𝓡𝓸𝓶𝓪 🕸️

(GOD FIRST)
Web3_enthusiast||content creator||crypto_trader||CM|| Just want to have fun and grow

[𝓡𝓸𝓶𝓪 🕸️ @Official_roma1]

Congratulations guys we did it
200k followers 😁💥🎊🎉

Up next 300k followers 😁💪

Let's go guys
I connect back

[DeepSafe @DeepSafe_AI]

On 1 October, the Ethereum Foundation blog introduced zkAPI, built by the Open Anonymity Project with the EF: a way to pay for a metered API, AI inference first, without the payment being tied to who you are.

You deposit credits into a vault contract on Ethereum once. After that, your device produces a zero-knowledge proof that says, in effect, "a funded note covers this spend and nobody has spent it before." The server checks it, issues a short-lived API key capped in dollars, and never learns which deposit paid.

The design choice worth noticing is where those proofs get checked.

Day to day, spending goes through the server, which verifies spend proofs off-chain. Getting money out is handled differently: "The vault contract verifies the same kind of proof at deposit, close, and escape, so your exit never depends on the server's honesty." A balance can be closed and withdrawn on-chain "even if every zkAPI server disappears."

So the operator is relied on for one thing and not the other. Everyday spending runs through the server. The step that returns your funds is checked by the contract itself.

Not every check in a system has to run on-chain. In this design, the one that guards the exit does.

https://t.co/KPblUUWPJi

#DeepSafe #Web3Security

[𝓡𝓸𝓶𝓪 🕸️ @Official_roma1]

@DeepSafe_AI Thanks for the insight team

[𝓡𝓸𝓶𝓪 🕸️ @Official_roma1]

UPTOBER is here 🔥

Which COIN are you holding 💪

[𝓡𝓸𝓶𝓪 🕸️ @Official_roma1]

@DeepSafe_AI Thanks for the insight team

[DeepSafe @DeepSafe_AI]

Trail of Bits published notes on 18 September on reviewing the Miden zkVM. The part worth reading is what happened before the review started.

Security firms — the same firm included — have published a number of posts describing how they pointed an agent harness at a codebase. This post is about a stage earlier than that: "before code review even starts, agents now allow us to build custom tooling and formal models that improve the quality and depth of our reviews."

Miden has its own assembly language, MASM, and very little tooling around it. The firm had six months of lead time, because the implementation was not yet feature complete. It spent them having its agents build an LSP server, a decompiler, a static analysis engine, and a Lean model of the VM executor. None of that was the review.

Applied during the review that followed, those tools produced concrete results. The static analysis identified over 400 unique locations where type validation could be improved, all of them reachable from the library's public API, as well as one high-severity finding: a remainder supplied by the prover was never validated before being passed to a 32-bit subtraction — "a malicious prover could exploit this to forge Falcon signatures and drain any Miden account controlled by a Falcon key pair." The Lean modeling effort produced 95 machine-checked correctness proofs covering all the binary arithmetic in the core library, and surfaced two more bugs the existing unit tests had not caught.

The detail worth sitting with is smaller than any of those. The decompiler was the single largest piece of the work, over 100 agent-generated commits across months. The firm's own account of where the benefit landed: "The main benefit of this work turned out to be the decompiler's internal analysis frameworks and intermediate representation, which we could reuse for static analysis, rather than the full decompilation pipeline."

The post is direct about why work like this did not happen before. It is "highly exploratory in nature, and the end results and potential payoff may be difficult to predict," which makes it "hard to sell clients on them in advance."

What has changed, on the post's own account, is the cost of a miss: "Today, a failed side project only costs tokens." The payoff is no easier to predict than it was. What a wrong guess costs is smaller.

One thing about this particular case is worth noting on its own. The main benefit ended up somewhere the single largest piece of the work had not been aimed at. That is a payoff shape easier to recognize once the work is finished than to argue for before it starts.

https://t.co/972ijKSY19

#DeepSafe #Web3Security

[DeepSafe @DeepSafe_AI]

🤝 DeepSafe × @DeAgentAI

DeepSafe is partnering with DeAgentAI.

DeepSafe is a verification layer for AI and Web3 — using Ring-VRF, MPC, and TEE to validate AI Agent inputs and outputs, independent of the parties being verified.

DeAgentAI’s AI Token Smart Router is the model gateway. Verification and model access now sit next to each other.

#DeepSafe #DeAgentAI #AIA #VerifiableAI

[𝓡𝓸𝓶𝓪 🕸️ @Official_roma1]

@DeepSafe_AI @DeAgentAI Nice partnership 👏
Keep building team 💪

[𝓡𝓸𝓶𝓪 🕸️ @Official_roma1]

@DeepSafe_AI C not on it own

[𝓡𝓸𝓶𝓪 🕸️ @Official_roma1]

@DeepSafe_AI I will go with C

[DeepSafe @DeepSafe_AI]

Weekend puzzle.

A node operator publishes its source code. The code has been audited, and the audit report is public too.

Does any of that tell you which build is actually running on the node?

A. Yes. The code is public.
B. Yes. The code is audited.
C. No—not on its own.

[𝓡𝓸𝓶𝓪 🕸️ @Official_roma1]

@DeepSafe_AI Thanks for the insight team

[DeepSafe @DeepSafe_AI]

On 24 August, a proposal on Neutron titled "TestProp: Preparation for AIATO: AI Agent Takeover" asked governance to make one address the admin of ten contracts, among them six Astroport pools and two Drop contracts. When voting closed on 31 August, it was rejected. Roughly 10.4 million NTRN voted no; about 0.32 million voted yes.

