THE GLOBAL LEDGER | Markets. Money. Geopolitics
Independent analysis of the forces shaping global financial markets, economic policy and international affairs.
😂 @MarioBojic blocked me? So much for the Student List’s grand commitment to the “freedom of the press” and open debate. Apparently, freedom of expression is sacred right up until someone expresses an opinion you can’t handle.
Imagine wanting to lead a country but being unable to handle a comment on social media. If you can’t survive a disagreement on X, how exactly do you plan to survive parliamentary scrutiny, hostile interviews, or the responsibility of governing Serbia?
You don’t defend democracy by blocking criticism. You demonstrate that your commitment to free speech comes with conditions.
The Student List wants the keys to Serbia, but its representatives can’t even handle the comments section. Imagine handing them the country. 🇷🇸
You're presenting a very selective version of events while deliberately leaving out documented evidence that complicates your narrative.
Let's look at the facts.
Croatia: Youth Initiative for Human Rights Croatia (YIHR Croatia) and its Serbian counterpart participated in cross-border activist initiatives, including the Regional Activist School, Novi val, in Osijek in April 2025.
Montenegro: On 21 December 2024, more than 1,000 Montenegrin students publicly signed a letter supporting the Serbian student blockades. On 12 January 2025, the Montenegrin student group Kamo Śutra? published lists of supporting civil-society activists, including representatives of NGO Prima, Juventas, the Atlantic Alliance, the Centre for Civic Education and Human Rights Action.
More than 100 Montenegrin university professors and teaching assistants also publicly supported Kamo Śutra?
These are documented cross-border student and civil-society connections, not speculation.
And let's not forget the Erste Foundation's international civil-society academy in Belgrade in January 2025, involving participants from Croatia and other countries.
You keep quoting the students' refusal to be represented by NGOs as though it proves NGOs and international networks had no involvement whatsoever. It doesn't.
Grassroots participation and external organisational involvement are not mutually exclusive. why are you presenting organisational independence as proof of complete isolation while ignoring publicly documented international connections?
If you want to claim there was no external assistance or involvement, provide evidence. Don't substitute selective quotations for an honest examination of the facts.
Selective omission doesn't make a narrative factual.
https://t.co/uHAAq4TcRb
https://t.co/8cVcx41UXb
https://t.co/qpaFmooq5q
https://t.co/d1RLnY5AS8
Nobody said it was a fashion show. But given your crowd's criminal antics, perhaps you should worry less about how former presidents dressed and more about how your own supporters behave. Intimidation, aggression, insults and political thuggery are not signs of democratic values. They're the behaviour of people who have mistaken mob mentality for moral superiority. Your conduct says far more about the state of your movement than anyone's wardrobe ever could.
Conviction in The Hague: Former Kosovo President Hashim Thaci Sentenced for Obstructing Justice
A European Union-backed court in The Hague convicted Kosovo’s former president, Hashim Thaci, of attempting to obstruct justice and contempt of court, sentencing him to 17 months in prison. This term will be added to the 25-year war crimes sentence he is already serving.
Judge Christopher Gosnell stated that Thaci disclosed confidential witness information and conveyed instructions on how to testify. Removing his headset during the hearing, Thaci declared, «This is politics, not justice.» His defense attorney announced plans to appeal.
#Kosovo #TheHague #Balkans #Justice #News
Apparently, a Serbian song is enough to send Pristina into a diplomatic meltdown. Emergency statements, demands for explanations and lectures about European values — all because Serbian culture was heard at an EU event.
If a song can cause this much panic, perhaps the problem is not the music but the insecurity of a political narrative that cannot tolerate a Serbian perspective.
Serbia has a history, a culture and a national identity. None requires permission from Pristina.
And here is the challenge to Pristina: if you are so confident in your claims of sovereignty and European values, why does the mere expression of Serbian identity provoke such an extraordinary reaction? You cannot demand tolerance from everyone else while refusing to show it yourselves.
https://t.co/dpimiAAQEk
European values cannot be defended with one hand while undermined with the other.
It is deeply disturbing that, at an EU Enlargement Forum celebrating “unity”, a Serbian nationalist song denying Kosovo’s sovereignty was given a stage, while Kosovo itself was absent.
This is not a musical choice without consequences. It is a political message with a history.
