This guy is becoming mad .This indicates that he got millions of Dollars from Abyi regime. Please don't be hurry and conclude the warr situation as things will not be easy for the regime. Don't be the best layer of the year!
What Has Changed in Tigray?
We are witnessing something unusual in Tigray as town after town, residents come onto the streets to welcome ENDF/TPF forces after the TPLF is pushed out. What first looked to me like an isolated reaction in southern Tigray has continued farther north, with the crowds appearing to grow along the way.
When Alamata, the first major town to fall, was taken, I initially thought the explanation was straightforward. The TPLF had long faced political difficulties in the area, and many residents were already hostile toward it.
Mekelle surprised me. Even then, I wondered whether the crowds were largely urban youth sympathetic to Getachew Reda, or whether some of the scenes had been encouraged by pro-government networks.
But as similar scenes appeared in different cities and towns, including today in Adigrat, where we saw the largest crowd so far, that explanation became increasingly difficult to sustain on its own. What I first thought could be explained locally was beginning to look like a wider pattern.
That pattern becomes even more striking when compared with 2020. When the ENDF entered Tigrayan towns then, the dominant images were empty streets, fear and uncertainty, with nothing resembling the public welcomes we are seeing six years later as the TPLF retreats. The contrast raises a much larger question about what has changed inside Tigrayan society during the years in between.
Some of that change may reflect exhaustion with TPLF rule. After decades of political dominance, the organisation has been weakened by internal division, disputes among political and military leaders, accusations of corruption and abuse, and another round of mobilisation. Families that already paid an extraordinary price during the previous war may simply have reached the limits of what they are prepared to sacrifice under the same political leadership.
Yet dissatisfaction alone does not fully explain why people are willing to express themselves so openly. People can lose confidence in a political movement and still remain quiet when they believe its armed forces may return. Coming onto the streets carries personal and political risk. The growing willingness to do so may therefore indicate that fear of a TPLF return is also receding and that some residents are beginning to see the balance of power inside Tigray differently.
That changing perception is probably reinforced by the composition of the forces entering these towns. Residents are seeing ENDF soldiers alongside the Tigray Peace Force, whose members carry Tigrayan symbols and include fighters and commanders from the region. Their presence gives the change of power a recognisably Tigrayan dimension and may make it easier for communities shaped by the experience of the previous war to accept.
Years of conflict have also left many people exhausted. When fighting moves away, roads reopen, businesses begin functioning and ordinary life starts returning, relief itself can bring people onto the streets. The same crowd can include people disappointed with the TPLF, people hopeful about a political alternative and people whose immediate concern is simply that their children should not live through another war.
Getachew Reda’s return to Mekelle should be understood within this changing political mood. The reception he received suggests that there is still space for Tigrayan political leadership outside the current TPLF establishment, particularly among constituencies frustrated with the direction of the old leadership.
For Getachew, however, the moment also carries a warning from his own recent experience. During his leadership of the interim administration, he enjoyed considerable goodwill, especially among younger Tigrayans, and had an opportunity to turn that support into a durable political base. He failed to use that momentum before the old establishment and influential military actors regained the initiative. If another opening is emerging, he will need to understand that public goodwill becomes politically meaningful only when it is organised and translated into a credible alternative. He has already seen how quickly such an opportunity can disappear.
These scenes cannot tell us exactly how far the change extends across Tigrayan society. But after Alamata, Mekelle and the succession of towns farther north, it is becoming increasingly difficult to treat what we are seeing as a passing reaction to one military advance. The repetition itself is politically significant in a region where the TPLF once enjoyed an unusually strong identification with the defence of Tigrayan political interests.
The deeper question is whether that relationship is now beginning to weaken. The TPLF may be losing territory, but the more consequential loss would be the assumption that Tigrayan society will naturally return to it once the battlefield settles. If that assumption is fading, the struggle over what replaces it may become the defining political contest inside Tigray after the war.
Do Not Squander This Opportunity: Suggestion for Building a New Political Order in Tigray
To our Tigrayan brothers and sisters, the latest developments present not only another dramatic turn in Tigray’s long political crisis, but also a rare opportunity to determine what should come next.
