. Today CIO is behind on a lot of things - AI, crypto, blockchain tech, drone tech, quantum chii chii etc
Instead of sitting and wallowing "Maiweee ta infiltretwa!" , you create webs and mazes of functionality. You create mbudyos (outlets). You build with intentionality.
Most of all, constant mistrust, constant vigilance & constant mobility.
While I appreciate the academic effort to distinguish "term lengths" from "term limits," the argument is dangerous legal sophistry. It uses a strained, technical interpretation to find a semantic loophole in an unambiguous constitutional firewall.
The argument is unconstitutional, failing for three primary reasons:
1. It creates a false dichotomy between "term length" and "term limit."
2. It catastrophically misapplies the Mupungu precedent.
3. It willfully ignores the purposive language of Section 328(7).
I will break these down below:
1. The False Dichotomy
The central thesis that Section 95(2) (a 5-year length) is not a "term-limit provision" and thus evades Section 328(7); is a distinction without a legal difference.
A "term limit" of two terms (S. 91) is meaningless without the "term length" of five years (S. 95). They are inextricably linked. Arguing that Parliament can change the "length" to 20 years but not the "limit" of two terms renders the principle of limited government absurd.
Furthermore, the claim that S. 95 is "flexible" is a severe misreading:
"Except as otherwise provided...": This is a standard harmonization clause referring to existing provisions (like S. 158 wartime extensions), not a loophole for future amendments.
"Coterminous with... Parliament": This reinforces the 5-year term (S. 143), as it provides for shortening a term via early dissolution, not a basis for unilateral extension.
2. The Misapplication of Mupungu
The reliance on Mupungu v. Minister of Justice (CCZ 7/21) is a critical legal error.
In Mupungu, the Court ruled a judge's retirement age was not a term limit because it was a "non-specific effluxion of time" (contingent on a birthdate). A 5-year presidential term is the exact opposite: it is the very definition of a "fixed, determinable period."
Therefore, the Mupungu precedent actually supports the conclusion that S. 95(2) is a term-limit provision, entirely defeating the argument.
3. The Disregard of Section 328(7)
This is the argument's fatal flaw. The framers of S. 328(7) anticipated exactly this semantic trickery. The safeguard does not just ban amending "Section 91(2)"; it bans any amendment to a "term-limit provision" "the effect of which is to extend the length of time..."
A court will not ask what label is put on the amendment ("length adjustment"). It will ask what its effect is.
The only possible effect of amending "five years" to "seven years" is to "extend the length of time" the incumbent holds office. Therefore, S. 328(7) applies directly and prohibits the incumbent from benefiting.
4. A Note on Misreading Section 91(2)
The claim that S. 91(2) sets a minimum term ("three or more years") but no upper cap is a stunning misinterpretation. That clause is an anti-circumvention provision to define what counts as a "full term," preventing a president from resigning after 4 years and claiming it "doesn't count." It in no way implies a term can be longer than the 5 years explicitly set in S. 95.
This argument by the Professor who is yet to conclude his legal studies is an exercise in constitutional vandalism. The legal position is unambiguous and rests on a "double-lock" mechanism:
1. Any amendment changing "five years" to "seven" has the effect of extending the incumbent's time in office.
2. Section 328(7) explicitly prohibits such an amendment from benefiting the incumbent.
3. To make this amendment apply to the incumbent, Section 328(7) must first be repealed.
4. Repealing S. 328(7) requires a national referendum, as mandated by S. 328(9) and S. 328(6).
Any attempt to bypass this referendum via a semantic "term length" trick would be a flagrant violation of the Constitution and should be struck down.
I thank you. 🙏
In other countries you can leave your phone unattended no-one will take it nor will it attract thievery, the culture does make anyone feel entitled to taking things without consent .Rape isn’t caused by clothing — it’s caused by people who choose to ignore consent. If your respect for others depends on what they wear, the problem isn’t women’s outfits, the problem is you. It’s the culture that keeps getting cultivated by people like you!