1.5°C is gone. ~130 GtCO2 left, about three years at current emissions. The problem isn't physics — it's that the whole target-setting architecture assumes a corridor that no longer exists. https://t.co/bXFxea7HGI
@moritz_schmoll YUP!! And here is the kicker: Morocco refuses to build more RE capacity ;). This merits a thorough and brave paper re the what the why and the WHO.
@n_munguti_ Bouadi will probably mature into one of the best registas to ever touch the ball (a bit of Pirlo, Zidane, Kroos, etc.). Certainly makes the game look slow.
@Tablesalt13 Having lived in both geographies, I can say that the Canadian social fabric is so much similar to that of any European country. A huge W if it materializes.
3/3 🏦 This chart shows who is financing expansion.
The stacked bars compare financing associated with major Canadian producers in 2024 and 2025. Each colour identifies a bank, and the vertical axis is US$ millions.
ARC stands out: total financing rises from roughly US$0.9 billion to US$3 billion.
According to Carbon Tracker, each Big Five bank increased its upstream expansion financing to ARC by approximately 80% to 670%, while financing from banks outside that group fell by around 60%.
That connects directly to the previous chart: financing increased for a company whose proposed expansion shows substantial sensitivity to lower future prices.
📉 Across the banks’ broader financing to oil and gas expansion companies, the article reports different overall trends:
• RBC: approximately +8%.
• Scotiabank: approximately +2%.
• CIBC: approximately −9%.
• TD: approximately −7%.
• BMO: approximately −20%.
Yet all five increased financing to some producers with significant downside exposure in their project portfolios.
A lower overall financing total therefore does not automatically establish lower transition risk. The companies and projects receiving that money matter.
These figures include lending and underwriting activity. They measure financing flows, rather than outstanding bank loan balances or predicted credit losses.
Chart: Carbon Tracker, using Banking on Climate Chaos data.
2/3 📊 More production can mean less financial value.
This chart compares two expansion strategies with a baseline where companies continue operating existing assets without developing new projects:
🔴 Broad investment in additional projects.
🟠 Selective investment focused on lower-cost opportunities.
The bars show how expansion changes upstream net present value, meaning the value today of expected future cash flows after costs and investment.
⬅️ Left of zero: expansion reduces value.
➡️ Right of zero: expansion adds value.
Across the commodity-price scenarios labelled $30, $50 and $70 per barrel, the results change considerably. Several companies face substantial value destruction at lower prices, while higher prices make expansion more attractive.
⚖️ Across the ten companies assessed, Carbon Tracker estimates that downside exposure under a fast transition is approximately twice the upside potential under a slow transition.
ARC illustrates the sensitivity: its potential new projects could reduce upstream value by approximately 60% under the fast-transition scenario, relative to the no-new-projects baseline.
These are conditional valuation outcomes, not share-price forecasts.
For investors, the chart reinforces the importance of project costs, break-even prices and disciplined capital allocation.
Chart: Carbon Tracker, using Rystad Energy data.
1/3 🇨🇦🛢️ Canada’s oil and gas expansion is a long-term bet on future demand, particularly in Asia.
Carbon Tracker argues that today’s favourable market conditions could encourage investments whose returns become much less attractive in the 2030s and 2040s.
🌏 The article cites Asia’s rapid electrification and growing investment in renewables, storage and domestic energy sources. High prices and unreliable fossil fuel imports can strengthen the incentive to accelerate that shift.
🚢 LNG also faces growing competition. Approximately 254 million tonnes of new capacity are expected by 2030, while the article cites futures prices of US$10 per MMBtu or less from 2028. Carbon Tracker questions whether some Canadian projects can compete at those prices.
💰 The exposure extends across producers, banks, pension funds, pipelines and government revenues. Profitable production today does not establish that additional investment will earn adequate returns over its lifetime.
The practical issue is capital allocation: which projects remain competitive under weaker demand and lower prices, and which depend on favourable assumptions?
The next two charts connect the potential investment risk with the financing behind expansion. 📊🏦
Source: Carbon Tracker
https://t.co/W0RHRwFMeM
🇬🇧🌾 The UK could be heading for its smallest combined harvest of wheat, barley, oats and oilseed rape since 1984.
An analysis from the Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit estimates that provisional 2026 yields imply £305 million to £390 million less crop value than earlier forecasts anticipated.
The figures illustrate how successive heatwaves and drought can translate into substantial agricultural losses. They also come with important qualifications.
🌡️ The growing season changed considerably.
Earlier forecasts anticipated yields around or slightly above their ten-year averages, following favourable conditions for autumn planting.
Then came a very dry April in England, heatwaves in May, June and July, and exceptionally low July rainfall.
📉 Combined production is now provisionally estimated at 19.48 million tonnes.
Using the same 2026 planted areas, earlier USDA and COCERAL yield forecasts would have implied approximately 21.35 million and 21.99 million tonnes, respectively.
That represents a shortfall of approximately 1.86 million to 2.51 million tonnes, or 8.7% to 11.4%.