Regret is not enough. Who selected it, who approved it, and most importantly, who takes responsibility?
Accountability for Serbia, Excuses for Kosovo: The Double Standard of Its Government
The Kosovo government has spent years demanding that Serbia confront its wartime past, accept responsibility and answer for alleged crimes. It presents accountability as an unquestionable principle when directing accusations at Belgrade.
But what happens when accountability reaches Kosovo's own political establishment?
Suddenly, the language changes.
When four former senior Ex Terrorist KLA commanders received a combined 81 years in prison in September for War Crimes against humanity against own Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo's political leadership was quick to condemn the judgment. Prime Minister Albin Kurti described it as an unacceptable injustice, questioned the court's approach and promised support for the convicted former commanders through the appeal process.
Now, following Ex President of Kosovo Hashim Thaçi's additional 17-month sentence in a separate case involving the disclosure of confidential information and attempts to influence witnesses, the familiar pattern has returned. Thaçi himself dismissed the ruling as “politics, not justice,” while political figures and former KLA supporters have denounced the proceedings.
The Kosovo government's latest statement is more carefully worded, reaffirming respect for judicial decisions while repeating concerns about transparency and fair-trial standards. Those concerns can be legitimate. Every defendant is entitled to due process, and every judgment can be challenged through the proper legal channels.
But that principle cannot be reserved for one side.
The question is straightforward: why does Kosovo insist that Serbia must accept judicial accountability, while its own political leadership repeatedly casts doubt on the legitimacy of proceedings when former KLA commanders are the ones being held responsible?
Does the rule of law apply only when the verdict is politically convenient?
Kosovo cannot demand that Serbia respect international judicial institutions while simultaneously encouraging a political narrative that portrays those same institutions as illegitimate whenever their decisions are unwelcome. It cannot insist that allegations against Serbian officials be taken seriously while treating proceedings against former KLA leaders as politically motivated by default.
And it cannot expect the international community to accept one standard for Belgrade and another for Pristina.
There is a difference between defending the right to appeal and attempting to discredit the institution delivering an unwelcome judgment. There is a difference between scrutinising a court and dismissing its decisions because they challenge a preferred national narrative.
Kosovo's political establishment needs to decide whether it genuinely believes in accountability or simply wants accountability imposed on Serbia.
Because the rule of law is not a political instrument. It is not something to invoke against your opponents and abandon when it reaches your own doorstep.
Accountability isn't a one-way street. Kosovo's political leadership cannot continually demand that Serbia meet the democratic and legal standards it associates with the United States and the United Kingdom, while questioning those same principles when they apply to its own former leaders. Kosovo always presents itself as as Europe's most pro-American societies and looks to Washington and London as models of democracy, freedom and the rule of law. But those principles are not a political convenience. They do not change depending on whose interests are at stake.
Accountability isn't a one-way street. Kosovo must accept accountability for its own guilty actions, and its political leadership must be prepared to accept exactly the same standard it demands of Serbia. You cannot invoke democracy, the rule of law and the most Pro American in Europe when judging others, then question those very same deomcract principles when they apply to your own political establishment.
https://t.co/etjpUhgr0o
Conviction in The Hague: Former Kosovo President Hashim Thaci Sentenced for Obstructing Justice
A European Union-backed court in The Hague convicted Kosovo’s former president, Hashim Thaci, of attempting to obstruct justice and contempt of court, sentencing him to 17 months in prison. This term will be added to the 25-year war crimes sentence he is already serving.
Judge Christopher Gosnell stated that Thaci disclosed confidential witness information and conveyed instructions on how to testify. Removing his headset during the hearing, Thaci declared, «This is politics, not justice.» His defense attorney announced plans to appeal.
#Kosovo #TheHague #Balkans #Justice #News
@DissapointedK Four former senior KLA commanders received a combined 81 years in September. Thaçi has just received another 17 months for witness tampering.
Live with it!
What an extraordinary lecture on moving forward, delivered with the usual expectation that Serbs should simply surrender their history, national interests and legitimate concerns because you have decided the discussion is over.
You throw around words like sovereignty, territorial ambitions and international recognition as though they magically erase the history, the unresolved disputes and the rights of the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija.
And the little lecture about Serbia being trapped in the 20th century? Spare me. Serbia does not need an Albanian permission slip to defend its national interests.
