Huldreich Stroh

Wiederauferstandener Gladiator aus dem alten Rom, der die Welt um sich her verwundert durch die Brille der Satire betrachtet

[Huldreich Stroh @HuldreichS]

One cannot emphasise this enough…
one of the tenets of history.

[Titus Flavius Vespasianus @Verboten_Truth]

@Aristotle7777 …and each will think themselves unique. Not like the other girls.

A sad state tbh.

[Aristotle 🏛️ @Aristotle7777]

This is more evidence for my theory that a lot of female behavior is based on social cues and copying other people, rather than thinking for themselves.

[Ban Notice 🇺🇸 @BannedNotice]

@BrianAtlas How long before "feminism was created by men to enslave women to careers and personal responsibilities"

[Huldreich Stroh @HuldreichS]

@BrianAtlas Wow, exactly, let’s get back together before the 60ies! 😆
But she is blunt about seeing Marriage as about using a man like cattle for her advantage.
So I thank her for opening my eyes and consider she has to walk this path alone….

[Huldreich Stroh @HuldreichS]

@MarcheseMethods She’s showing possible male audience that she is above.
Long time ago I had interaction with a girl, on our first phone call as a (potential) couple she did the same and didn’t stop after I was asking. She wanted to show her aloofness.

[Une Bonne Droite 👊🏻 @BonneDroite]

Le premier bénéfice qu'on retire d'une origine populaire est de n'avoir aucun respect pour le peuple : le second, de n'avoir aucune peur de la gauche ; le troisième, de n'avoir aucune fascination pour la racaille.

— Michel Houellebecq

[Richard Arion @RichardArion1]

Rape being mislabeled by women is not because of regret becoming rape. The cause is far more sinister.

Women are cognitively incapable of differentiating heinous crimes from harmless acts because their minds are devoid of any concept of a tangible aggression that exists an act besides themselves.

Women only understand rape insofar as it relates to their sense of power. They perceive rape to be a violation of their sense of situational dominance. It has nothing to do with aggression. When women speak of “consent” they are referring to their DOMINANCE.

Feminine cognition is structured to perceive potential danger as an absolute crime because their cognition is made to protect their frail bodies incapable of directly dealing with physical violence.

Any indication that women weren’t in full control = a crime could have been committed= a crime was committed = rape

This is why women cannot be allowed to have political participation

[Huldreich Stroh @HuldreichS]

@MattRob78281471 But his „personal fulfillment“ is something that rebounds the individual to the „real“ (overindividual) self?

[Stirling Cooper @StirlingWisdom]

Man expresses enthusiasm = creep

Man expresses frustration = incel

Man expresses anger = toxic

Man expresses sadness = weak

Man shares emotions other than happiness = emotional labor

Man shares no emotions at all = emotionally distant

What did I miss?

[Huldreich Stroh @HuldreichS]

@MattRob78281471 So it follows that Aquinas allows for abortion up to the point the intellectual soul is created and united to the body?

[Plato's Stepchild @MattRob78281471]

I term Nicomachean Ethics "Boomer Ethics", because it enjoyed a strong renaissance in 1970s pop psychology: achieving "levels of happiness" and "self-actualization."

Many Boomers adopted our Aristotle at a practical level, sharing a natural affinity for his godless materialism.

[cliff @cliffster]

Attention Chris Hatch:

I am surrounded by 20-35 year old women in my life that are dumb, incapable, useless, and fat. Everybody is fucking them. Not sure what the deal is, but I don't get it....

1. Their body count is higher than my victory royale count in fortnite.

2. They get 100s of matches per week on dating apps, they literally don't see me as a human.

3. They make more money than me in the same position.

4. They go to female-only gyms for their yoga classes to avoid me.

5. If I somehow get their number, they text back one word responses.

6. If I take them on a dinner date, they stare at their phone the whole time to get a free meal out of me.

7. They think I'm a weak bitch soyboy if I give them princess treatment bc they're comparing me to one of the dozen chads they've fucked in the last year.

8. If I date well below my SMV-match, she still thinks she's better than me and feels like she's settling for me, expecting me to be her wallet.

