Matteo de Luca

Geopolitics through a historical lens. To understand what's happening now, look at what happened before.

UK-EU-US relations. Lived across all three

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

Dachau opened in March 1933 - nine years before the Wannsee Conference - processing people an authority had decided weren't entitled to due process. The mechanism is identical to what ICE is doing now. The scale and the destination are not - yet. 'Yet' is doing a lot of work in that sentence.

The warning isn't that MAGA supporters are uniquely monstrous. It's that there's absolutely nothing unique about them at all - and that is the most frightening conclusion history has to offer."

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

On the 3rd of May, Trump announced Project Freedom: the US Navy would escort vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, backed by 15,000 service members, more than 100 aircraft, guided-missile destroyers, and unmanned systems. Iran called it a ceasefire violation and warned that any foreign military force approaching the strait "will be targeted."

On the 4th of May, the USS Truxtun and USS Mason transited the strait. Iran fired missiles and drones at both destroyers. Small Iranian attack boats attempted to interfere. Apache helicopters and air defence systems engaged. The US Navy sank six Iranian small boats - the confirmed CENTCOM count. Neither destroyer was hit.

Simultaneously, Iran attacked the UAE. Two Iranian cruise missiles were intercepted over UAE airspace. An Iranian drone struck Fujairah port, starting a fire that hospitalised three workers. Abu Dhabi formally blamed Tehran.

Iran's position is that Project Freedom constitutes a resumption of hostilities under the April ceasefire terms, which require both sides to end military operations. The US position is that escorting commercial ships through an international waterway is not an offensive operation against Iran. That argument is harder to sustain when you have just sunk six of their boats in the process of making it.

As of the 5th of May, the ceasefire is formally "still in place." Peace talks have produced nothing.

Project Freedom has now put the ceasefire under direct military pressure for the first time. The Strait remains partially closed. The question is no longer whether the ceasefire will hold.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

@clashreport Claiming that Oil being at $102 is actually a good thing is a pretty remarkable strategy, and that kind of propaganda that the North Koreans would blush at...

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

Russia declared a ceasefire for the 8th and 9th of May to coincide with Victory Day. The announcement came with a clause: if Ukraine attempted to disrupt the celebrations, the Russian Armed Forces would "launch a retaliatory, massive missile strike on the centre of Kyiv."

This is a ceasefire declaration that contains, within its own text, a threat to destroy the capital of the country it is asking to stop fighting.

Zelenskyy's response was to declare Ukraine's own ceasefire, starting from midnight on the 6th of May, with no end date. He noted that he had not received official notification from Russia of their ceasefire. He did not say Ukraine would abide by Russia's conditions; he announced his own, on his own timeline.

What is happening is not a ceasefire. It is a bidding war for Trump's approval, conducted in the language of peace. Putin wants Victory Day celebrations to pass uninterrupted. Trump wants to claim progress. Zelenskyy wants to appear cooperative while ensuring Ukraine is not bound by Russian-set terms. All three are calibrating for the optics of the 81st anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe.

The subtext is legible in what Russia cannot do. For the first time in nearly twenty years, there will be no military hardware on Red Square - no tanks, no missiles, no intercontinental ballistic missiles. Russia's defence ministry attributed the decision to security concerns. The real reason is that Ukrainian long-range drones have made a public display of military equipment in central Moscow a liability rather than a statement of strength. Zelenskyy's response was precise: Russia's defence ministry "cannot hold a parade in Moscow without Ukraine's goodwill."

A ceasefire announced with a threat of mass missile strikes, met with a counter-ceasefire on different dates, from a country that received no official notification of the original ceasefire, while Russian missiles are still killing Ukrainians, is not a ceasefire.

It is two governments reminding the American president that they exist - and competing to be seen as the one that wants peace.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

The guardian reporting what many of us believed. It’s the only logical explanation as to why Trump behaves the way he does towards Russia and Putin.