🌾 Wheat accounts for most of the deterioration.
Its provisional yield is 6.8 tonnes per hectare, compared with a ten-year average of 7.9 tonnes.
Estimated wheat production falls to approximately 11.7 million tonnes, around 1.96 million to 2.27 million tonnes below what the earlier forecasts implied.
But the crop results vary considerably. Provisional yields compared with their ten-year averages are:
• Wheat: 6.8 versus 7.9 tonnes per hectare.
• Winter barley: 6.8 versus 6.9.
• Spring barley: 5.3 versus 5.7.
• Oats: 4.9 versus 5.4.
• Oilseed rape: 3.9 versus 3.3.
🌱 Oilseed rape helps cushion the losses.
Its stronger performance adds approximately £69 million to £107 million in production value relative to earlier forecasts, partly offsetting the decline in cereals.
The overall harvest figure therefore conceals very different outcomes across crops and growers.
💷 The financial benchmark matters.
The estimated £305 million to £390 million shortfall compares provisional production with earlier 2026 forecasts.
Against ten-year average yields applied to the same 2026 planted areas, the estimated shortfall is £293 million.
These are estimates of missing production valued at specified farm-gate prices. They do not directly measure farmers’ net profit losses or increases in supermarket prices.
🔎 Four qualifications are essential:
• Only 54% of the wheat crop had been harvested when the analysis was prepared. Much of the remaining crop was in northern England and Scotland, where better yields could improve the final result.
• Smaller barley and oat planting areas also contribute to the potentially record-low total. Weaker demand from brewing, malting and distilling is part of that picture.
• The authors hold planted areas constant when comparing yield forecasts. This helps distinguish deteriorating yields from changes in how much land was planted.
• The report cites separate research linking the June heatwave to climate change. Its harvest calculations do not establish the precise share of financial losses attributable to human-caused warming.
🏦 For physical climate risk analysis, this is a concrete example of how weather shocks can affect production and expected revenue within a single growing season.
It also shows why crop mix and geography matter for agricultural businesses, their lenders and food supply chains. A national harvest estimate can conceal substantial differences in vulnerability, losses and resilience.
Source: Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit, “Impact of heatwaves and drought on UK harvest prospects in 2026.”
https://t.co/jq8MafuSx9
🇺🇸⚡ Data centres could account for 17% of US electricity demand by 2040. Over the same period, power sector emissions could fall by 24% to 48%.
How those two trends unfold together is central to Rhodium Group’s Taking Stock 2026. The report projects continued emissions reductions this decade, followed by very different outcomes depending on technology costs, gas prices, policy support and the infrastructure that actually gets built.
🌍 Across the economy, US emissions fall 26% to 29% below 2005 levels by 2030. By 2040, the scenarios diverge:
• Low emissions: 41% below 2005, supported by cheaper clean technologies and higher fossil fuel prices.
• Mid emissions: 36% below 2005, with renewables becoming more competitive over time.
• High emissions: 27% below 2005, as cheap fossil fuels, slower clean technology cost reductions and stronger economic growth limit progress. Emissions begin rising again from 2036.
🖥️ Data centres become the largest driver of electricity demand growth.
Their electricity consumption more than triples between 2025 and 2040, reaching approximately 17% of national demand. They account for 59% to 66% of gross electricity demand growth over that period.
Total US electricity demand rises 19% to 23%. EV adoption and industrial activity also contribute, while efficiency improvements help reduce demand from buildings excluding data centres.
☀️ Solar, wind and storage have a strong pipeline through 2030.
The report projects approximately 48 to 50 GW of combined capacity additions annually as developers respond to growing demand and rush to qualify for expiring federal tax credits.
Power sector emissions fall 22% to 27% between 2025 and 2030. Deployment still faces substantial barriers: transmission constraints, interconnection queues, equipment shortages and local restrictions.
🏗️ After 2030, the competition between renewables and gas becomes much sharper.
In the low-emissions scenario, annual renewable additions average approximately 53 GW, alongside 5 GW of gas additions.
In the high-emissions scenario, renewable additions fall to approximately 3 GW annually, while gas additions reach 16 GW.
By 2040, zero-emitting resources supply 47% to 72% of electricity, compared with 43% in 2025. Gas supplies approximately half of US electricity in the high-emissions case.
That is a substantial difference in the generation mix behind the same assumed data centre growth.
🌋 Coal, geothermal and nuclear follow different paths.
Coal capacity declines 51% to 79% by 2040. Interestingly, the low-emissions scenario retains more coal capacity because higher gas prices discourage its replacement with gas, while greater renewable generation still brings total emissions down.
Enhanced geothermal begins scaling in the early 2030s, with approximately 13 to 19 GW of cumulative additions by 2040.
The model finds new nuclear construction uneconomic under its assumptions, although it includes planned restarts and upgrades. The authors acknowledge that policy support and other investment considerations could produce deployment beyond what the model captures.
💡 Electricity affordability remains a major issue.