On 19 September, proposal 9, "AIATO: AI Agent Takeover. Phase 1: Agent Admin Registration", asked for the same ten admin changes to the same address, plus an eleventh. It was filed as an expedited proposal and passed when voting closed on 22 September at 02:24 UTC, with about 37.3 million NTRN voting yes.

Cosmos Hub validators halted the Hub to limit losses of ATOM moved there from Neutron, and say the funds secured at restart are held in a community validator multisig.

None of this was hidden. From 24 August, the title, the ten contracts and the address that would become admin were public on-chain. From 31 August, so was the rejection.

The August vote said no to that proposal. It did not stop the same request from being filed again nineteen days later and passing. It ended a vote. It did not end the attempt.

Proposal 5: https://t.co/c1atRWPk16
Proposal 9: https://t.co/7LorAITXVB
Cosmos Hub halt: https://t.co/11iqGhmtsp
Cosmos Hub restart: https://t.co/kNhbpbafrG

#DeepSafe #Web3Security

[𝓡𝓸𝓶𝓪 🕸️ @Official_roma1]

@DeepSafe_AI Thanks for the insight team

[DeepSafe @DeepSafe_AI]

A draft posted to bitcoin-dev this month reworks one small piece of taproot backup. It sits in an individual fork, hasn't been assigned a BIP number, and is still in its earliest form.

The draft addresses backup for unspendable internal keys. One existing approach it cites as motivation is to choose a random r and retain it, so the internal key can be recomputed later.

The draft's mechanism derives a chain code from a tagged hash of a normalized wallet policy. That chain code, the fixed NUMS point H, and a selected derivation path together determine the internal key — in a step the draft describes as being done "without additional secret material."

Its Security considerations section states two things: "The policy and selected derivation are enough to reproduce the internal key," and, in the same section, "Seed backups alone do not reconstruct the policy."

Read narrowly, what the draft changes is which inputs are needed to reconstruct that internal key.

Draft: https://t.co/IiCRQuQPcv

[𝓡𝓸𝓶𝓪 🕸️ @Official_roma1]

@DeepSafe_AI GM Deepsafe

[DeepSafe @DeepSafe_AI]

GM.

Two words that get used as if they were one, and shouldn't be.

Ours: encrypted and private. Encrypting something keeps its contents from being read by anyone without the key. Whether anyone can see that it happened at all is a separate question — and "private" gets used for both.

What's your pair?

[𝓡𝓸𝓶𝓪 🕸️ @Official_roma1]

@DeepSafe_AI I will go with C

[DeepSafe @DeepSafe_AI]

Weekend puzzle.

A contract checks a condition, then acts on it. Both in the same transaction, atomically.

How old can the thing it checked be?

A. Zero. It's atomic.
B. One block at most.
C. Depends on where the fact came from.

[𝓡𝓸𝓶𝓪 🕸️ @Official_roma1]

@DeepSafe_AI Keep building team

[DeepSafe @DeepSafe_AI]

EIP-8365 was added to the Ethereum EIPs repository on 17 September, with status Draft. It proposes retiring 0x00, the original genesis-era withdrawal credential type: exit every active validator that still carries one, and stop processing deposits that would create more.

The proposal reports that the population has fallen from roughly 600,000 to 9,290 since Capella opened one-way conversion, but that the decline has stalled. Of the 9,119 still active, it counts 374 that have not attested for over six months and 253 that have never attested in a 14-month observation window. Its own reading: "These are, with high likelihood, validators whose keys are lost."

High likelihood is as far as it gets, and the proposal has to reason from attestation history precisely because the fact it needs is not in the state. The chain records that a validator is not producing attestations. Whether anyone is still able to act for it is not something the chain records.

What the proposal does supply is a measurement of what that missing fact costs. 4.45% of active 0x00 validators have been offline for 30 days or more, against 0.10% for 0x01 and 0.05% for 0x02. The same observable state, with two different meanings: "Being offline is a transient state for execution-credentialed validators, whose owners can always exit and recover funds, but a terminal state for 0x00 validators with lost keys."

Terminal, when the signing key is the thing that is gone. Voluntary exit needs that key; the execution-layer triggerable exit needs an execution address, which 0x00 credentials do not have. For that subset — and only that subset — both paths are closed, and at the penalty rates cited natural ejection takes roughly 28 years. Other 0x00 holders still have the ordinary exit available; the proposal writes a rule that does not depend on knowing which is which.

No balance is moved by this stage. The unchanged rotation path stays open, and any 0x00 holder who still controls their withdrawal key can use it to recover in full. The lost-key subset — by definition — cannot.

The part worth reading twice is what the proposal declines to do. Rescue proposals for this population have been rejected before on credible-neutrality grounds, because a rescue "adjudicates off-chain ownership claims and selects beneficiaries." So this one does not ask who owns anything. It writes "a uniform rule over a class defined by an objective on-chain property," announced ahead of activation, with the conversion path open to every member throughout.

That is the trade. A protocol that cannot verify a claim can still act on it — by never making the claim the thing it acts on.

https://t.co/UBRFhBDJfc

#DeepSafe #Web3Security