PourEVA ♡ ✏

Pour une Ethique du Vote Automatisé

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

Voici en trois minutes de quoi réfléchir sur le vote électronique à Bruxelles et en Flandre :
https://t.co/eugfCcA3cD

[michel henrion @michelhenrion]

Alors qu' Allemagne, Pays-Bas, Norvège, Finlande, etc...ont abandonné ou suspendu l’usage du vote électronique suite à des problèmes de sécurité, de confiance ou de coûts (c'est aussi bien plus cher que le vote papier) , le gouvernement wallon MR-Engagés ( qui a trop d'argent?) décide à l'inverse de faire la joie des marchands de machines et des hackers russes et autres... En 2015, le cdH avait voté pour l'abandon du système: les Engagés changent d'avis et s'accordent en 2026 sur la position du MR. Le vote électronique va faire son retour en Wallonie https://t.co/jDZtjfUF8D

[Christian Perrot @ChrisPerrot29]

@PaulVannierFI #Municipales2026
⚠️ URGENT !

1,3 million de Français-es est toujours privé de la possibilité de contrôler le bon déroulement de toutes les étapes du scrutin dans les 63 villes où est imposé l'usage de machines à voter opaques, invérifiables et fraudables.👎

[Christian Perrot @ChrisPerrot29]

🗳️#Municipales2026
Tout comme à #Brest les élus régressifs de #Mulhouse #Riedisheim prennent toujours leurs administrés pour des buses en leur imposant l'usage de machines à voter opaques, invérifiables et fraudables❗️👎
@NunezLaurent @canardenchaine

👉https://t.co/9yT8Fx5aam

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

Hackers will never know that on election day, all Belgian localities will have to connect via the internet to the regional instance of MARTINE to upload their results.
https://t.co/JmCzB7OAmD
A DDoS attack would only ruin the election night. Bugs and misconfiguration do that too.

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) saves the day when voting machines results differs from paper count.

For Paper to be useful:
1) The human readable vote should be the true record, not a QR code
2) Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA) must be performed

Belgium does none of that...

[Robert F. Kennedy Jr @RobertKennedyJr]

Puerto Rico’s primary elections just experienced hundreds of voting irregularities related to electronic voting machines, according to the Associated Press.

Luckily, there was a paper trail so the problem was identified and vote tallies corrected.

What happens in jurisdictions where there is no paper trail?

US citizens need to know that every one of their votes were counted, and that their elections cannot be hacked. We need to return to paper ballots to avoid electronic interference with elections.

My administration will require paper ballots and we will guarantee honest and fair elections.

https://t.co/upfEwocXmy

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

Un petit reportage dans le journal de @BX1Officiel sur l'opposition au vote électronique:
https://t.co/JH13uBEO81

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

Autant pour les ordinateurs de vote, notre action en justice et notre lobbying a permis d'obtenir le code source (malheureusement publié uniquement après les élections)... pour MARTINE on n'a rien, tout se passe côté serveur.
C'est connecté à internet, et tout est possible!

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

On vous parle beaucoup des machines à voter, car c'est ce que l'électeur voit et lui permet de se poser des questions sur le manque de transparence du vote électronique.

Mais il y a aussi MARTINE qui est utilisé pour tous les types de dépouillement:
https://t.co/t3ppH0EqY6

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

Pour les élections, vous êtes plutôt "bon vieux papier" que tout le monde peut vérifier ou "QR code" illisible venant d'une machine incontrôlable?

https://t.co/JHEXgQ94CD

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

Observing #evoting is challenging because once running you cannot tell what software is running... even if you were presented with some source code.
Apparently some do not want more transparency and the likely negative publicity that more eyeballs at the system would bring.