Average electricity prices rise 3% to 10% above inflation by 2040, equivalent to a nominal increase of 39% to 48%.
Residential customers face real price increases of 9% to 13%, with significant regional variation.
Grid upgrades, equipment costs and concentrated demand growth all contribute. For data centres, the effect on other customers depends partly on how quickly supply arrives and who pays for the infrastructure needed to serve them.
🚗 Transport continues to decarbonize, but fleet turnover takes time.
Transport emissions decline 12% to 22% between 2025 and 2040.
Zero-emission vehicles reach 19% to 43% of new light-duty vehicle sales, but represent only 13% to 22% of vehicles on the road by 2040. More efficient new conventional vehicles also contribute to emissions reductions.
Truck electrification remains limited in the model, while growing demand for aviation pushes its emissions upward.
🚢 Export demand sustains US gas production.
LNG exports increase 94% to 148% by 2040. Domestic gas consumption is broadly flat or declining, yet production rises 1% to 44%, largely because of exports.
Industrial emissions range from a 4% decline to a 15% increase, depending on fossil fuel production and economic growth. Chemicals are particularly sensitive to cheap gas and stronger industrial activity.
🔎 The assumptions deserve close attention.
• These are scenarios, not probability forecasts. All three use the same data centre demand trajectory, so the range does not capture the full uncertainty around AI growth.
• The model assumes electricity demand can be served. Local grid constraints could limit actual development, and generation built directly at data centres falls outside the grid analysis discussed.
• The headline results assume a relatively strong land and forest carbon sink. Under the weaker sink assumption, the 2040 emissions reduction falls to 21% to 35% below 2005, compared with 27% to 41%.
• The policy baseline generally reflects June 2026, while also assuming certain power plant and methane regulatory rollbacks that were not finalized at the modelling cutoff.
💼 For investors, the report puts grid access, construction timelines, economics after tax credits expire, gas price exposure and customer cost allocation at the centre of the analysis.
Rising electricity demand creates opportunities. These factors help determine which projects can turn that demand into durable cash flows, and how much decarbonization accompanies the growth.
Source: Rhodium Group, Taking Stock 2026: US Energy and Emissions Outlook, July 29, 2026.
https://t.co/MBuSnX0Nse via @rhodium_group
As the planet heats up, tundras are thawing, wetlands are fermenting, and forests are succumbing to larger and more frequent wildfires.
A new study finds the breakdown of natural systems could amplify human-driven warming by 20 to 30 percent.
https://t.co/Pk9VIGTB3N
🌊 What if mangrove restoration were evaluated not simply as conservation, but as natural infrastructure and a banking risk-management tool?
A new investment brief from the Global Center on Adaptation examines that opportunity in Kenya. Its central argument is compelling: mangroves can reduce flooding, erosion and storm-surge damage while protecting collateral values, borrower cash flows and the performance of coastal loan portfolios. 🌱🏦
The scale of the risk is significant:
🔹 Up to US$4.8 billion in Mombasa’s coastal assets could be exposed to flooding and inundation by 2050 without adaptation.
🔹 A 1-in-100-year flood could reach depths of 1.8 metres, cause roughly US$570 million in damage and affect approximately 1.8 million people.
🔹 An estimated US$3–6 billion of Kenyan commercial-bank lending may already be exposed to coastal physical climate risk across real estate, tourism, manufacturing, infrastructure and SMEs.
The report estimates that Kenya has approximately 28,000 hectares of restorable mangroves. At an assumed lifecycle cost of US$10,000 per hectare, the total investment need would be around US$280 million. 🇰🇪
For banks, the opportunity is both defensive and offensive.
🛡️ Defensively, mangroves could protect existing loans by reducing physical damage, business interruption, collateral impairment and correlated losses across coastal borrowers.
📈 Offensively, banks could finance carbon-project developers, mangrove-aligned businesses, coastal supply chains, infrastructure and county resilience programs. They could also earn fees as arrangers, trustees, custodians and escrow agents for blue bonds, carbon projects and resilience-financing structures.
But the report also exposes an important financing reality: carbon revenues alone will not pay for restoration at this scale. Current Kenyan mangrove credits may generate only US$80,000–150,000 annually, potentially rising to US$1.2–2.3 million by 2030 under the central scenario.
That means grants, concessional capital, guarantees and blended-finance structures will remain essential.
The strongest near-term business case may therefore be less about creating a new “mangrove asset class” and more about helping banks understand and protect the coastal assets already sitting on their balance sheets.
A practical starting point would be a three-to-six-month pilot mapping a bank’s hospitality, fisheries or infrastructure portfolio against coastal hazards, estimating potential credit losses and identifying where mangroves, asset-level resilience measures and insurance could reduce risk.
The broader lesson is important: nature is not separate from financial infrastructure. When ecosystems protect assets, livelihoods and cash flows, their degradation becomes a credit risk and their restoration becomes an investment in economic resilience. 🌍🌿💰
https://t.co/6PBtP16vxz