9. She expects me to be an infallible provider who makes no mistakes, ready to leave me the instant I lose frame by giving her the ick for sneezing the wrong way.

I can keep going until I find a unicorn, but she is at minimum 1 in 1000. It is completely unrealistic.
My life is empty and meaningless knowing I will never have a companion. I wish you never experience the same misfortune in life. Happy Coping.

[Yuri Bezmenov's Ghost @Ne_pas_couvrir]

As the West imports populations with strong ethnocollectivist loyalties, the primary axis of political competition will increasingly shift from the left–right distinctions to ethnic bloc politics. Blank-slate fundamentalism obscures this shift, while strands of Left theory demoralize some Westerners into helping bring it about.

The concept of Left and Right originated in the seating arrangements of French Revolutionary politics, dividing defenders of inherited authority from advocates of revolutionary change. Over time, the left frame came to encompass disputes over property, class, hierarchy, equality, and political legitimacy. So, left–right is a historically particular European political framework; it is, then, a mistake to assume it is a universal organizing human principle.

Within that evolving framework, the emerging 19th-c. socialist Left developed a far more ambitious philosophy of history, whose underlying logic would persist in later strands of revolutionary and critical thought. Rousseau had identified private property as a decisive source of inequality, but Moses Hess went further, joining Hegelian dialectics to a secularized history of human redemption. History became a movement from original unity through alienation and social division toward a higher, consciously achieved reconciliation.

Before Marx's communist theory took shape, Hess had already made alienation, communal human existence, and the philosophy of action (Philosophie der Tat) central to a socialist program addressing money and economic relations. Marx drew heavily on Hess's framework, developing it through a more extensive analysis of political economy and history. But he also took Hess's openly redemptive vision of history, papered over much of its religious and esoteric language with the language of science and historical necessity, and kept the underlying structure intact. Hess spoke in the name of redemption; Marx in the name of history. Private property, money, and estranged labor expressed a deeper rupture in human existence, to be overcome through revolutionary praxis and the recovery of species-being. Transforming society also meant transforming man himself.

So, this philosophy of history treats bourgeois society as an alienated order to be overcome through revolutionary praxis. Within influential post-Marxist and later critical traditions, the critique extends beyond capitalism to the inherited institutions, norms, and hierarchies of Western civ. Marginalized identity groups increasingly assume the emancipatory role once assigned to the proletariat. Western civilization itself becomes an object of negation and transformation, its eventual sublation presented as progress toward a higher social order.

Yet this “universalism” is applied selectively in these Left frameworks. Western institutions and collective identities are treated as expressions of historical oppression, while the ethnocultural identities of marginalized groups are affirmed through recognition, liberation, and self-determination. Western particularity becomes something to overcome, while the particularity of others becomes something to preserve. This is the Left's ontological and teleological inversion of reality: Western civilization is recast as a structure of oppression, and its dismantling as progress toward a higher social order. The promise of universal emancipation thus accommodates particularistic struggles for group identity and power. This is a cultural solvent, and Western civilization is what it dissolves.

The result of internalizing this frame is demoralization. Westerners who internalize this framework come to regard defending their inherited civilization as morally suspect, even an obstacle to human progress. As these assumptions spread through education, institutions, and political discourse, they determine which collective loyalties are legitimate and which must be overcome. People can help destabilize their inherited institutions, interpret the resulting crises as justification for further transformation, and eventually lose control over what replaces them. No coordinated plan is necessary. People simply apply the framework.

Blank-slate assumptions reinforce this process by treating inherited political loyalties as products of socialization that citizenship and common institutions can supersede. What's more, these assumptions camouflage the political transformation underway. Westerners are encouraged to believe that populations with strong ethnocollectivist loyalties will eventually shed them through assimilation into a shared civic identity, even as the same Left frameworks encourage those groups to organize around those very loyalties.

Yet kinship, tribe, religion, and ethnos have organized human societies for millennia. The same frameworks that affirm ethnic solidarity among marginalized groups cast comparable solidarity among European-origin populations as illegitimate. Those who internalize this asymmetry may find themselves competing against organized ethnic blocs while attacking members of their own population who assert similar collective interests.

