One of the best strategies I have identified and used in my career is thematic investing, which to me is identifying a mispricing, not just on an individual stock basis but on a macro level for a group of stocks and buy a basket and wait. This worked for me in cybersecurity, energy, semiconductors, drones, AI, etc etc
My latest basket after semiconductors because of AI was energy as the rails of AI. One basket that is slowly becoming interesting and i’m definitely not all in at the moment as there still is plenty of room to the downside but one basket I’m pretty confident I will be trading in soon is restaurants. I already own $DPZ and now $CMG is getting interesting. $SHAK hitting new lows. There is a lot of pessimism in the restaurant space right now which creates opportunity.
Let's be clear about what this actually is.
Index providers didn't change their rules out of goodwill. They changed them because SpaceX is too big and too politically connected to exclude. A $1.5 trillion company going public and not landing in passive funds immediately would be embarrassing for the index industry.
But the consequence is real: $30 trillion in retirement money gets forced into SpaceX at whatever valuation Elon and the bankers set. No price discovery. No earnings track record requirement. No seasoning period to let the market find fair value.
The rules that protected passive investors since 2002 were waived in weeks.
If SpaceX is overvalued at IPO, every 401k in America owns it at the top.
Most people think the key variable for $SLM is credit quality. The better interpretation is that the key variable is the irreversibility of the PLUS reform, because the system actually turns on political lock-in dynamics.
The OBBBA was a massive reconciliation bill that required extraordinary political capital to pass. Reversing the PLUS
elimination would require another reconciliation bill or bipartisan
legislation, neither of which is politically feasible within the next 4-6 years. This means the demand shift is not a one-year event. It is a structural, multi-year tailwind that compounds. By the time any future Congress could theoretically reverse it, $SLM will have originated $15-25B in new grad loans, built deep relationships with grad borrowers, and established the private market as the default funding source. The political lock in creates an economic moat extension that is not priced into a 6x multiple.
One more thing: $SLM is transitioning from a balance sheet lender
to a lending platform. Originate, sell to KKR, collect servicing fees, recycle capital into buybacks. This is the same business model evolution that made companies like Rocket Mortgage valuable: capital light origination with fee based income. The market is valuing $SLM as a capital heavy bank. It is becoming a capital light origination
platform. When that transition completes, the correct multiple is not
6-8x. It is 10-14x.
I own a significant position in the dominant private student lender in the United States. It holds 63-64% market share. It earns a 56% return on
equity. It trades at 6x trailing earnings. The federal government, through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act signed July 4, 2025, is about to eliminate the Graduate PLUS Loan program effective July 1, 2026, precisely 31 days from now, forcing an estimated $5-10 billion in annual graduate student borrowing out of federal channels and into private ones. Management is buying back ~12% of shares outstanding this year at depressed prices. The credit markets are pricing the loan portfolio at attractive premiums. And yet the stock sits 38% below its 52-week high, weighed down by a whistleblower lawsuit alleging data monetization of minors' information,
an ongoing class action about delinquency disclosures, and generic
"student lending = bad" sentiment.
This is a regulatory driven demand shock game layered on top of a capital
allocation game. The federal government has permanently reduced its own lending to graduate students and capped parent lending. This is not a proposal. It is enacted law. The question is who captures the redirected demand, at what price, and how the equity market reprices the winner.
The equity market is pricing $SLM as a shrinking, troubled lender. The credit market (ABS spreads tightening), the
private credit market (KKR buying $5B+ of loans at premiums), and the
legislative reality (PLUS elimination in 31 days) are all saying the opposite.
When the equity market disagrees with the credit market about a lender's quality, the credit market is usually right.
I own a significant position in the dominant private student lender in the United States. It holds 63-64% market share. It earns a 56% return on
equity. It trades at 6x trailing earnings. The federal government, through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act signed July 4, 2025, is about to eliminate the Graduate PLUS Loan program effective July 1, 2026, precisely 31 days from now, forcing an estimated $5-10 billion in annual graduate student borrowing out of federal channels and into private ones. Management is buying back ~12% of shares outstanding this year at depressed prices. The credit markets are pricing the loan portfolio at attractive premiums. And yet the stock sits 38% below its 52-week high, weighed down by a whistleblower lawsuit alleging data monetization of minors' information,
an ongoing class action about delinquency disclosures, and generic
"student lending = bad" sentiment.
This is a regulatory driven demand shock game layered on top of a capital
allocation game. The federal government has permanently reduced its own lending to graduate students and capped parent lending. This is not a proposal. It is enacted law. The question is who captures the redirected demand, at what price, and how the equity market reprices the winner.
The equity market is pricing $SLM as a shrinking, troubled lender. The credit market (ABS spreads tightening), the
private credit market (KKR buying $5B+ of loans at premiums), and the
legislative reality (PLUS elimination in 31 days) are all saying the opposite.
When the equity market disagrees with the credit market about a lender's quality, the credit market is usually right.
A debt-free, 30% ROIC business at 9x earnings with multiple activist catalysts, improving tariff dynamics, and a growing international franchise. Deducted points for genuine brand risk in North America, a 7 month CEO vacuum, and an ugly proxy fight that could distract management. There is a decent discount with real risks, the arithmetic is compelling enough to warrant capital allocation
The base rate for career lieutenants succeeding as turnaround CEOs under activist siege is not great. But Heidi could prove everyone wrong if she hires the right creative leader and gets out of her own institutional conditioning. $LULU
If she hires a $NKE person, I’ll cut my position. If she hires a genuine creative obsessive from outside the Nike/Lululemon ecosystem, that’s a strong signal she understands the real problem.