You talk about Serbia's future while demanding that Serbs abandon their own historical and national perspective. That's not reconciliation. That's a demand for political submission dressed up as enlightened advice.
You call disagreement nostalgia, Serbian concerns chauvinism and your own political position an unquestionable reality.
Perhaps before lecturing anyone about moving forward, learn that accepting your narrative is not a prerequisite for having a conversation.
And one final point: recognition by some governments does not mean universal recognition, nor does it settle every question surrounding Kosovo's status.
You can keep delivering lectures about the 20th century. The rest of us can see the double standards perfectly well.
My DMs are being flooded with messages of sympathy for Kosovo Albanians from Student List supporters, and, of course, Albanians lecturing me about Serbia, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Oh, the irony. 😂
Did we all suddenly forget September, when four former KLA commanders were handed a combined 81 years in prison for war crimes?
And today's little reminder: Hashim Thaçi gets another 17 months for witness tampering and obstructing justice, only to complain to the court that this is "politics, not justice."
Oh, how convenient. When the court is dealing with someone else, it's justice. When it's dealing with convicted War Criminal Thaci and associates, suddenly it's politics. 😂
But please, keep flooding my inbox with lectures about Serbian accountability. Perhaps start by having that same conversation at home.
The irony really does write itself.
https://t.co/SNSfA6cdJ5
https://t.co/FoVh9WlPC0
@DissapointedK Imagine the irony of Albanians lecturing anyone about war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide. The audacity is extraordinary.
https://t.co/e7PGOUL6RH
@anelmrkaljevic 😂 First you claim Republika Srpska doesn't exist, then you acknowledge it was established as one of the two entities under the Dayton Agreement. Make up your mind. Perhaps learn something about Bosnia lecturing anyone about Bosnia. 😂
SARAJEVO, TEHRAN AND THE PALESTINE CONNECTION: THE RELATIONSHIP THAT DESERVES CLOSER SCRUTINY
Yesterday, I raised questions about the connections between Palestine, Bosnia and the political and ideological narratives surrounding the Muslim world in the Balkans.
Today, another development deserves very serious attention.
Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, one of the most senior religious figures in the Islamic Republic of Iran, has been in Sarajevo attending the ceremony marking the formal installation of Nedžad Grabus as the new Reis-ul-Ulema, the head of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Islamic Community.
This is not an ordinary diplomatic guest.
Arafi is a member of Iran's Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts. He also heads Iran's national religious seminary system. In March 2026, he briefly served on the country's interim Leadership Council following the death of Ali Khamenei.
His presence in Sarajevo therefore deserves more than a passing mention.
But it is what he said during his interview with Bosnian news outlet Klix that makes this visit particularly interesting.
Arafi openly stated that Iran wants to deepen and expand its relationship with Bosnia and Herzegovina across multiple fields, including culture, intellectual life, education and the arts.
He went further.
Discussing the Bosnian War and the Iranian experience, Arafi drew a parallel between the two countries' histories of resistance. He specifically identified what he called the literature of resistance as an area in which Iran and Bosnia could develop cooperation.
He also stated that Bosnia's wartime experience occupies a special place in Iran's educational programmes, including its religious institutions and universities.
These are his own words, not an interpretation imposed on them.
And they raise an important question: what kind of relationship is Tehran seeking to develop with Bosnia, and what role does religious and cultural engagement play in that relationship?
THE PALESTINE CONNECTION
Arafi himself connected Iran's religious outlook with its involvement in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Gaza, describing assistance to people facing injustice as a religious obligation.
This is significant because Iran's regional position is not limited to conventional diplomacy. Its political and religious identity is closely connected to its declared support for the Palestinian cause and what its leadership describes as resistance.
This is where the direct connection becomes impossible to ignore. Iran is not merely engaging with Bosnia through conventional diplomacy. Its senior religious leadership is establishing direct religious, cultural and intellectual ties with Bosnia's Islamic institutions, while openly promoting a shared narrative of resistance that connects Bosnia's wartime experience with Tehran's political and ideological position on Palestine. These connections deserve to be examined for what they are: a developing relationship between religious institutions and a state whose regional influence is deeply intertwined with its political agenda.
