አብይ ማለት አዲስ የኢኮኖሚ እድገት ማስመዝገብ ይቅርና፤ ከሀይለማሪያም ደሳለኝ የተረከበውን እንኳን ማቆየት አቅቶት ሀገር እያከሰረ ያለ ሰው ነው። ለምሳሌ ኢንዱስትሪ ፓርኮች ለ71 ሺህ በላይ ሰዎች የስራ እድል ፈጠረው 165 ሚሊዬን ዶላር ያክል የውጪ ምንዛሬ ያስገኙ ነበር። ዛሬ በኢንዱስትሪ ፓርኮች የሚሰሩ ሰዎች ቁጥር 10ሺ እንኳ አይሞላም። በጦርነት ምክንያት ከAGOA የምናገኘውን ጥቅም አሳጥቶን፤ የውጪ ኩባንያዎች ደሞ እንዲሸሹ በማደረግ ኢኮኖሚውን ለመቀየር ትልቅ አቅም የነበራችውን የኢንዱስትሪ ፓርኮች አክስሯቸዋል።
Instead of taking a hard look at the reasons for the collapse of the little that was achieved in industrialisation, Abiy and his cronies were busy with the “ኢትዮጵያ ታምርት” sloganeering. 🤦🏿♀️🤦🏿♀️
That is a classic example of replacing policy with a slogan.
ደሞ ቁምነገር እንደሰራ ሰው መፎከር ይቃጣዋል 🤔
Source: Addis Standard magazine 2022
“ይህ የእያንዳንዱ የኢትዮጲያ ወታደር ድምጽ ነው!”
I have been repeatedly arguing that the Ethiopian military is overstretched and exhausted due to these never ending civil wars. Now the soldiers are speaking up loud and clear saying “we are fed up” and asking the political class to resolve its difference through negotiations. Will Abiy listen or face the music down the road? Time will tell!!
#Egypt not serious about #Somalia
In this op-ed, Haitham El-Zobaidi, Executive Editor of Al Arab Publishing House, argues that Ethiopians can observe how #Egypt's attempts to intervene in eastern #Libya, #Sudan, and particularly #Gaza, have faltered despite Egypt's assertive rhetoric.
Formal meetings between Egypt and Somali officials further emphasize that Egypt's involvement in Somalia was primarily for show. “Formal meetings are another reminder of what Egypt intended from its “intervention” in Somalia: merely posturing,” Haitham says.
He further argues that while Somalia is engaged in a critical battle against the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, it is unlikely to provoke a conflict with #Somaliland to achieve national unity. “Any Egyptian forces that arrive, regardless of whether they do so within an African peacekeeping mandate or as a special mission backing the government in Somalia, are not about to involve themselves in an internal conflict, let alone to take part in a confrontation with Ethiopia.”
https://t.co/Txlwf7RXYm
I am glad to hear Ethiopia and Somalia have sent delegations to Türkiye to begin negotiations. Lets hope logic rather than emotion prevails resulting in mutually beneficial outcome. The following was my response to @addisstandard 's question regarding the disputes between the two countries. It was published in May.
===========
AS: There were many questions we wanted to ask you regarding current state of affairs in the Horn of Africa, but we are constrained by space. However, we can’t skip the recently announced Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland and the reactions that followed. It has not only been rejected by the government of Somalia, as expected, but also may have caused a reconfiguration of regional alliances. Is having access to the Sea such a crucial national interest for Ethiopia worth endangering conflict with Somalia and backlash from other countries? How do you access the strategy followed by the government?
JM: The controversy surrounding the MoU is an unfortunate development that has hurt all stakeholders involved. It was an avoidable crisis caused by the impatience, miscommunication, and miscalculations of leaders. It is unfortunate because it threatens to reverse the gains made in the last six years, which saw a significant improvement in bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Somalia.
If there is one positive foreign policy shift for which the current Ethiopian government can be credited, it is its diplomatic approach toward Somalia. The government made the right call to abandon its predecessor’s strategy of blatantly interfering in the internal affairs of Somalia, bringing the two peoples and countries closer. Despite maintaining a significant military presence in support of Mogadishu’s fight against the Al-Shabaab terror group, the Ethiopian side restrained itself from taking sides in Somalia’s factional politics. This shift resulted in reducing the hitherto anti-Ethiopian rhetoric among Somali political factions until it resurfaced following the signing of the MoU.
Although it was blown open with the MoU, divergent sentiments have been simmering between the two governments for the last two years. This was not caused by a disagreement on real or substantive issues of bilateral interest but rather due to mutual suspicions, unmet expectations, and exaggerated interpretation of relations with other states. The absence of an honest and direct dialogue to clear up mutual concerns created a fertile ground for a breakdown of relations with the announcement of the MoU.
It is important not to exacerbate the disagreement more than it should be, or we risk losing control of what unites us rather than divides us. Reverting to rhetoric that remind us of the Mengistu and Barre era was irresponsible and dangerous. We should not forget how irredentism, populist hysteria, and hyper-nationalism of yesteryear left us in ruins. We can and should re-imagine notions of sovereignty and approaches to mutual development in line with the cultural, social, linguistic, economic, and demographic bonds that link us.