[Annie Dufour @anniedufour99]

Canada : you wonder why Trump is acting the way it does? Constantly making the decision that benefits Russia, even to the detriment of the USA and -always- to the detriment of its allies like Canada?
This Guardian exclusive explains it all :
"Vladimir Putin personally authorised a secret spy agency operation to support a “mentally unstable” Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election... according to what are assessed to be leaked Kremlin documents."
"There is also apparent confirmation that the Kremlin possesses kompromat, or potentially compromising material, on the future president, collected – the document says – from Trump’s earlier “non-official visits to Russian Federation territory”."
"There is a brief psychological assessment of Trump, who is described as an “impulsive, mentally unstable and unbalanced individual who suffers from an inferiority complex”."
TRUMP, TO THIS DAY, WHO SUES EVERYBODY AND THEIR MOTHER, HAS NEVER SUED THE GUARDIAN.
#Trump #Russia #cdnpoli #euronews

https://t.co/08iRPraJw9

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

The UAE is leaving OPEC for reasons that look like they are about oil production but are actually about something else.

Yes, the quotas were constraining. Abu Dhabi has capacity to produce 4 million barrels per day and ambitions to reach 5 million by 2027. OPEC was capping it at 3.2 million. Leaving frees the UAE to pump an extra 800,000 barrels per day immediately.

At $103 per barrel, that is approximately $30 billion a year in additional revenue. The production argument is real.

But the UAE could have made this argument at any point over the past five years. It chose to make it now - during a war in which Iran is under military pressure, Hormuz is disrupted, and Saudi Arabia, OPEC's de facto leader, is in a complicated position as its close partner Iran absorbs American and Israeli strikes.

What the timing tells you is that Abu Dhabi is placing a strategic bet. It is betting that the post-war Gulf will look different from the pre-war Gulf, and that being outside the OPEC framework gives it more freedom to navigate that difference.

The UAE has consistently pursued a foreign policy distinct from Riyadh's - on Iran, on the Muslim Brotherhood, on Israel normalisation, on relations with Russia. Leaving OPEC is an extension of that pattern: Abu Dhabi acting on its own calculation rather than sheltering inside a Saudi-led institutional structure.

The Hormuz context adds one more layer. OPEC+ includes Russia. Russia is Iran's most vocal political backer. The UAE is the Gulf state that has maintained the most ambiguous relationship with the current conflict - neither condemning the US-Israeli operation nor endorsing it, while maintaining commercial ties with multiple parties.

Leaving an institutional structure that formally links Abu Dhabi to Moscow's energy coordination is consistent with that positioning.

OPEC has survived defections before. It has not previously lost a producer of this size and strategic weight during a moment of maximum regional instability.

Whether other members draw the conclusion that the quota framework is worth less than they thought - and whether Saudi Arabia can hold the remaining coalition together - will be one of the defining energy market questions of the next two years.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

While global attention has been fixed on Hormuz and the Iran peace talks, Ukraine has conducted its most significant ground operation in years.

Since the 29th of January 2026, Ukrainian forces have sustained a counteroffensive on the Oleksandrivsk axis in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. By early March they had reclaimed approximately 400–460 square kilometres of territory and liberated at least 12 settlements.

Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi confirmed that nearly all Russian-held territory in the region has been retaken, with three small settlements still to be cleared.

The strategic purpose of Russia's push into Dnipropetrovsk was explicit: establish a "buffer zone" that would bring Dnipro city and the logistics hub of Pavlohrad within artillery range, and threaten Ukraine's supply lines to Zaporizhzhia.

That objective has been reversed. Russian forces were pushed back to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk administrative boundary.

The timing is notable. Russia's professional military has been reconstituted multiple times over three years; the units now fighting in Dnipropetrovsk are not the force that entered Ukraine in 2022.

The Iran war has pulled global media and diplomatic focus away from the Ukrainian front. Ukraine used the window. The question now is whether the 2026 counteroffensive represents the beginning of a broader shift in momentum, or a single successful regional operation in a war that remains grinding and attritional.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

On the 28th of April, the UAE announced it will leave OPEC on the 1st of May, ending a membership of nearly 60 years. It is simultaneously withdrawing from OPEC+, the broader group that includes Russia.

The immediate reason is production capacity. OPEC quotas have capped the UAE at 3.2 million barrels per day against an actual capacity of around 4 million and an ambition to reach 5 million by 2027. Leaving the cartel frees Abu Dhabi to produce at whatever level it chooses. Its energy minister said the country "remains committed to oil price stability" - a statement designed to reassure markets rather than describe policy.