When a senior Iranian religious authority visits Sarajevo, speaks openly about expanding institutional, intellectual and cultural cooperation, and identifies common ground through the language of resistance, these are legitimate subjects for public scrutiny.
BOSNIA, IRAN AND THE GROWING RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL CONNECTION
The relationship between Bosnia and Iran did not begin with this week's visit to Sarajevo. It has deep roots in the Bosnian War of the 1990s, when Iran established itself as an important supporter of the Bosnian Muslim side during the conflict.
Tehran's involvement went beyond expressions of solidarity. Iran provided assistance to the Bosnian government, and its wartime relationship with Bosnia created political, religious and institutional connections that continued long after the Dayton Peace Agreement.
That history matters when examining what is happening today.
Iran has maintained an interest in Bosnia through religious diplomacy, cultural programmes, educational exchanges and engagement with Muslim institutions. The presence of Ayatollah Alireza Arafi in Sarajevo is a contemporary illustration of that relationship.
This is not simply a meeting between two religious representatives. It brings together a senior figure of the Islamic Republic, a state whose political system is built around the authority of its religious establishment, and the highest religious institution representing Bosnia's Muslim community.
Arafi's own statements make the connection even more relevant. He has spoken about expanding cooperation, shared historical experiences and the importance of resistance literature. He has also connected Iran's experience with Bosnia's wartime history and the Palestinian cause.
There is a broader ideological dimension here that cannot be ignored.
Iran has consistently positioned itself as a leading political and religious supporter of the Palestinian cause. Its concept of resistance is central to its regional foreign policy. By drawing parallels between Bosnia's wartime experience, Iran's own history and Gaza, Arafi is placing these different conflicts within a shared political and religious narrative.
That is a significant connection.
Bosnia's historical relationship with Iran, its Muslim religious institutions and Tehran's contemporary engagement with Sarajevo deserve serious scrutiny. The question is how these relationships have developed, how deeply they are embedded institutionally, and what role they may play in Iran's wider ambitions in the Balkans.
Bosnia's European future and its relationship with the wider Muslim world are not mutually exclusive. But understanding the influence of a foreign state with an explicitly ideological political system is essential to understanding the geopolitical environment in which Bosnia operates.
THE QUESTIONS THAT NEED ANSWERS
How extensive are Iran's religious, cultural and educational relationships with Bosnian institutions?
What formal agreements, exchange programmes and financial relationships exist?
How much of Iran's political and religious messaging is being incorporated into cultural and educational cooperation?
And what does Tehran ultimately hope to achieve by deepening its relationship with Sarajevo?
These are not abstract questions. They concern the historical relationship between two countries, the influence of a regional power in the Balkans and the intersection of religion and geopolitics.
Yesterday's discussion about Palestine and Bosnia must therefore be viewed in a wider context. The historical relationship between Iran and Bosnia, combined with Tehran's declared interest in expanding its presence, gives this subject a contemporary dimension that deserves much closer attention.
The connection between Sarajevo and Tehran is real, it has a history, and it is developing. Understanding its political, religious and geopolitical implications is not optional for anyone concerned with Bosnia's future.
https://t.co/hsyxSRzVrp
https://t.co/DrXkQi2Cnw
Republika Srpska doesn't exist? 😂 It's no wonder you struggle with basic political and historical facts. Perhaps try reading the Dayton Agreement before lecturing anyone about Bosnia. We know you hate Republika Srpska all you want cause you dream about being us, but denying its constitutional existence is an entirely different level of ignorance. 😂
ALEKSANDAR ČUPIĆ: THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER-KING — A LITTLE LESS HAGIOGRAPHY, A LITTLE MORE SUBSTANCE
@studentblokade, are you actually taking the piss? Is this a political movement or a medieval royal court preparing the coronation of its spiritual leader?
The Student List's (@studentblokade) description of Aleksandar Čupić is extraordinary. A long beard reminiscent of the great Enlightenment philosophers, a noble and perceptive gaze, profound anthropological understanding of humanity, an exceptional spiritual constitution. Apparently, we are no longer introducing a parliamentary candidate. We are being presented with Serbia's very own philosopher-king.
Who exactly are they trying to convince?
Let's look at the actual public record rather than the carefully manufactured mythology.
