@maazrsn@FergiesRightRef@markgoldbridge Roberto Martinez will go down as one of the worst coaches to have 2 golden generations and kill them dead lol. Anyways, I think Bruno is a maverick like Alexis Sanchez who thrives in environments with little to no structure where he can go anywhere and do every and anything.
@EBL2017 Carrick is a solid mid table manager! However!!! The club, the higher ups should be ashamed…..these players on the pitch should have the salary slashed in half STARTING WITH THEIR CAPTAIN!
@UnitedStandMUFC@markgoldbridge Como has been one of the shining lights in Serie A since they were promoted just 3 years ago. Their football came under scrutiny from fellow Italian clubs and managers but Cesc Fabegras stood by his philosophy with a much much smaller budget than the top clubs and have superseded expectations each year! Has Serie A fallen off? Yes but Como has been its glimmer of hope because of how they are changing the league. Man Utd were never ever gonna win this game! A point? Maybe! But if you have followed Como and Cesc Fabegras you’d know the huge gap in tactics and coaching against this farce of a Manchester United team and organization! The WORLD NOW SEES IT!
@pythaginboots
Let's talk about PSG.
Why are they so difficult to defend?
A look at their wide triangles, high mobility, large distances and positional play principles, exploring the tactical dilemmas they create and how different teams have tried to stop them.
It's a clear 3+1 structure, with the two centre-backs and the left-back staying deeper, plus Vitinha usually in front of them.
Then we have two wide triangles, one on each side. Both wingers provide the full width, while the attacking midfielders on each side, Fabián and João Neves, have the responsibility of joining those wide triangles. As you can see in the picture, João Neves doesn't approach the ball; he has a positional responsibility to stay on the far side. In those wide triangles, we can see a lot of mobility between the three players.
PSG plays with very large distances, with a lot of mobility in the wide triangles but with clear positional play principles.
To understand why it is also positional, we can take a look at Vitinha. Vitinha usually stays in front of the defenders, but occasionally, he likes to make runs and join the wide triangles. Immediately, you will see Fabián Ruiz or João Neves dropping to occupy the space Vitinha has left, maintaining the same structure.
Vitinha is so important for them because he is the player in charge of connecting both triangles and bringing the ball from one triangle to the other. It's common to see Vitinha receive under pressure next to one of the triangles, play a quick one-two to beat his direct opponent, and then carry the ball to the other triangle. This tends to be faster and safer than the typical long switch of play that many teams use, which I feel gives the opponents more time to drop back.
The wide triangles are difficult to defend.
If you play the offside trap, it doesn't work as well for FC Barcelona as it does against other teams. The offside trap works well to disconnect the first-wave runs. But the wide triangles, with their high mobility, are meant to take advantage of second-line runs, for example, from Hakimi, the right full-back, or Fabián/João Neves, the attacking midfielders.
If you defend zonally, you will protect the ball side better, but on the far side, you might end up having one player less. Look at this picture. FC Barcelona are defending in a zonal 4-2-3-1, with Rodri defending zonally and protecting the space on the ball side. The play ends up with João Neves on the far side, creating a clear 3v2 situation.
There is another aspect PSG looks for by separating both triangles so much. If the opposition goes man-oriented in both triangles, you are giving the wide triangle much more space to operate, freeing up space for those runs to happen by taking away the coverage function that zonal defending can provide.
Kompany mentioned last season that an "in-between" defensive posture doesn't work against PSG, and decided to go full man-to-man. "You either go full attack or drop completely back into a deep block." With this approach, my feeling is that you become highly dependent on the quality and athleticism of your players. The fact that PSG don't have to play their strongest starting XI every weekend can be an advantage for them.
Arteta opted for the second option, dropping into a deep zonal 4-4-2 block, but with the two midfielders protecting the half-spaces, at times becoming a 6-4-0. It worked well defensively, but lacked a threat in offensive transitions.
The best team I have seen play against PSG was Chelsea under Enzo Maresca in the Club World Cup final. They played very man-oriented also in deeper areas, while trying to prioritise a +1 at the back, but still keeping a front three higher up to try to punish PSG in transition and exploit their 3+1 rest defense. In that game, Pedro Neto tracked Hakimi all the time.