The underlying reason is a decade of accumulating tension with Saudi Arabia over output quotas, price targets, and regional political competition. The UAE's energy minister was direct about the timing: the Hormuz closure limits the near-term market impact of the exit. With roughly 20 million barrels per day already disrupted, the departure of one producer from a quota framework is difficult for markets to price as a separate event. Abu Dhabi chose its window.

The precedent matters. The UAE is OPEC's third-largest producer, behind Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Ecuador left in 2020. Qatar left in 2019. Both were smaller.

When a top-three producer demonstrates it is more profitable to leave than to stay, the logic of remaining inside a Saudi-led quota structure weakens for every other member watching.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

@Acyn @velocity_snow Soft power and its absolute finest - no political leader would get away with that or have the courage to say it.

The royal’s non-political nature allows for this type of thing, and whatever you think about them as an institution, it’s valuable in this day and age.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

Whatever you may think about the royals, they are an unbelievable soft power resource.

No political leader could get away with that, and do so with grace and good humour. Very valuable at a time like this.

[Clash Report @clashreport]

King Charles III:

Indeed, you recently commented, Mr. President, that if it were not for the United States, European countries would be speaking German.

Dare I say that if it wasn't for us, you'd be speaking French.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

On the 25th of April, Trump cancelled the planned trip by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Islamabad for a second round of US-Iran peace talks. He blamed "infighting" in the Iranian government. Pakistan dismantled the security checkpoints and logistics it had erected in anticipation.

Iran's Foreign Minister Araghchi did not stay. He flew to St. Petersburg, where he met Vladimir Putin on the 27th of April. Putin told him: "We see how courageously and heroically the Iranian people are fighting for their independence, for their sovereignty," and pledged Russian support for achieving peace on Iran's terms. Araghchi called the partnership "strategic, at the highest level."

Also on the 27th of April, Iran submitted a new proposal: postpone the nuclear question entirely, and deal only with ending the war and reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Secretary of State Rubio said it was "better than what we thought they were going to submit" - but added that any deal must still "definitively prevent them from sprinting towards a nuclear weapon." By the 28th of April, a US official told reporters Trump was "not happy" with the proposal.

The sequencing of those four days matters. Talks fail. Iran goes to Moscow. Moscow publicly backs Iran. Iran then submits a more limited - and more acceptable - offer.

The US rejects it anyway. Whether the Moscow stop was designed to signal that Iran has backing before making a concession, or whether it was simply diplomatic coordination, the outcome is the same: a narrower proposal on the table, a ceasefire still nominally in force, and the question of Iran's nuclear programme deferred to a future negotiation that may never happen.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

Oman’s incentive is actually the opposite - their economy depends on regional stability and open trade. Prolonged sanctions and war creates instability on their doorstep. That’s why they keep showing up to mediate. Whilst I agree with that point on good faith, it’s not based on evidence and that’s the point.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

And that attitude is why we’re in this position. They complied with the JCPOA. The regime are abhorrent, but just because you don’t trust them - despite the evidence suggesting the contrary - you start a war with them. You cannot bomb people while negotiating with them, and expect them to trust you after. It doesn’t work that way.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

Interesting, so the argument is: Oman profits from Iran, therefore ignore everything their FM says. By that logic you’d have to discard every mediator in history. They all have skin in the game. That’s what makes them useful in these circumstances. The question isn’t whether Albusaidi is neutral. It’s whether his account of the talks is accurate. Nothing you’ve said changes that.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

@panizzon_paolo @FaytuksNetwork The Omani foreign minister who was facilitating the negotiations certainly seemed to think so.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

@karbaralef1 @FaytuksNetwork Absolutely, and they promised not to enrich uranium beyond 3.67%. This situation can be traced back to Trump tearing up the JCPOA.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

Putin told Araghchi that Russia would do "everything that meets your interests and the interests of all peoples in the region" to achieve peace.

He praised how "courageously and heroically" the Iranian people were fighting. Araghchi called the partnership "strategic, at the highest level." On the basis of these statements, you might conclude Russia is deeply committed to Iran's survival and willing to back it materially in the war.