Čupić is an Assistant academic professor at the University of Belgrade's Faculty of Transport and Traffic Engineering. He graduated in 2003 (took him 8 yrs to finish 4 yr BA degree), completed his master's in 2007 and defended his doctorate in 2014. He has worked at the faculty since 2004. His wife, Ana, is a medical specialist. Together they moved from Belgrade to Sopot in 2012, have six children and developed a certified organic agricultural business, which received certification in 2017.
These are legitimate aspects of his biography. Nobody disputes that. But they do not automatically establish political wisdom, exceptional moral authority or some extraordinary understanding of the human condition.
His public profile within the student movement was significantly elevated after he and his family accommodated students travelling towards Kragujevac in their greenhouses. That was a generous gesture. It deserves recognition as an act of hospitality. But hospitality is not a political qualification, and helping students does not confer intellectual infallibility.
There are also identifiable professional and institutional connections worth understanding, including his academic career at the University of Belgrade and the academic supervision of his doctoral work by Professor Dušan Teodorović. These should be examined on their actual merits, not turned into insinuations or treated as evidence of wrongdoing.
And here is where the Student List's presentation becomes particularly revealing.
Instead of allowing the public to evaluate Čupić through his ideas, policies, professional record and political positions, they are wrapping him in the language of spiritual superiority. They describe his physical appearance as though it were evidence of intellectual depth. They romanticise his personality and elevate ordinary biographical details into a narrative of exceptional moral character.
Why?
Because there is a fundamental difference between presenting a candidate and manufacturing a personality.
Čupić has academic credentials. Fine. But what is his actual political philosophy? What is his economic programme? What does he understand about the workings of the Serbian state, international relations, public finance and the realities of governing a country?
Where is the serious examination of his positions?
And why should anyone accept this almost reverential portrayal without asking difficult questions?
The Student List cannot demand accountability from everyone else while surrounding its own personalities with an atmosphere of untouchability.
If Čupić wants to occupy one of the highest constitutional positions in Serbia, he should expect scrutiny, not literary worship.
A doctorate does not make someone a philosopher. A beard does not make someone a sage. Hosting students does not make someone a statesman. And writing extravagant descriptions of a man's gaze certainly does not establish his moral or intellectual superiority.
Serbia needs public officials who can demonstrate their competence through decisions, arguments and accountability.
It does not need a political movement auditioning candidates for the role of a spiritual patriarch.
Enough with the theatre. Show us the substance.
https://t.co/zC62LjV17Q
Стасит и висок, појавом природно и спонтано ауторитативан, дуге браде која буди асоцијацију на ликове старих просветитеља, мислилаца и народних мудраца, са племенитим, проницљивим погледом у којем се огледа дубоко антрополошко разумевање човека и његове крхкости, он по својој духовној конституцији не припада онима који политичку снагу траже у заглушујућој буци, демагогији и међусобном надвикивању.
Наш Александар Чупић!
HA! Is that really the best you could come up with? When you run out of arguments, you resort to calling someone AI. That says considerably more about your inability to engage with an argument than it does about me. And for what it's worth, there's nothing artificial about me. The opinions are mine, the words are mine, and I'm perfectly capable of defending them. Try addressing the argument next time. 🤣
THE MELTDOWN OVER A SERBIAN SONG
There is something extraordinary about watching the reaction to a post defending the right of Serbs to express their historical and cultural attachment to Kosovo and Metohija.
A Serbian song becomes a controversy. A few paragraphs defending Serbian historical memory provoke an avalanche of indignation. Albanian commentators enter the debate, Nataša Kandić (@natasakandic) weighs in, and suddenly the discussion is no longer about the lyrics of a song. It becomes an argument about whether Serbs are entitled to express their own national identity without first obtaining someone else's approval.
The reaction has been truly revealing.
The original argument was straightforward: the historical origins of a song deserve discussion, but they do not give anyone the authority to dictate what that song means to every Serbian person who sings it today.
The year 1989 matters. The political circumstances matter. The lyrics matter. But none of those considerations automatically establishes that every person singing the song is advocating another war.
If critics believe particular lyrics explicitly call for violence, they should identify them, quote them and explain their argument. That is how a serious discussion works. Simply labelling a song propaganda and then treating everyone who sings it as politically suspect is not historical analysis. It is collective attribution.
And this is where the reaction becomes particularly interesting.
