Dude. I agree with you. Completely. But I have no interest in the opinions of a foreign power whose institutions are being degraded, whose president is an election denier making bank on his office, whose criminal justice system has been compromised by politics and whose sovereign debt crisis is leading to an economic crisis that will end the West's preeminence.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
They think people are stupid because they are.
Or more precisely, because they’ve got the brainrot so badly that they’re impervious to evidence and reason, unable to think critically, and have become completely conditioned to accepting irreconcilable contradictions as unfalsifiable facts.
And Al Jazeera together with its owner Qatar have been instrumental in that happening.
In the latest @AusForeign, I respond to David Kilcullen’s June essay, Plan B: How to defend Australia without submarines.
David is right that Australia needs contingency planning. All good militaries undertake contingency planning, they just generally don’t do it in public.
But there is no simple Plan B for AUKUS. It is a multi-phase capability program, and the response depends on what has failed and why. A delay in the Virginia-class transfer is a very different problem from the US ultimately refusing to transfer submarines.
I also question how far other capabilities can compensate for the loss of submarines. David canvasses options including the B-21, long-range strike, drones, surface ships and a larger army. All may have value, but none replicates the full range of roles submarines perform.
Likewise, the frequently cited idea of simply returning to France is not a straightforward alternative. France faces many of the same industrial and timeline challenges, with its nuclear-submarine construction concentrated at Cherbourg alongside its own substantial submarine program.
The broader point is that Australia needs a balanced force regardless of what happens with AUKUS. The capabilities David identifies should be pursued because they strengthen the ADF, not because they offer an easy replacement for submarines.
David’s piece:
https://t.co/2EnwCChnsz
My response:
https://t.co/q67QEp8xgt
@DefenceUwa@LowyInstitute@NSC_ANU
Securing Australia's sea lanes would ensure platforms like the B-21 remain active. Otherwise, like the Me 262, any performance advantages would vanish due to fuel shortages. 2/3
In the latest @AusForeign, I respond to David Kilcullen’s June essay, Plan B: How to defend Australia without submarines.
David is right that Australia needs contingency planning. All good militaries undertake contingency planning, they just generally don’t do it in public.
But there is no simple Plan B for AUKUS. It is a multi-phase capability program, and the response depends on what has failed and why. A delay in the Virginia-class transfer is a very different problem from the US ultimately refusing to transfer submarines.
I also question how far other capabilities can compensate for the loss of submarines. David canvasses options including the B-21, long-range strike, drones, surface ships and a larger army. All may have value, but none replicates the full range of roles submarines perform.
Likewise, the frequently cited idea of simply returning to France is not a straightforward alternative. France faces many of the same industrial and timeline challenges, with its nuclear-submarine construction concentrated at Cherbourg alongside its own substantial submarine program.
The broader point is that Australia needs a balanced force regardless of what happens with AUKUS. The capabilities David identifies should be pursued because they strengthen the ADF, not because they offer an easy replacement for submarines.
David’s piece:
https://t.co/2EnwCChnsz
My response:
https://t.co/q67QEp8xgt
@DefenceUwa@LowyInstitute@NSC_ANU
Australia replacing nuclear-powered submarines with B-21 bombers is a strange idea. Neither platform performs the same roles. Wartime fuel shortages would ground the B-21. 1/2
In the latest @AusForeign, I respond to David Kilcullen’s June essay, Plan B: How to defend Australia without submarines.
David is right that Australia needs contingency planning. All good militaries undertake contingency planning, they just generally don’t do it in public.
But there is no simple Plan B for AUKUS. It is a multi-phase capability program, and the response depends on what has failed and why. A delay in the Virginia-class transfer is a very different problem from the US ultimately refusing to transfer submarines.
I also question how far other capabilities can compensate for the loss of submarines. David canvasses options including the B-21, long-range strike, drones, surface ships and a larger army. All may have value, but none replicates the full range of roles submarines perform.
Likewise, the frequently cited idea of simply returning to France is not a straightforward alternative. France faces many of the same industrial and timeline challenges, with its nuclear-submarine construction concentrated at Cherbourg alongside its own substantial submarine program.
The broader point is that Australia needs a balanced force regardless of what happens with AUKUS. The capabilities David identifies should be pursued because they strengthen the ADF, not because they offer an easy replacement for submarines.
David’s piece:
https://t.co/2EnwCChnsz
My response:
https://t.co/q67QEp8xgt
@DefenceUwa@LowyInstitute@NSC_ANU
🟢 Facts Matter ✅️ Which Legacy Media Forgets To mention.
Mosab Hassan Yousef's father was a founder of Hamas.
Mosab was born in Ramallah a Palestinian city which I know well & was callled the son of Hamas or The Green Prince.
He has an insiders perspective into Hamas and their evil ⤵️.
Nefarious hackers: "Ha! See! You can't use your inbox this morning! No emails! We will bring chaos on the world!"
Office workers: "Don't threaten me with a good time" (laptops close en masse and everyone goes for coffee)
#OTD in 1918, at around 05:00, the Armistice was signed - bringing an end to the hostilities of the FWW Whilst the official end would not come until the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, this innocuous location near Compiegne was where the war was brought to its close.
There is no acknowledgement of the efficacy of the arguments made here or in my AUKUS inquiry submission in the Garrett led report. I guess I should have known that the report's outcome was pre-determined.
Buying "off the shelf" warships landed Australia in trouble. Repeating the process of reworking existing designs to suit the RAN's needs is an insane idea.
How did I not know you can buy submarines off the shelf? What aisle - I’m interested…. 😂
(Unless you’re talking about the Virginia subs we are buying….)