This asymmetry carries into electoral politics. Organized blocs can concentrate votes, coordinate demands, and make their support conditional. Britain's 2024 general election illustrates the mechanism. The Muslim Vote campaign endorsed candidates around community priorities, often across traditional party lines. In constituencies where Muslims made up at least 20% of the population, Labour's vote share fell by an average of 22.7 percentage points compared with 2019, while rising 5.5 points in constituencies where they made up less than 5%. Gaza was the immediate issue, and the shift cannot simply be attributed to one organization. Still, it illustrates how religious and community-based political mobilization can disrupt established party loyalties.

Also, the organizational advantage matters more than numbers alone. A cohesive minority can exert considerable influence when its members coordinate their political demands, while a larger, more atomized population dispersed across competing parties and priorities may struggle to act collectively. Politicians do respond to groups that can reliably deliver votes, withhold support, or threaten an incumbent's position. Representation, resources, and institutional influence become subjects of collective bargaining.

As the European-origin share of the electorate declines relative to populations from more collectivist cultural backgrounds, the balance between individualist and group-oriented political traditions may shift with it. Where those collective loyalties translate into coordinated electoral action, demographic change also changes the distribution of political bargaining power. A more individualist population, dispersed across competing parties and priorities, then face pressure to organize counter-blocs to preserve its influence.

This creates a self-reinforcing process. Successful collective mobilization encourages competing groups to organize in response, making ethnic allegiance increasingly consequential even for those who initially rejected that basis of political competition. Parties can retain their familiar ideological language even as the coalitions sustaining them reorganize along ethnic lines. Left and Right may linger as political labels, while the contest over how society should be governed increasingly gives way to competition over what ethnos-bloc controls its institutions.

[Li Mengbai @lvjin1993]

小孩问庄子，什么是诡辩。庄子反问：我家来了两个客人，一个很干净，一个很脏。我请他俩洗澡，你觉得谁会洗？
小孩脱口而出；肯定是脏的那个!
庄子摇摇头：不对。干净的人爱干净，脏的人不在乎脏，应该是干净的人洗。
小孩赶紧改口：那就是干净的洗。
庄子又笑了：又错了。干净的人没必要洗，脏的人才需要洗，是脏的洗。
小孩情了：那到底是谁洗？
庄子说：干净的人有习惯，脏的人有需要，两个人都洗。不等小孩反应，他又补了一句；其实俩人都不洗，干净的不用洗，脏���不爱洗。
小孩彻底迷糊。
庄子这才点明：这就是诡辩。逻辑都通顺，但答案却不一样，很多人跟你争论，逻辑听着都没问题，但结论可以随意变换。
绕来绕去，目的不是求真，���是把你绕晕。
遇到这种诡辩，不必争辩。

[Huldreich Stroh @HuldreichS]

@iulstiteo @_quodvultdeus No. Where? John 8:1-11?

[Girardism @Girardism]

“Everything, in fact, is false, theatrical, and artificial in desire except the immense hunger for the sacred.”

— René Girard, ‘Deceit, Desire, and the Novel,’ ch. 2

[Adriana Flowers 🌸 @Adriana19Flower]

If you wonder why there’s masses of women who worship Lindsay Clancy, a child killer, this is why.

They clap, smile, and rejoice when children are killed. They see it as liberation, and they see children as the source of female oppression; an extension of the “suffering” that men implant on women.

These women think they are God, and the godless men allowing this are facilitating such view.

Babies are no longer the most innocent and pure class of humans to be protected, they are parasites that interfere with a woman’s freedom.

Socially acceptable female degeneracy is at an all time high

This is demonic.

[Adriana Flowers 🌸 @Adriana19Flower]

Tradcons: “Why aren’t men getting married? Why aren’t they getting with the countless of marriageable, God fearing, women at church that are waiting to find their husband? Men need to man up and stop watching porn! Porn and video games are the problem!”

The women being offered at church: