One thing I have noticed about government officials in Indonesia is the lack of urgency.
Various ministries continue to request larger budgets, but I wonder how many are paying attention to the fact that Indonesia’s debt service ratio has reportedly reached around 52% in 2025. Perhaps some policymakers take comfort from Indonesia’s relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio, which remains below 40%. But debt sustainability is not determined by debt-to-GDP alone. The ability to service that debt matters just as much.
A low debt ratio is not an invitation to borrow endlessly. It is a fiscal advantage that should be protected. Using low debt-to-GDP as a justification for taking on more debt without regard for repayment capacity is not prudent fiscal management. It is simply poor risk management.
Pendapat Ahok soal demo mahasiswa:
- Tidak perlu takut demo hadapi langsung, tanya maunya apa
- Tuntutan mahasiswa wajar, soal penghematan
- Sarankan bubarkan BGN, ganti voucher digital
- Sindir e-KTP yang tidak dimanfaatkan untuk subsidi langsung
- Tantang pemerintah buka anggaran sampai satuan ketiga
- Sindir tuduhan under invoicing yang asal tanpa bukti jelas
- Kritik keras pengerahan pasukan cadangan hadapi demo (TNI dan komcad
- Saran terima mahasiswa dan siarkan langsung biar transparan
"Demo kok kenapa harus ditakutin
kalau berjiwa laki laki temui,hadapi dan bicarakan"
anda (presiden) laki laki atau tidak ? (tambahin admin)
Di Mulai dari Malang
Ketua DPRD Kota Malang, Ibu Amithya RS menerima aspirasi Rakyat dan TEGAS akan memberhentikan Program MBG di Kota Malang yg mencederai kepercayaan rakyat terhadap Pemerintah
Malang sdh yang lain kapan
Berhentikan MBG 🔥🔥🔥
#salamwaras
Indonesia has swung from an emerging-market darling to a global laggard, with insiders blaming the president and his inner circle for erratic and poorly communicated policies. https://t.co/6AlwZOjUqS
"Kami mau melapor ke polisi, polisi punya dapur SPPG. Kami mau melapor ke TNI, tentara punya dapur SPPG. Kami mau melapor ke DPR RI, anggota DPR banyak yang punya dapur SPPG," kata Iman Zanatul Haeri, seorang guru, di hadapan Mahkamah Konstitusi.
ada yg kenal dengan wajah ini?
kenalin, bu hendri saparini.
ekonom ugm yang melanjutkan ke tsukuba.
jika ditanya soal MBG, bu hendri sudah merumuskan hal ini sejak 2007-2008 bersama prabowo.
pak sumitro orang banyumas. demikian juga bu hendri. ada garis kedaerahan yg sama.
namun konsep MBG bu hendri beda dengan Prabowo. Bu Hendri menyalin tempel konsep makan siang bagi siswa jepang, tempat dia sekolah dulu.
konsep otonom sekolah dan komite sekolah
menghindari adanya food waste berlebihan dan keracunan makanan. proses hidangan yang juga dibersihkan secara mandiri oleh siswa untuk membentuk karakter siswa. "dimulai dengan pilot project dulu ya mas", ujarnya
implementasi mbg prabowo berbeda dengan yang ia diskusikan bersama bu hendri saat baru saja mendirikan @Gerindra
bu hendri saat ini masih aktif di Core, tebet. lembaga thinktank yang mumpuni.
bu kenapa jarang nulis lagi?
"serba salah mas, kalau tulisan opini saya di media ada yang dipuji dengan policy, nanti dikira saya sedang nitip CV. kalau saya terlalu keras, nanti utusan Dasco datang lagi".
saya dan beliau akhirnya menikmati sushi, di sebuah kedai jepang yang berada tepat di atas kantornya.
nyam nyam nyam
China Hapus 8 Jurusan Kampus
Mayoritas Universitas di China tutup jurusan kuliah dibawah ini:
1. Sistem Informasi ( Sarjana Komputer)
2. Managemen Informatika ( S.Kom )
3. Administrasi Publik ( Sarjana Informasi Publik )
4. Design Mode / Tata Busana (Sarjana Design / Seni)
5. Design Produk
6. DKV Design Komunikasi Visual
7. Fotografi
8. Sastra Inggris
Kenapa? Karena mereka akan terganti oleh AI.
Kamu lulusan salah satu jurusan diatas?
Ekonom Universitas Indonesia Teuku Riefky ditanya di Kompas TV: apa rekomendasi utama untuk Presiden Prabowo?
Jawabannya tiga kata pertama: acknowledge the problem.
Bangun sense of crisis.
Karena menurut dia, itulah yang paling dikhawatirkan investor dari Indonesia saat ini , pemerintah tidak terlihat menganggap masalah ini serius.
Singapura, Malaysia, Filipina, Thailand , semua negara tetangga merespons tekanan ekonomi global dengan lebih dulu mengakui ada masalah. Baru membangun optimisme.
Indonesia?
Presidennya pernah menyepelekan pelemahan rupiah di depan publik.
Menterinya bilang "fundamentalnya aman."
Jubir energinya bilang kenaikan Pertamax sudah "dihitung secara bijak."
Hasilnya: capital outflow yang deras dan konsisten selama berbulan-bulan.
IHSG yang baru naik karena , kata ekonom UI sendiri ,"obat sementara": buyback saham Himbara dan kenaikan suku bunga darurat BI.
Bukan karena fundamental yang membaik.
Bukan oposisi yang bilang ini.
Bukan aktivis jalanan.
Ini ekonom dari universitas negeri terbaik Indonesia, bicara di televisi nasional, 9 Juni 2026.
Kalau para ahlinya sudah bicara sekeras ini, siapa yang sedang didengar di Istana?
Once seen as the darling of Southeast Asia, government policies under President Prabowo Subianto appear to be slowing Indonesia’s economic rise https://t.co/QDqdy9ovll
The most interesting part of Danantara’s growing financial war chest is not the headline number itself. It is how that capital is being assembled.
At first glance, Danantara Investment Management (DIM) appears to have accumulated substantial firepower consisting of roughly US$7.4 billion of state equity, US$4.2 billion of domestic bond funding, US$10 billion of revolving credit facilities, and now an inaugural dual-tranche US dollar bond offering. By regional standards, that is a significant pool of capital capable of funding acquisitions, infrastructure projects, downstream investments, and strategic national initiatives.
However, investors should distinguish carefully between permanent capital and borrowed capital. Only around one-third of the reported funding comes from actual equity injections. The remainder consists of debt and credit facilities that ultimately need to be serviced, refinanced, and repaid. That distinction matters because the strongest sovereign wealth funds in the world were built primarily on accumulated savings and investment surpluses rather than increasing leverage.
The latest dollar bond issuance reinforces this point. Importantly, the reported 5.7% five-year and 6.3% ten-year yields are merely initial price guidance rather than final pricing. They represent what Danantara and its underwriting banks are offering investors, not necessarily where the bonds will ultimately clear once the order book is built.
The more important question is what level of compensation investors will ultimately demand. For reference, the US 10-year Treasury currently yields around 4.5%. If Danantara ultimately prices near the initial guidance, investors would be accepting a spread of roughly 180 basis points over the world’s benchmark risk-free rate to lend to a newly established institution with limited operating history, no long-term investment track record, and no explicit sovereign guarantee. That observation highlights why Danantara has attracted so much attention from investors, rating agencies, and policymakers.
Unlike the Indonesian government, Danantara is not a sovereign borrower. Unlike Singapore’s GIC or Abu Dhabi’s ADIA, it was not built from decades of accumulated fiscal surpluses and national savings. Yet the market appears willing to evaluate Danantara through a quasi-sovereign lens because of its strategic role and close relationship with the state.
This is why many investors increasingly view Danantara less as a traditional sovereign wealth fund and more as a quasi-fiscal vehicle operating alongside the government’s balance sheet.
When a state-owned investment platform raises domestic bonds, secures large revolving credit facilities, and accesses international debt markets, the debate naturally shifts from capital raising to liability ownership. Investors begin asking whether those obligations should be viewed as entirely separate from the sovereign or as contingent liabilities that could ultimately migrate back to the public balance sheet during periods of stress.
That is where the concept of shadow public debt emerges. Officially, Danantara’s liabilities belong to Danantara. In practice, however, markets may assume that government support would be forthcoming if the institution encountered serious financial difficulties. Whether that assumption is correct or not, it influences how investors price risk.
None of this means the strategy is inherently flawed. If Danantara successfully deploys capital into productive infrastructure, power generation, logistics, ports, digital infrastructure, industrial development, and other assets capable of generating durable cash flows above its cost of capital, leverage can become a powerful tool for accelerating economic growth and improving national competitiveness. 🧵