🚨🇷🇺Long-Stalled Arctic LNG 2 Project Shows Signs of Life as Key Chinese Modules Head to Russia
👉Key construction modules for T3 of Arctic LNG 2 are once again on the move from China to the Russian Arctic after a hiatus of nearly two years.
https://t.co/siwypfr9aA
NEW: CENTCOM CONFIRMS: adversaries are buying commercial location data to target US troops.
Pentagon acknowledges it's not a one-off threat.
We got here thanks to big companies:
Who forced advertising everywhere. And it became a surveillance & weapons targeting system.
When you use apps they often harvest detailed data from your phone.
That data gets piped to an ecosystem of data brokers... who then sell the movements of millions to anybody with a credit card.
Customers include: shady players, criminals & military adversaries.
The data is incredibly detailed and can be used to track US military & intelligence activity (and that of every other government) and direct attacks.
Americans = extra vulnerable
Thanks to a lot of lobbying, the US has no comprehensive privacy law. For all of GDPR's flaws, Americans are far less protected from the data broker ecosystem.
...which is now leaving everybody exposed. Troops included.
Pentagon Policy? Yikes
Right now troops aren't prohibited from using their personal phones (which for reasons explained above are like giant, identifying beacons).
And until recently government devices could have ad tracking functionality enabled. Another massive own-goal.
Finally it seems like policy is being implemented to disable trackign on gov devices, but the gaps are enormous.
Some Action?
Now, a bipartisan group of Senators led by @RonWyden has called on the Pentagon to stop the flow of location data & stop using browsers built around collecting advertising data (they specifically call out Chrome).
And some other eminently sensible measures.
Good but also: experts have been collectively warning about this for almost a decade. What are we doing?
Story by @razhael
https://t.co/dY5m9lBZPs
Europe 2050 project: A piece to feel better and hope for more: Things are happening to make Europe stronger. An important contribution by @Enricoletta, which goes against the "Europe is paralyzed" dominant line. Read it and feel (a bit) better. https://t.co/s5ZTOxnunJ
@A_Melikishvili While the strategic thought behind it is correct, I'd be careful with that, as it is used to fuel irredentism in Kazakhstan, playing into the Kremlin's hand. As far as I am concerned, the ru can choke on it or Bashkortostan should incorporate that area in case of independence.
While the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz continues and Western constituents and, by extension, elected officials are focused on the inflationary shock caused by the crisis, some very interesting opinions on the state of the ru economy have been published in the past month. 1/
However, discussing the Russian economy without the context of the Kremlin's political objectives and Russian cultural traits of stubborn tolerance to hardship is an exercise in futility. 8/
1/2 У Львові відкрили меморіальну таблицю Джохару Дудаєву – першому президенту Чеченської Республіки Ічкерія, герою чеченського народу та символу боротьби за свободу.
На урочистості присутні, зокрема, прем'єр-міністр Чеченської Республіки Ічкерія (у вигнанні) Ахмед Закаєв.
‼️Statement on the Orbán Government Accusing Me, an Investigative Journalist, of Espionage‼️
Today, the Hungarian government has filed a complaint against me for espionage. Accusing investigative journalists of espionage is virtually unprecedented in the 21st century for an EU member state. This is typical of Putin’s Russia, Belarus, and similar regimes.
I have spent over a decade documenting how Russian spies and interests have penetrated Hungarian politics, so I am probably the least surprised by this.
Despite growing signs that the Hungarian government acts as a Kremlin ally and copies the Russian model, I still trust that parts of the Hungarian state—and the judiciary—follow the Hungarian constitution, not that of the Russian Federation.
I have never engaged in espionage. I see my work as journalistic counterintelligence—from exposing the hacking of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry by Russian actors to revealing the activities of Hungarian pro-Kremlin propagandists.
Defending myself publicly would be easier if I were not bound by source protection. But that remains my top priority. I cannot reveal who provides me information or what I receive, including from within Hungarian state structures.
If I were not a journalist, I could list many facts proving it is impossible for the Hungarian state to genuinely believe I am spying. Certain meetings, contacts, and information gathering could never have happened otherwise.
This baseless accusation now forces me to share details of a specific investigation, including a conversation with a confidential source that appears to have been wiretapped. Normally, this would appear in a finished article or my upcoming book—not here. (It will appear there as well.)
Since 2023, I have investigated whether the relationship between Péter Szijjártó and Russian officials exceeds legal limits. The published audio, where I’m heard talking to a source, mentions that communication between Szijjártó and Sergey Lavrov is recorded by EU intelligence services. Less attention has gone to my point that this relationship raises strong suspicion of political intelligence activity and influence operations in Russia’s interest.
These are serious claims and hard to prove. As a journalist, I cannot force anyone to speak or hand over documents. That is why gathering this information has taken so long—and why I spoke to that sensitive source (while the conversation was secretly recorded).
Serious claims require serious evidence, and I believe I have gathered some. I have not engaged in espionage.
I have not cooperated with any foreign intelligence service in surveilling Szijjártó. Instead, I tried to verify earlier fragments of information about Szijjártó–Lavrov communication.
I sought to identify the channels and phone numbers used, and whether a secret channel—possibly used by Russian intelligence—exists. In other words, whether Szijjártó uses a hidden device or number unknown even within the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.
This was only one part of my research. The other, more serious topic is this:
Since at least 2016–2017, EU and NATO intelligence services have had indications that large amounts of cash and precious stones may have been transported from Russia on Hungarian government aircraft or private jets used by government figures. Officials from at least six countries made such claims to me.
These signals did not come from monitoring Hungarian targets, but, for example, from intercepting Russian officials discussing or preparing such shipments.
Alongside Szijjártó–Lavrov communication, I examined how baggage screening and handling works on such flights, which officials travel with what luggage, whether more packages arrive from Moscow than depart, and how such shipments could be handled discreetly.
I know how serious this is, and I would not have written even this much—but since I do not know what else may be taken from the edited recording, or what fabricated accusations (like, for example, that I was seeking such details to commit terrorism) may follow, I believe I must share this now.
Why do I investigate all this?
According to many sources familiar with the Hungarian state and counterintelligence, there is no independent body in the Orbán system able to investigate or act if a senior official is suspected of espionage.
Government members direct intelligence services and set expectations. The services lack both tools and authority to investigate a government member.
I knew this would be difficult when I chose to pursue it. But few people in Hungary can or dare to do this, so I felt it was my duty.
We have now reached the point where the Orbán government—of which Szijjártó is still a member—aware of my reporting plans and the risk they pose, has preemptively accused me of espionage.
I am a Hungarian patriot. I serve the public. As an investigative journalist, my job is to hold power accountable. Neither political theater nor legal threats will deter me.
Many Ukrainians forced to flee in the last years of their lives are not just leaving a structure in which they live, but homes they built themselves. They poured everything into their homes. They are leaving behind a part of themselves. Just heartbreaking.