Access to the sea for economic and security purposes is an essential national objective for Ethiopia, which successive leaders and generations of citizens aspired for. It is one of the most unifying agendas in our otherwise fragmented, chaotic, and polarized public sphere. Indeed, as the most populous and largest economy in the region, Ethiopia’s maritime access would enhance not only its interest but also significantly contribute to the region’s security and economic integration.
It is very important to note that it would be unrealistic to expect Ethiopia to remain a passive observer of the geopolitical dynamics in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden at a time when far-flung states, large and small, continue to secure a naval presence. Although not a coastal state itself, Ethiopia sees accessing the sea as having a direct impact on its economy and security. The perennial quest to establish sustained maritime access is also driven by a desire to safeguard its sphere of influence against encroachment by geopolitical adversaries. Just as the Ethiopian leadership should pursue access to the sea through consultation rather than confrontation, coastal states must also be pragmatic and open to the idea of cooperating for mutual benefit. Unreasonably blocking Ethiopia from accessing the sea coast while offering it to far away states would only serve populist and militaristic leaders to agitate destructive confrontation.
Instead of aggressive posturing that revives memories, we should deliberate behind closed doors to jointly imagine a brighter collective future through cooperation. The issue of access to the sea should not be presented as a unilateral undertaking for the benefit of Ethiopia alone. It should be seen as just one element of a multifaceted project to improve collective security and development through consensus-based regional integration.
The Horn of Africa is highly interdependent economically, politically, and on matters of security, yet remains fragmented, serving as a cause of conflict rather than cooperation. None of the states in this region are self-sufficient, whether in ensuring internal security or sustained economic development. For decades, we have been wasting our meager resources on undermining each other rather than extricating ourselves from extreme poverty and perpetual conflict. This needs to change.
The need for regional integration has been an issue widely accepted by citizens and leaders alike. However, it remains elusive because the focus has been on the political aspect, which makes it difficult to move forward. Due to antagonistic history and unsettled domestic politics within each country, any initiative aimed at coordination among states at the political level provokes fear and suspicion. Fearing erosion of their grip on power, leaders tap into such sentiment to undermine political cooperation. To overcome this challenge, the effort at regional integration needs careful sequencing of its economic, security, and political components. The starting point should be the economy.
Our economies are already intertwined, but mostly informally. If we take the informal/ unofficial flow, Ethiopia’s trade volume with its coastal neighbors is estimated to be more than double that of our trade with faraway partners. Formalizing and increasing this economic interaction by synchronizing our laws to guarantee incentives for trade and upgrading infrastructure to streamline the movement of goods and labor needs to be the focus. If effectively executed, this will lead to growing interaction between institutions, and overlapping of material interest among the population, gradually softening suspicion and shifting public opinion to support even greater cooperation. A growing economic integration would also necessitate greater security coordination to protect the movement of goods and services and enforce mutually agreed-upon laws. By then, material gains from years of cooperation and frequent interaction among citizens and officials would produce a great degree of trust, enabling us to overcome the burden of history and making it possible to embark on some form of political union if necessary.
Looking at other regional integration initiatives that have made progress, we notice that they prioritized economic cooperation, delaying the political component. The integration of Europe began with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), later upgraded to the European Economic Community (EEC) and, eventually, the European Union ( EU). In Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) similarly started with the aim of fostering cooperation among countries towards economic growth and socio-cultural progress. Closer to home, the East African Community, although it envisions eventual political integration in the form of a federation, prioritizes promoting economic cooperation through a common market as the first step.
What each of these regional initiatives has in common, in addition to prioritizing economic cooperation, is ensuring the guarantee of the political independence of member states. Despite having a vision of greater political unity at some point in the future, they avoided tampering with sensitive issues such as domestic political affairs and borders. They left political integration to be a natural product of successful economic cooperation at a later date.
This should be a lesson for the Horn region. The path toward escaping abject poverty and debilitating conflict is to focus on fostering economic cooperation. Our experience with irredentism and attempts at military domination did not help any side emerge stronger; they left us with failed states, shattered communities, and paralyzed economies. Also, lofty promises of political integration that flare up during brief periods when leaders get along have yet to materialize. A case in point is the much-hyped tripartite alliance between Presidents Isaias, Farmajo, and Prime Minister Abiy.
I know that I digressed from the issue of access to the sea that you asked about. That is because I believe these countries should focus on the bigger picture rather than being bogged down on seasonal controversies. If we are going to have a substantive discussion, the issue of access to the sea should be discussed within the larger regional integration agenda. Most importantly, Ethiopia’s endeavor to secure maritime access needs comprehensive planning, confidence-building measures, and an anchor narrative that centers on regional integration. The controversy surrounding the MoU has also exposed how our diplomacy has taken the back seat. The government should use it as an opportunity to reassess the low value accorded to diplomacy and foreign policy.