With the latest developments dislodging the TPLF, which monopolised political power in Tigray and ultimately paralysed the region’s politics, there is now an opportunity to rebuild and transform the region. If handled wisely, this moment could create space for genuine political pluralism and potentially make Tigray a model of competitive regional democracy within the Ethiopian federation.
To seize this opportunity, I would suggest:
(1) Establish an inclusive interim administration that brings together talent, experience and wisdom from across Tigray’s political and social spectrum. It should have a clearly defined transitional mandate and create a credible path toward representative institutions, genuine political competition and elections rather than becoming another indefinite political arrangement.
(2) Develop a common roadmap for political transition, reconstruction and Tigray’s reintegration into the Ethiopian federation.
(3) Protect civilians and prevent revenge or collective punishment, regardless of political affiliation or perceived association with any side. A new political order cannot build legitimacy while communities fear retaliation, dispossession or abuse.
(4) Negotiate boldly and pragmatically with the federal government to secure Tigray’s fair share of federal resources and reconstruction assistance while restoring a functional political and constitutional relationship between Tigray and the federal government.
(5) Undertake a professionally managed DDR process for TPLF and TPF combatants once the fighting ends, with a strong emphasis on reintegration into civilian life or, where appropriate, legitimate security institutions. This should include negotiating the integration of a sufficient number of experienced and qualified fighters into federal security forces.
(6) Establish an intra-Tigray reconciliation process to address the deep political and social divisions created by years of conflict. A sustainable political transition will require rebuilding relationships among Tigrayans themselves, not simply changing who governs the region.
(7) Work with the federal and Amhara regional governments to facilitate the return and resettlement of IDPs and resolve territorial disputes through negotiation rather than renewed conflict.
(8) The federal government has an equally important responsibility not to repeat the mistakes of 2020. It should resist the temptation to build another regional administration around actors chosen primarily for their ties to Addis Ababa. Instead, it should create the political, security, and economic conditions in which Tigrayans can build a genuinely inclusive transitional arrangement.
The fall of one political order does not automatically produce a better one. Replacing TPLF dominance with another form of political monopoly, exclusion or externally constructed authority would only reproduce the underlying problem in a different form.
The real opportunity is therefore larger than changing who governs Tigray. It is an opportunity to move beyond a political system repeatedly shaped by monopoly, armed struggle and exclusion, and to build one in which different Tigrayan political voices can organise, compete and disagree without turning every struggle for political power into another struggle over the future of the region.
That is the opportunity before Tigray. Do not squander it.
Breaking News‼️
Ethiopian National Defense forces (ENDF) advancing toward Alamata after fighting shifts from morning clashes.
Ethiopian National Defense Forces left Kobo this morning, passed through Waja, and are now approaching Alamata town.
According to multiple sources, ENDF won’t stop until completely take over Tigray and reached to Asmara, 🇪🇷
OLA's move is the smartest https://t.co/ZIqNEdPF9x exposed the narrathat PP regime belongs to Oromo people rather it is the worst enemy of Oromo people of all times and all of Ethiopian regimes
Bombshell‼️
According to a BBC News Amharic report, Amhara FANO National Movements leader Zemene Kassie agreed to dismantle Ethiopia’s empire with Ola-Shane says Jaal Jeregna in his interview with BBC Afan Oromo. Jaal Jeregna’s real name is Zelalem Tefera and his ethnicity is Gojam Amhara.
However he is a senior adviser to the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA).
According to the report, he stated that the OLA-Shane’s core political stance hasn’t changed despite joining the coalition.
Jaal Jeremain also stated, "They are the ones who came to us; we did not go to them."
https://t.co/xnDd6O69TR
@biscuit34756@hawwiijatani Yaadiikee kuun yaada dabeessaati.uumata m50 abaluu kana jedhee sana jedhee xibaaruun kuun nama dhiba .yeroo faannoon dhufee finfinnee dhunfatuu eessa jirta?