Why does a Serbian song expressing attachment to Kosovo provoke such an intense response? Why does the continued existence of Serbian historical memory appear to be so difficult for certain commentators to accept?
Kosovo is not an incidental geographical reference in Serbian history. It occupies a central place in Serbian medieval history, Orthodox religious heritage, literature and national consciousness. The monasteries, churches and historical monuments of Kosovo and Metohija are part of a cultural inheritance that predates the political disputes of the modern era.
One does not have to agree with Serbia's political position to acknowledge that history.
Yet there appears to be an expectation that Serbian identity must be expressed within carefully prescribed boundaries. Serbs may remember their history, provided that their memories do not make anyone uncomfortable. They may express cultural attachment, provided that it does not challenge another political narrative. They may speak about Kosovo, provided that they do so in language approved by their critics.
That is not reconciliation. It is an expectation of political conformity.
Nataša Kandić's (@natasakandic) intervention is part of a much wider debate about the relationship between Serbian national identity, historical responsibility and political memory. Accountability for crimes committed during the wars of the 1990s is essential. The suffering of civilians must never be dismissed, and historical facts should never be distorted to serve political convenience.
But accountability is not collective guilt. Criticism of nationalism is not a justification for treating Serbian national identity itself as something that requires permanent correction.
These are two entirely different questions, and deliberately confusing them makes honest discussion impossible.
The response from Albanian commentators has been equally revealing. Kosovo declared independence in 2008 and received recognition from the United States and numerous other countries. That is the present diplomatic reality. But recognition does not erase the history that preceded it, nor does it extinguish the historical attachment that millions of Serbs feel towards Kosovo.
International recognition is a political and diplomatic fact. It is not a mechanism for rewriting centuries of history.
And if Kosovo's sovereignty is secure, why should a Serbian song provoke such extraordinary anxiety? Why should a social-media post defending Serbian cultural memory be treated as a threat?
A confident society should be capable of hearing an expression of another nation's historical identity without interpreting every word as a challenge to its existence.
There is a difference between expressing national identity and advocating violence. There is a difference between remembering history and attempting to reverse it through force. Those distinctions should be obvious, particularly to people who claim to support European democratic values.
The Western media also has a responsibility to approach this subject with greater consistency. Serbian national expression is too often examined exclusively through the political controversies of the 1990s, while the deeper historical and cultural context is pushed aside. This creates a distorted picture in which Serbian identity itself becomes inseparable from the actions of particular political leaders.
That is neither fair nor intellectually serious.
The purpose of this debate should be to examine history honestly, not to establish which nation has the right to remember it. Serbs do not need to deny the suffering of others to acknowledge their own historical inheritance. Nor should they be expected to apologise for the existence of that inheritance.
The extraordinary reaction to this debate has only reinforced the central point: Serbian identity cannot be defined by those who object to its expression.
People are entitled to disagree with the song. They are entitled to criticise its origins, its lyrics and its political associations. What they are not entitled to do is turn that criticism into a demand that Serbs abandon their historical memory or submit their cultural identity to external approval.
If a song and a social-media post can provoke this much outrage, perhaps it is time to ask why the expression of Serbian identity remains such a sensitive subject.
Serbia's history belongs to its people. Kosovo and Metohija remain part of that history and of the Serbian national consciousness. No amount of outrage, condemnation or political pressure can change that.
Serbs do not need permission to remember who they are.
https://t.co/KjrL4eKEYy
@MiloshOffical@natasakandic "Rewrite the meaning of serbian identity...."
No one was talking about your identity.... but about a song written witj the pure purpose of propaganda... who's lyrics call for new wars....
And the year it was written, just as the purpose of why it was written mean a lot....
Big Q, imagine how triggered you the rest of Albanians have become by a Serbian song expressing attachment to Kosovo. Perhaps that reaction says more about insecurity over sovereignty than it does about the song. Kosovo's independence was declared in 2008 and recognised by the United States; it was not won through a decisive victory over Serbia on the battlefield. Yet a song written decades ago still seems to provoke extraordinary anxiety. The year it was written is historical context, not a licence to dictate what it means to every Serb who sings it. If you claim its lyrics explicitly call for new wars, quote them and make your case. But don't confuse Serbian historical memory, national identity and attachment to Kosovo with an endorsement of violence. If your sovereignty is secure, why are you so threatened by a song?