Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦

🇺🇦 Las palabras demuestran quien eres.

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

@LOVREGA Eres de esas personas que buscan constantemente cualquier cosita que les puede ayudar para desprestigiar a quien odian. Todos los días de tu vida, ya durante años. Entonces, eres una persona bastante patética, no? Tu vida es odio, qué triste.

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

@DrewPavlou What the heck are you? Do you really think you are the freedom-loving patriot who can just tell us how society works?

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

@MLopezSanMartin @VicenteFoxQue Desde una perspectiva política, me parece bien que Sheinbaum se reúna con Trump. Pero tú no lo ves así. Solo buscas oportunidades para hablar mal de la presidenta.

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

@VicenteFoxQue Así eres: para los amigos no aplica la ley.

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

@MaxKaiser75 ¿Te has preguntado alguna vez si tu enfoque conduce a algo y si tus actividades son realmente significativas? Un poco de autocrítica, entonces; ¿puedes con eso?

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

@SimonLevyMx Eres un charlatan.

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

@SimonLevyMx Cómo vas a sanar si te encuentras en una situación no sana?

[PUBLIKA @Publika_ge]

It has been 7 years since the brutal crackdown on the anti-Russian protest held in Tbilisi on June 20, 2019. Today's march was dedicated to commemorating that day.

We would also like to remind you that protests are still being held in Tbilisi every day.

#GeorgiaProtests

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

@temoris Está bien criticar a “Occidente”, porque allí hay mucho que mejorar. Pero parece que prefieres países donde la democracia y los derechos humanos son pisoteados de forma terrible.Por qué por ejemplo no puedes criticar al gobierno de Israel y también al gobierno de Irán?

[Anton Gerashchenko @Gerashchenko_en]

President Zelenskyy met with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Brussels - the first meeting since the strain in relations

This marks the first personal contact between the leaders of Ukraine and Poland following the escalation of the Polish-Ukrainian dispute.

Not only the quality of bilateral relations but also the security and future of the entire Eastern European region depend on Ukrainian-Polish mutual understanding. This is precisely why current disputes over historical memory require exceptional caution. In the face of Russian aggression, any rift between Ukraine and Poland quickly becomes a matter of regional security.
Poland has every right to its own memory - to the pain of Volyn, to the demand for a dignified commemoration of the victims, and to an honest conversation about the difficult pages of our shared history. This pain cannot be minimized or dismissed as secondary.
However, precisely because Poland is not currently waging a war on its own territory and does not live under the daily emotional strain experienced by Ukrainian society, a particular strategic restraint is expected of it. Poland's strength as a regional leader lies not in publicly disciplining Ukraine, but in maintaining the broader framework of shared security.
Ukraine is operating under the conditions of an existential war. Its symbolic policy often stems from the need to restore historical continuity that was disrupted by empires for centuries; many controversial figures and movements are perceived here primarily through the prism of resistance to Moscow. This does not justify all of Kyiv's decisions. Ukraine must also learn to distinguish more clearly between anti-imperial resistance and moral responsibility for the dark pages of the past - it has enough of its own heroes to build a pantheon without unnecessary recourse to the most painful historical codes.
And yet, the responsibility of the sides is asymmetric. Ukraine is fighting, losing cities, people, energy, and psychological resources. Poland has more room for cold strategic thinking - meaning its reaction should be statesmanlike rather than emotional.
Poland can and should speak about history. But this conversation cannot become a tool for pressuring Ukraine, an argument against its European future, or material for domestic political mobilization. In such a form, memory stops healing the past and begins destroying the future. The greatest danger is when it turns into the language of ultimatums: that is when the dialogue between allies devolves into a mutual settling of scores.