[Märt Põder / @[email protected] @trtram]

Election observers with more than 1000 signatories petitioned @Riigikogu constitutional committee to "render #evoting meaningfully observable", but in January 2024 after six months of silent processing the proposals were dismissed without an explanation. https://t.co/X3gO1um8mZ

[Märt Põder / @[email protected] @trtram]

The ruling coalition in #Estonia has excluded election observers from legislative process to update #evoting regulation, although we tabled our proposals already in 2023 -- this not an internal issue of the parliament, but rather a crisis of electoral law! https://t.co/e6wObBjL2Q

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

A touch screen voting machine, activated by a chip card, that produce a QR as the trace/proof of the vote... and the QR code is not human readable, and the machine can be hacked.
A very Belgian scenario, but this is a US trial to get rid of the machine.

https://t.co/mDPq7xmRk2

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

@Ahmad_Bilal @tanmoyofc @A_K_Chandra_IYC @Adil_INC_ @alokpandeykkc @asmatasleem13 @HakimSaifyINC @Sai_INDIA007 @EnvironGanguly @sidd_sharma01 @poonamjourno @digvijaya_28 @pbhushan1 @pbmehta @DrSYQuraishi @smartmatic RLA = Risk-Limiting Audit:
Take (at random) a statistically significant number of ballot (box) and do a recount of the voter verified audit trail. Quantity depends on the margin between winner and loser. That count should be identical to results produced by EVM else full recount.

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

@Ahmad_Bilal @tanmoyofc @A_K_Chandra_IYC @Adil_INC_ @alokpandeykkc @asmatasleem13 @HakimSaifyINC @Sai_INDIA007 @EnvironGanguly @sidd_sharma01 @poonamjourno @MishiChoudhary @digvijaya_28 @pbmehta I say that it is impossible to verify if the program running on election day is the same as the code published!

Still, full code (and reference compilation/binaries) and documentation and security audit should be published and signed by the authorities. But this is not enough.

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

@tanmoyofc @MahaboobBashaP9 @A_K_Chandra_IYC @Adil_INC_ @AkshathaRaviku2 @alokpandeykkc @asmatasleem13 @HakimSaifyINC @Sai_INDIA007 @sidd_sharma01 @EnvironGanguly "if there is any doubt" <= This is your mistake.

You NEED to have mandatory (by law) Risk-Limiting Audit done by humans and sufficiently in number to detect bugs and detect/deter frauds.

The Paper Audit Trail is only meaningful if used for Audit...

Belgium does not do RLA!!!

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

@Ahmad_Bilal @tanmoyofc @A_K_Chandra_IYC @Adil_INC_ @alokpandeykkc @asmatasleem13 @HakimSaifyINC @Sai_INDIA007 @EnvironGanguly @sidd_sharma01 @poonamjourno @MishiChoudhary @digvijaya_28 @pbmehta The security part of the code is not published. The code published is NOT signed. You need the hardware. No guarantee that this code effectively running during the election. Despite the official audit we do have bugs.

Source code is a MUST HAVE but not a guarantee.

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

@urbanform10 @tanmoyofc @A_K_Chandra_IYC @Adil_INC_ @alokpandeykkc @asmatasleem13 @HakimSaifyINC @Sai_INDIA007 @EnvironGanguly @sidd_sharma01 VVPAT does not make EV better than pure paper voting.
The computer between the voter and the vote makes it less accessible. But VVPAT only makes sense if you effectively, by law, practice RLA (Risk Limiting Audit), else it is just blind trust that there are no bugs and no fraud.

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

@trtram @zoobab @valimisedeestis From outside, the biggest issue with Estonian internet voting is vote secrecy.
No guarantee of the absence of pressure, worst you have shown that it is possible to keep a proof of your vote.
(the fact that you can overwrite one eVote by another or by a vote in person is moot)

[PourEVA ♡ ✏ @Pour_EVA]

@trtram @zoobab @valimisedeestis And this is where (as you explained) the distinction between the ballot (medium) and the vote (choice) is important.
Belgium has a similar problem with previous and new voting machine.
The new system has the QR code and human readable version of the vote on the ballot "ticket"...