An MCP compromise may look like normal tool usage. π¨
The agent invokes tools, retrieves data, and returns an answer.
But the instruction came from the wrong place.
https://t.co/dZ74QEvClC
#IncidentResponse
Authenticated does not mean hardened. π‘οΈ
Your MCP server may have OAuth and logs, but is it running as root? Storing secrets in images? Allowing open egress?
https://t.co/GXhwsnDroz
#ServerHardening
MCP risk is not just an AppSec issue. π
It crosses API security, cloud security, third-party risk, identity, logging, and governance.
CISOs need a real framework.
https://t.co/Qqu3XxYCDo
#MCPSecurity
OAuth is not enough if every agent can call every tool. π
For MCP, use session-scoped access: role plus task equals allowed tools.
Give the agent only what the task needs.
https://t.co/z6d3lhPEts
#MCPAuth
Prompt injection is no longer just a chat input problem. π§
With MCP, instructions can enter through PDFs, web pages, emails, calendars, memory, and other agents.
https://t.co/lEXE8PLA8T
#PromptInjection
Quick MCP audit question: π
Can someone access your tool manifest without logging in?
If yes, attackers can see tool names, descriptions, schemas, and capabilities.
https://t.co/4COqnu9IsF
#MCPSecurity
The user sees a tool name.
The model sees the full tool description. π§ͺ
That hidden surface can be poisoned. Hash manifests, detect drift, and monitor tool call chains.
https://t.co/3XAfTCOns1
#ToolPoisoning#MCPSecurity
MCP connects agents to databases, code, email, cloud APIs, and internal tools. π
That is power and risk in the same pipe.
Inventory servers, remove secrets, add OAuth, enforce allowlists, and log tool calls.
https://t.co/L8mHKjUndZ
#MCPSecurity
MCP now has an OWASP Top 10. β οΈ
30+ MCP CVEs were filed in Jan-Feb 2026. 43% were shell injection issues.
If your agents touch code, data, email, or cloud APIs, start here:
https://t.co/QJ5skY2eaN
#MCPSecurity#OWASP
ποΈ Two days to go!
This one is for you if you are π
π Security Engineer
βοΈ DevSecOps Practitioner
π‘οΈ AppSec Professional
π€ AI/ML Engineer
π Security Leader
Free. 23rd April. DevSecOps Live. π―
π https://t.co/nK4buh6Iaa
#AgenticAI#MAESTRO#AISecurity#DevSecOps
πΊοΈ MAESTRO's 7 layers π
Foundation Models
Data Operations
Agent Frameworks
Infrastructure
Observability
Integration
Agent Ecosystem
π¨ Most teams stop at Layer 1.
π‘ DevSecOps Live | 23rd April
π https://t.co/nK4buh7fZI
#MAESTRO#AgenticAI#AISecurity
β οΈ STRIDE. DREAD. PASTA.
Built for deterministic software. Not for AI agents. π€
π― MAESTRO closes that gap.
π‘ DevSecOps Live | 23rd April 2026
β° 10.00 EDT / 14.00 GMT / 19.30 IST / 22.00 SGT
π https://t.co/nK4buh7fZI
#AgenticAI#MAESTRO#AISecurity#DevSecOps
π‘ Next DevSecOps Live is here! π
π₯οΈ Topic: Agentic AI Threat Modeling with MAESTRO
ποΈ Speaker: Ken Huang
ποΈ 23rd April 2026
β° 10.00 EDT / 14.00 GMT / 19.30 IST / 22.00 SGT π
π https://t.co/nK4buh7fZI
#AISecurity#AgenticAI#MAESTRO#DevSecOps#Infosec
Spending thousands on scanners π
Skipping what makes them useful?
4 questions before writing code:
β‘οΈ What are we building?
β‘οΈ What can go wrong?
β‘οΈ What do we do about it?
β‘οΈ Did we do a good job?
#ThreatModeling#DevSecOps#AppSec#SecurityBasics
https://t.co/463Y1CLVvk
Most DevSecOps rollouts fail in 90 days π
Not bad tech. No plan.
Phase 1: Assess gaps
Phase 2: Align people
Phase 3: Automate right
Phase 4: Measure + iterate
Skipping phases = 3x the debt.
#DevSecOps#Implementation#SDLC#CyberSecurity
https://t.co/qeFgYY3Xbk
2025 = DevSecOps stopped being optional π
AI threats outpaced defenses.
Supply chain attacks went mainstream.
Compliance forced security into business functions.
Adapted early = miles ahead in 2026.
#DevSecOps#CyberSecurity#SecurityTrends#appsec
https://t.co/Ei2Svms7oj