Luis Enrique.
• Flexible 3-3-4
• +1 in every phase
• Hakimi the key to break the press
• Overloading 2nd and 3rd phase
• Fabian as the free man
• Hakimi luring Cancelo
• Vitinha dropping to create 3v2
• Exploiting wide areas in build-up
• Doue free man on far-side
Continuing to talk about FC Barcelona.
The value of the 6th player. Creating dynamic superiorities without losing defensive balance and taking advantage of wrong-footed players.
Barcelona mainly attack in a 2-3-5 or 3-2-5. Besides the four attackers, the 5th player in the last line tends to be either the #8 or the left fullback.
What Barcelona do very well is move from having five players in the last line to having six. Rather than positioning six players there from the start, they prefer to do it dynamically. The intention is to surprise the opposition with a run from the second line, which is always more difficult to track. If you position six players in the last line from the start, the opposition can adjust by dropping another player to match the numbers.
The players who usually make these runs are either the attacking midfielder (#8) or the left fullback. They alternate throughout games: one stays in the last line while the other joins late from behind. They are basically the 5th and 6th player.
When these runs happen, Barcelona move into a 3-1-6 or 2-2-6. But for this to happen the role of the right-back, Koundé in the picture, is massive. His priority is to move inside and provide balance in rest defence. You will rarely see Barcelona defending with only their two centre-backs and Rodri behind the attack, which would be a much riskier scenario.
Koundé does make occasional forward runs, mainly when the ball is on his side, overlapping or underlapping. However, many of these are decoy runs designed to create space for Lamine Yamal. When Koundé makes these runs, look at the far side: the #8 or the left fullback moves inside to make sure the rest defence remains protected.
So yes, Barcelona sometimes push six players into the last line. But when do they do it?
Pep once said in an interview: "Sometimes I put 5 players in the last line, sometimes 6, depends on the day I take the risk or I don't."
Pushing six players into the last line involves more risk than using five. But FC Barcelona has designed specific moments to do this, with the idea of taking advantage of wrong-footed wingers, Gordon and Lamine Yamal, while their left-backs, Cancelo and Espart, are also wrong-footed playing in the left. As mentioned earlier, the left fullback can join the last line, sometimes alternating the wide position with Gordon.
Whenever a wrong-footed player receives the ball in a wide area, Barcelona can use the sixth player's run from behind to create an additional threat. These runs can be tracked, but at times, as in the picture, they are difficult to follow, disorganising the opposition's defensive line and creating a 2v1 against a specific defender.
Another advantage of wrong-footed players is the possibility of carrying the ball horizontally towards the inside. This allows the ball carrier and the runners to adjust their timing better, creating a stronger connection between them.
I've lost count of the number of goals Lamine Yamal has assisted from these situations. The same mechanism can be used in the final third, but instead of making a run into space to receive the ball, the 6th player makes a run to create a numerical advantage in the box and finish crosses.
Barcelona were already using this mechanism before, but this season it has become more frequent with players like Gordon and Espart on the left side.
Ultimately, pushing a sixth player into the last line involves taking a risk. However, by having the far-side fullback move inside and using this mechanism in specific situations where they can create real danger, Barcelona make that risk more controlled and worthwhile.
@Yuri_Ravens This might be a stretch but I think Zion might be a better pass rusher than Mike Green…..idk if it’s his aggression or bull rush or two diff profiles but he’s willing to move bodies out the way
New Analysis on Liverpool's low-block flaws!
We already discussed how Iraola's wingers are causing issues in the high press.
While a side of Liverpool’s stature rarely defends in a deep block for prolonged periods, moments of retreat are inevitable.
https://t.co/FGfFQzMAH4
🚨 Liverpool under Andoni Iraola:
With the addition of Jacquet, Araujo, Barcola and Munoz, Liverpool finally have basic balance.
Now that the team is less chaotic, we can begin to assess Iraola's tactics through a finer lens.
A comprehensive game-model analysis: 🔻