This is exactly what Russia wants. Moscow does not necessarily need a military victory to weaken Europe's eastern flank. It is enough to shake the trust between Warsaw and Kyiv, amplify mutual grievances, and weaponize historical memory.
Therefore, mutual understanding is not a gesture of goodwill, but a vital component of the security architecture of Central and Eastern Europe. Poland plays a unique role here: as Ukraine's advocate in Europe, a pillar of NATO's eastern flank, and a state that helps the region speak with its own voice.
But for this to happen, it is crucial for Poland not to slide back into the patterns of a "big brother" or a moral arbiter. True leadership lies elsewhere - in acknowledging one's own historical pain without letting it destroy the alliance, in demanding the truth without humiliating the partner, in remembering the past without losing the future.
Ukraine has its own share of the work to do as well. It must speak with Poland more attentively, sensitively, and maturely - acknowledging that certain symbols of its liberation movement are associated by Poles not with freedom, but with trauma and death.
Poland has a chance to demonstrate not only solidarity but also mature leadership. Ukraine has the opportunity to show that its struggle for statehood does not require silencing discussion of its complex past. Both states have the chance to prove that historical truth and a strategic alliance do not contradict each other. This opportunity must not be lost: the cost of misunderstanding will not be measured in diplomatic crises, but in the security and future of the entire region.

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

@SimonLevyMx @PTnacionalMX @jorgegogdl Hay algo triste en que hables de hipocresía de los demás.

[Maria Avdeeva @maria_avdv]

Ukraine hits Russian refineries that finance and sustain the war.

Russia hits ancient monasteries, museums, homes.

They believe destroying our culture and terrorizing civilians will break Ukraine.

They are wrong.

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

@temoris Totalmente de acuerdo. Y Putin y Xi hacen lo mismo.

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

@NaturPictures Por qué lo tiras al agua en vez que meterlo al agua con cuidado y respeto?

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

Me gustaría tomar algunas decisiones, pero no es tan sencillo.
Es una frase vacía.

[Citlalli Hernández Mora @CitlaHM]

En México decidimos las y los mexicanos 🇲🇽

[Marika Mikiashvili 🇬🇪🇺🇦🇪🇺 @Mikiashvili_M]

Day 549 of #GeorgiaProtests

New, free and fair parliamentary elections and the unconditional release of all regime prisoners.

📷 @GeorgeBurj

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

@RompevientoTV “Silencio oficial” del gobierno?
El Canciller Velasco:
https://t.co/mvjtKFU4QZ

[LupitaJuarez @LupitaJuarezH]

🚨🔴 Exige el canciller #SRE Roberto Velasco al gobierno de Israel que se respeten los derechos humanos de connacionales detenidos que viajan la Flotilla Global Sumud, entre los que se encuentran Sol González Eguía, Violeta Remedios Núñez Rodriguez y Paulina del Castillo Poblano, quienes fueron interceptados por las Fuerzas de Ocupación israelíes en aguas internacionales en su camino a Gaza.

«Exigimos, particularmente a las autoridades israelíes, el pleno respeto a los derechos humanos de nuestros connacionales detenidos en el marco de la Flotilla Global Sumud.

Reafirmamos la necesidad de que se garantice su integridad física, trato digno y acceso consular inmediato, en cumplimiento del derecho internacional.
Desde la @SRE_mx seguimos en contacto con sus familias, con nuestros equipos consulares activados y en coordinación con otros países cuyos ciudadanos participan en la flotilla. No descansaremos hasta asegurar su protección y una solución pronta», escribió Velasco.

[Anton Gerashchenko @Gerashchenko_en]

A war of orders: Russia, Ukraine, and the future of Europe in three texts.

My attention was drawn to three recent texts that read like a single argument. Duncan Allan explains why Russia is destroying the European order built after 1991. Olena Snigyr shows what kind of order Russia is building in its place. The SWP study describes what is emerging in response: European security with Ukraine inside it and Russia outside it.

The shared conclusion is clear. The war against Ukraine is not a war over territory. It is a war over how Europe is structured: who has the right to sovereignty, and who gets to write the rules of security.

Duncan Allan identifies the root cause. Russia acts according to the logic of a great power - and this is not merely about strength or influence, but about special rights: to rule at home without outside criticism, to maintain a sphere of influence, to limit the choices of its neighbors, and to demand recognition as an equal. This leads to a conclusion that many avoid: the issue is not NATO. What Moscow cannot tolerate is the very idea that neighboring states can choose their own course independently. That destroys the Russian hierarchy in which states are not equal.