The actions tell a different story.

Russia has not provided Iran with air defence systems capable of intercepting the US-Israeli strike packages that degraded Iran's nuclear and military infrastructure in February and March.

It has not transferred advanced anti-ship missiles that might change the balance at Hormuz. It has not sent military advisers or equipment to the front. Its support is political and rhetorical. Not operational.

What Russia is actually collecting from this relationship is economic and strategic, and none of it requires Iran to win.

Every day Hormuz stays disrupted, global oil prices remain elevated, and Russia - which exports through Arctic and Baltic routes entirely outside the strait -collects a windfall on its own revenues.

The war is subsidising the Russian state budget. If Iran negotiates a deal that reopens Hormuz next week, oil prices fall, and the windfall ends. Putin has limited incentive to facilitate that outcome quickly. He has every incentive to provide just enough support to keep Iran in the fight without ending the fight.

The "strategic partnership at the highest level" is real - but it is a partnership in which Russia supplies political legitimacy and Iran supplies the disruption that keeps energy prices where Russia wants them. Russia is not going to escalate to match US military power on Iran's behalf. It will attend summits, issue warm statements, and watch.

The danger in this reading is that it explains Putin's behaviour so far but doesn't tell you where the ceiling is.

If US policy moved toward full regime change - not just nuclear rollback but the end of the Islamic Republic -that calculation would likely change. That is the scenario Putin is most invested in preventing.

He would rather have a weakened, economically strained, but surviving Islamic Republic on Russia's southern flank than a US-aligned successor government. Short of an existential threat to the regime, though, the "strategic partnership" is more valuable to Russia at arm's length than it would be if Russia had to actually fight.

Putin is not Iran's ally. He is Iran's most profitable spectator.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

On the 14th of April, the IMF published its World Economic Outlook under the title "Global Economy in the Shadow of War." It presents three scenarios for 2026, depending on how the conflict plays out.

In the reference forecast - limited conflict, moderate 19% rise in energy prices - global growth is projected at 3.1% this year. Headline inflation rises to 4.4%. For comparison, the pre-war forecast was 3.4%, and without the conflict growth would have been revised slightly upward.

In the adverse scenario, growth falls to 2.5%. In the severe scenario - prolonged disruption, infrastructure damage taking years to repair - global growth falls to 2.0% and inflation exceeds 6%. The IMF uses 2.0% as its informal threshold for near-recessionary conditions globally.

The baseline assumption embedded in the reference forecast is that the conflict is "short-lived." As of the 28th of April, the primary peace talks track - the Islamabad process - has just collapsed.

Iran submitted a revised proposal on the 28th that defers the nuclear question and focuses only on ending the war and reopening Hormuz. The US has not accepted it. Neither scenario on offer looks short-lived.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

On the 23rd of April, IEA executive director Fatih Birol appeared at CNBC CONVERGE LIVE in Singapore and said: "We are facing the biggest energy security threat in history."

The number: 13 million barrels per day of oil have been removed from global supply. Both 1970s oil crises - 1973 and 1979 -each removed around 5 million barrels per day. This one is more than both of them combined. In March, the IEA released 400 million barrels from emergency stockpiles.

Brent crude opened the year at $61 per barrel. On the 23rd of April it was sitting at $103 - approximately +70% in four months.

The cost in Europe: the EU has paid $28 billion extra for energy since the war began - $587 million per day - "without receiving a single extra molecule of energy." Germany's growth forecast for 2026 was halved from 1% to 0.5%. The ZEW economic sentiment index fell to -17.2 in April, its lowest since December 2022.

Lufthansa is cutting 20,000 flights through October because jet fuel has doubled in price.

Birol's assessment: "no cure in sight." More than 40 energy infrastructure assets across the Gulf have been severely damaged.

Even after any peace deal, repairs are expected to take months to years. The 1970s crises reshaped Western energy policy for a generation. This one is larger, the infrastructure damage is deeper, and the ceasefire is still being violated while the strait is still mined.

[Matteo de Luca @Matteodeluca95]

@clashreport Makes sense considering not even the Americans have an exit strategy.