Vapen som vi i Sverige förser Ukraina med. Betänk att vi bara är 11 miljoner Svenskar. Ett ganska litet land. Ändå klarar vi av att på egen hand producera många olika typer av vapen. Bra är de också. Sverige är humlan som inte borde kunna flyga när det gäller vapenproduktion.
Viktig och korrekt analys över vad en europeisk förhandlingsdelegation ka. Och inte kan göra.
Lägg till att Ryssland inte ser eu som
En stormakt för vi saknar förutsättningar att projicera makt utanför vårt eget område.
Därför behöver eu inse att
Man ÄR
En geopolitisk spelare
Another negotiation wave is unfolding. This time, the UK, France and Germany, the E3, are looking for a formula to design talks.
There is no need to overstate Putin’s interest in negotiations. Today, he appears to be looking for a way to change the dynamics of the war, not a way out of it. But let us assume for a moment that Moscow is genuinely interested in exploring a pause.
In a potential Ukraine–E3–Russia format, there are three problems that need to be addressed before taking the plunge.
1. E3 has agency in Ukraine’s eyes. It does not have agency in Russia’s.
Moscow no longer sees Europe as an independent center of power. It despises Europe only slightly less than it despises Ukraine. For the Kremlin, Europe is not a negotiating party but a space of influence.
2. E3 has decisive leverage over Ukraine. It does not have decisive leverage over Russia.
Through bilateral and EU mechanisms, Europe can influence Kyiv through financial and military support, and the prospect of EU membership.
But Europe’s main instrument vis-à-vis Moscow, sanctions, suffers from a credibility gap. The Kremlin no longer believes they would be genuinely lifted even if an agreement were reached.
The same applies to the idea, floated by some, that Europe should resume purchases of Russian gas in order to regain leverage. In Moscow, this would be read not as Europe gaining leverage, but as Europe looking for an off-ramp back to business as usual.
A lever the other side does not believe in ceases to be a lever.
3. The format itself creates the wrong incentives.
Moscow would inevitably seek to turn E3 into a channel for Russian proposals, encouraging Europeans to persuade Kyiv to accept arrangements it would otherwise reject. This would create friction between Ukraine and its European partners precisely where unity matters most.
And when talks once again reach the question of territory, E3 will not be able to side with Russia without undermining its own principles. The process would likely run into the same wall.
The key to a breakthrough lies elsewhere: in Moscow abandoning its claims to the rest of Donbas and in Kyiv refraining from expanding its military gains in the air and on the ground. The obstacle is not the format. It is the substance.
A Ukraine–E3–Russia format may be useful if it helps clarify and expand support for Ukraine and test Moscow’s room for compromise.
As a pathway to a political settlement, however, it is difficult to see how it produces a fundamentally different outcome.
The juice may not be worth the squeeze.
Then again, diplomacy sometimes consists precisely of trying to squeeze juice from fruit that is clearly not yet ripe.
Marco Rubio hyllar Sverige på nytt:
USA:s utrikesminister Rubio hyllade Sverige för vårt ansvarstagande, vår självförsörjning och vår starka industri, i gårdagens hearing i senaten.
Sveriges högteknologiska kunnande och ”do it yourself”-anda gör landet till en attraktiv partner, enligt Rubio.
The Hill: ”Sweden is now America’s most valuable tech ally. Most Americans haven’t noticed.”
In March, Sweden became the first European Union member state to sign the Pax Silica Declaration, Washington’s flagship initiative to secure global AI and semiconductor supply chains.
And now, the first European nation to sign the Technology Prosperity Deal on quantum technology, biomedicine, space, defense innovation and energy
https://t.co/fw1EYoYAym
"The Rheinmetall Skynex and Skyranger, descendants of the Gepard, fire 35 mm programmable ammunition that detonates ahead of the target, creating a cloud of tungsten sub-projectiles. Cost per engagement is approximately 4,000 euros — three orders of magnitude below a Patriot intercept. The Gepard’s Ukrainian record is the single strongest empirical data point in the counter-drone literature. The constraint is industrial rather than conceptual: the global Gepard inventory has been effectively exhausted by transfers to Ukraine, the Skynex successor is barely in production, and the bespoke ammunition supply chain is narrow. These systems are the correct solution for the highest-value defended sites — LNG trains, desalination complexes, remaining early-warning radars — but cannot, at present production rates, cover the full breadth of Gulf critical infrastructure."
KAMYSHIN: There are two nations on the continent who know how to produce 10 million drones a year.
One of them wants not to integrate into Europe, but to invade. Russians have always been very vocal about their targets.
When we check tanks we captured from Russia in our tank repair factories, because we grab them, repair them, and try to send them back to Russia to fight against Russia, so when we check those tanks, they never write to Kyiv.
They always write to Berlin, NATO, Prague, whatever. They can't admit to themselves that they fight Ukraine only.
They believe they fight with NATO. They've always been very vocal about their targets. They want to invade Europe, period.
There's another nation which is also capable of producing whatever is needed in big war, and we are asking to get us integrated into Europe.
So, you have to choose whether you want to have Ukraine integrated into European defense industry and European Union, rather than Russia invading.
Because I've never thought that Ukraine would be integrated into European Union via security and defense road. And it looks like we will be there.
Here is the full version of our latest three-part investigative series, published in collaboration with @AbhishekSay, @EmilyFishbein11, and @AltNews.
https://t.co/OTbuJH6Brm
News of the Gripen deal for Ukraine is another major achievement by Zelenskyy in strengthening the country’s defense. And another step in deepening Ukraine’s special relationship with Sweden.
But the bigger question is this: is Ukraine becoming a Nordic country?
Not geographically. Strategically.
For decades, Ukrainians thought of their place in Europe through the lens of Central and Eastern Europe. Some dreamed of an arc from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
After 2022, reality began to change doctrine. A renaissance in Ukraine’s relations with Northern Europe began.
It was driven by three forces: the North’s leadership in supporting Ukraine, backed by resources; frictions with partners in Central Europe; and Ukraine’s search for more strategic anchors in Europe.
For Ukrainians, this movement makes sense. More than a thousand years ago, the Varangians were an important part of the rise of Rus. In the early 18th century, Sweden was already an ally of Ukraine’s attempt to break free from Moscow’s rule.
But this is not only about history.
Ukrainians are drawn to the Nordic world, where strength does not contradict democracy, defense does not contradict prosperity, technology reinforces resilience, and cool-headedness serves freedom and dignity.
Kyiv will not change its geography. But its center of gravity is changing.
The Vikings are returning to Ukraine. And Ukrainians are charting their country’s path to the North.
It is still unclear where this will lead. But it is already a fascinating turn of history.
Let's go #Canada and a GlobalEye purchase!! But also if you ever want to read the most Canadian-like, confusing release:
-we want it formally
-are negotiating and announcing it
-but god forbid we commit to an order or an actual procurement.
🇺🇦 More than half of Ukrainians would support the participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the defense of all allied countries on the list if they were attacked by Russia, - Rating Group