Olena Snigyr shows what exactly Russia is building in place of what it has destroyed. The Russian international order is a system of unequal circles. At the center is Russia itself and the space of its direct control. Further out are neighbors held in place through force, dependency, intimidation, and bought elites. Further still are partners tied by benefit, anti-Western solidarity, and a shared interest in weakening the West. The tools vary - violence, gas, debt, corruption, information campaigns. The principle is the same: the world is divided into zones of influence among several powers, and Russia is among those that decide for others.

Here, both authors converge: Russia’s foreign policy is the export of its domestic order. Allan describes the current system as wartime Putinism resting on three pillars: repression, anti-Western mobilization, and a militarized economy. Snigyr shows that the same logic is projected outward. Russia does not simply want influence - it reproduces around itself its own model of power: coercion, control, dependency, and managed approval.

That is why not only tanks and gas contracts matter, but narratives as well. The Russian order rests on stories: the external enemy, “traditional values,” a special path, the cult of Victory, the “historical unity” of peoples. These stories turn violence into “protection,” dependency into “brotherhood,” and the seizure of another country’s sovereignty into “historical justice.”

Ukraine and Belarus occupy a special place. Control over them is not a trophy, but part of the answer to the question of what Russia itself is. If Ukraine consolidates itself as a sovereign European state, it is not only Russia’s plan of influence that collapses - the very story through which the Kremlin justifies itself collapses as well. That is why the war is not instrumental for the regime, but existential. At stake is Moscow’s right to decide the fate of its neighbors - and its demand that the West recognize this right.

SWP adds a third dimension: Europe’s response. The old model, in which Russia was treated as a partner or at least a necessary interlocutor, can no longer be restored. The question is now different: how to build European security with Ukraine inside the system - and without Russia among those who write its rules. Russia is not going anywhere; it remains the main military threat. But from a co-creator of the order, it has turned into a state from which that order must be defended. Ukraine, meanwhile, is moving in the opposite direction - from a “security problem” into one of its supporting pillars. The former buffer and object of other people’s agreements has become a condition of a stable European order: one guaranteed by the Ukrainian army, resilience, and political choice.

This is where the three texts come together. Allan explains why compromise with Russia is so difficult: its demands are not about concessions, but about the very principle of order. Snigyr explains why Russia will not back down: the project is embedded in the way the regime holds power and sees itself. SWP explains why the response is becoming a restructuring of European security around Ukraine and against the Russian threat.

The same framework also exposes the weak point. From the outside, Russia looks invulnerable: it adapts to sanctions, shifts the economy onto a war footing, applies pressure through repression, and maintains support through fear and control of information. But endurance is not stability. Snigyr shows where the limit lies: the system can absorb gradual pressure, but not simultaneous pressure. Economic collapse can be absorbed.

Military defeat can be rewritten by propaganda. Political crisis can be suppressed. But when the pillars weaken together, rather than one by one, the regime loses its ability to adapt.

Snigyr also points to the paradox: the regime’s greatest strength is also its point of fragility. All the legitimacy of power is concentrated in one figure - this provides control, but it also makes the system hostage to one person. Once that center disappears, the regime begins to disintegrate from within until it finds a replacement.

The conclusion for Europe is direct. If the challenge is not only military, then the response cannot be only military either. Defense, support for Ukraine, sanctions, technological containment, and strategic clarity are necessary - but not sufficient. Russia is fighting over how people see reality, history, and justice. Therefore, Europe must defend not only borders, but also the ability to call things by their names. Aggression is not a “conflict of interests.” A sphere of influence is not a “security guarantee.” Conquest is not “historical justice.” And peace is not a return to an order in which the aggressor dictates rules to the victim.

Together, these texts show one thing: Russia’s war against Ukraine is the front line of a wider war of orders. Russia is destroying a model in which states choose their own path. Ukraine is defending not only its territory, but that principle itself. And Europe is reaching the conclusion it avoided for a long time: its security cannot be built by appeasing Russia - only by including Ukraine, containing Russia, and defending the rules without which Europe ceases to be itself.

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

https://t.co/bSOfBUSJsU

[Mich Irenaeus 🇺🇦 @IrenaeusMich]

@PartidoMorenaMx Y los demás 52%?