Riley Jackson

Living the life.
Making money moves.
Staying real.

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@death_jokes @m477lander You're right. Let the decision come from them.

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@SixHandsMouth @m477lander It's all based on the time and speed I guess

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@m477lander This is a solid reminder that faster chain does not automatically mean that apps get faster too.

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@chefgamblez @m477lander

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@chefgamblez @m477lander Do you mean like a timer for the conversion?

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@radiotadkaDinu @m477lander Is there any solution that could solve this?🤕

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@m477lander Same rules, different world timing. That's the part builders need to watch before the next upgrade.

[Matt lander @m477lander]

Solana won my network poll, so I took the hint and spent some time looking through the latest network changes.

the obvious headline is SIMD-0525: the 350ms slot target is now live. Faster slots and the shorter blockhash window have already been covered. I wanted to see what this changes higher up the stack, so I went through the proposal, docs and public protocol code.

What I hadn't seen discussed much is what happens one layer above it:: the chain clock moved, while some app logic still reads time through the old 400ms assumption

The SIMD warns about this directly. anything measured in slots now covers less real time, and programs that treat slot distance as wall-clock time may need an update Static SDK constants also stay unchanged for now.

@switchboardxyz's Solana tutorial gave me the cleanest example:

`.max_age(30)` rejects data older than 30 slots and describes that as roughly 12 seconds..

At the 350ms target, those 30 slots are nominally 10.5 seconds. At 200ms, 6 seconds.

Same code. Same parameter. Different risk policy.

Switchboard is doing exactly what it says. If you meant 30 slots, the rule still does exactly what you asked. If you meant roughly 12 seconds, you don't have 12 seconds anymore.

I checked @kamino's public kLend code and found the same handoff. The path starts with Switchboard's last update slot, uses DEFAULT_MS_PER_SLOT to manufacture a timestamp, then checks that against a max age in seconds. the SDK constant is still 400ms, so against the 350ms target the nominal age comes out 14.3% higher.

At the 200ms target, it would read as 2x older than it really is. A 30-second policy would trip after roughly 15 seconds of wall time, without anyone changing the policy.

The deeper problem isn't the number 400. It's that a risk check silently translates between two clocks. And this is why "just use `Clock::unix_timestamp`" isn't the whole fix. the current time is in seconds, but this oracle update starts in slots Both sides of the check still need to speak the same clock

No exploit claim here. The bias is conservative: valid data can look stale sooner. This is an availability risk, not a direct value-extraction path. The important part is that the handoff exists in real code.

This is exactly why I keep banging on about the full execution path. The network can report the right slot. The oracle can report the right update. The check can run exactly as written. the final behavior still changes at the handoff between protocol time and real time.

This actually makes me like @Solana's staged rollout more. A faster clock is good infra, and every gate gives builders a real checkpoint to catch these assumptions before 200ms.

Before the next gate, grep for every `max_age`, staleness check, cooldown, retry and timeout expressed in slots. Did you mean slots or seconds?

@bw_solana, should apps stop converting between the two entirely: slots for protocol ordering, timestamped data for wall-clock policy? And if so, what should an oracle expose so apps never have to manufacture that timestamp themselves?

SIMD-0525:
https://t.co/GRZMxPDlti

Switchboard example:
https://t.co/HYhQE7X4Yw

SDK constant:
https://t.co/QtzmoQQItE

Public code example:
https://t.co/EFJ2bXV7NB
https://t.co/xm1gTjQEPc

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@Mike_3336 @m477lander Are you familiar with the layer you're talking about?

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@twleb505 @m477lander I think this is a better option.

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@idkloubear @m477lander

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@camelliapearl @m477lander

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@twleb505 @m477lander What about large payments?🤔

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@Mike_3336 @m477lander What if you're wrong about this statement you made?🤕

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@m477lander The agent should be able to reason but it shouldn't be the final authority over it's own permissions

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@idkloubear @m477lander A need to know basis.

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@walaamaged @m477lander So what you're trying to say is that trust is overrated?🤔

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@MatiasR64909100 @m477lander The bug was recognized as a familiar during the authorization which led to different circumstances.

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@Namit3394 @m477lander You can also call it a camouflage😂

[Riley Jackson @Riley_jacksonn]

@m477lander It exploited trust in the interface. If model output can trigger financial actions language itself becomes part of the attack surface.