Élite russe

аналитики Russian Elite. Nous avons d’anciens journalistes des journaux russes Kommersant, Vedomosti, Gazeta, ainsi que de la Haute école d’économie.

[Независимый взгляд 💥 @zgldz]

Умерший С.Иванов, оставил семье активы на 4,2 млрд руб. Дом на Рублевке 2700 кв.м на участке в 10359 кв.м. Квартиры в Москве и Дубае, дом на балтийском побережье Калининградской обл. При этом доходы эксминистра Минобороны не превышали 1 млн руб в мес.

[Utkarsh Sharma @techxutkarsh]

Google automatically turned on AI features in Gmail, Chat, and Meet for many users in late 2025.

These features can read your emails, messages, and attachments to create summaries and suggestions.

Google says your emails don't train Gemini, but some users say they never clearly agreed to these AI features being enabled.

Unless you turn them off, the AI can still analyze your inbox to provide these features.

[Hanna Notte @HannaNotte]

Eine Eskalation gegen europäische Staaten wäre für Russland mit enormen Risiken verbunden.

Sollte es sie trotzdem wagen, dann vermutlich nicht aus gefühlter Überlegenheit sondern wachsender Alternativlosigkeit im Ukrainekrieg, schreibe ich in @zeitonline
https://t.co/ZVKRI622Hw

[Élite russe @Russ_Elite]

Суд приговорил к 3 годам лишения свободы заочно бывшего журналиста газеты "Коммерсантъ" Владимира Соловьева по обвинению в участии в деятельности нежелательной организации.

[Élite russe @Russ_Elite]

Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing will take place on May 19-20, according to a Yezh source. However, there is still no clarity on the program and agenda: the Chinese side is so preoccupied with Trump’s visit that it has not coordinated anything with the Kremlin regarding the Russian president’s trip. As a result, even the delegation’s composition is currently unknown.
Reported by Russian public page Yezh Lab.

[Ruslan Trad @ruslantrad]

Rumen Radev, whose party took the lead in Bulgaria’s elections tonight, has long been linked to the Kremlin in a “controversial manner”.

Leonid Reshetnikov is a retired Lieutenant General of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) who headed the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI) from 2009 to 2017. RISI, formally part of the SVR until 2009 and thereafter under the presidential administration, served as a key instrument of Russian soft power and influence operations across Eastern Europe. After leaving RISI in 2017, Reshetnikov became chairman of the supervisory board of Tsargrad TV, a neo-imperial Russian news channel financed by Kremlin-linked oligarch Konstantin Malofeev.

The core of the Radev–Reshetnikov link traces to the 2016 Bulgarian presidential election. According to a U.S. State Department report on Russian disinformation, Reshetnikov directly interfered in that election. His institute commissioned a sociological study conducted between July 1–15, 2016, specifically designed to identify the profile of an ideal pro-Russian BSP presidential candidate - one who would increase support for Russia while eroding support for the US, EU, and NATO. The results of that survey, analysts noted, mapped almost precisely onto Rumen Radev's public profile. Crucially, just two weeks after the study concluded, General Radev resigned as Air Force commander on August 1, 2016 - and within days, BSP and ABV were already promoting him as their presidential candidate.

After Radev won the 2016 presidential election, Reshetnikov himself publicly acknowledged that he had discussed Radev's candidacy with BSP leader Kornelia Ninova, effectively confirming Russian intelligence involvement in shaping the nomination. This admission was cited directly in Bulgarian and international media. The U.S. State Department subsequently included the 2016 Bulgarian presidential election in its broader report on the Kremlin's global propaganda and disinformation ecosystem.

The Reshetnikov connection deepened in September 2019, when Bulgarian Prosecutor General Sotir Tsatsarov charged Nikolai Malinov - head of the pro-Russian Russophile National Movement - with espionage for Russia, and simultaneously announced that Reshetnikov was banned from entering Bulgaria for 10 years on national security grounds. Investigations revealed that Malinov had controlled accounts receiving funds from RISI and the Double-Headed Eagle Society - organizations linked directly to Reshetnikov and Malofeev. At the time, President Radev responded cautiously, demanding "incontrovertible evidence" and suggesting the prosecution might be a politically motivated domestic maneuver — a reaction that critics interpreted as shielding the network.

On the eve of today's election, the Washington Post published an analysis describing Bulgaria as the "Kremlin's next best bet" following Viktor Orbán's defeat in Hungary - framing a potential Radev government as Moscow's most significant remaining lever of influence inside the EU and NATO. Analysts and former diplomats interviewed expressed concern that Russian influence operations, with Reshetnikov's 2016 template as the blueprint, had now produced a political vehicle - Progressive Bulgaria - capable of reaching government.

[Élite russe @Russ_Elite]

3. Просьба Кремля об ускорении визита вполне может ослабить позиции России, так к��к Китай понимает серьезное ослабление Кремля и будет использовать это в собственных интересах. Задача Лаврова была в том, чтобы заинтересовать Пекин в необходимости продолжать долгую игру с Америкой и использовать для этого разновекторность Кремля. Продавая свою стратегическую роль, России необходимо выглядеть в контактах с китайцами в сильной позиции.

[Élite russe @Russ_Elite]

Визит Сергея Лаврова в Пекин был связан с подготовкой визита Путина к председателю Си. Путину крайне важно оказаться в Пекине в канун или после визита Трампа. Лавров должен был объяснить китайским товарищам, что соблюдение парите��а визитов усилит и Пекин, и Москву на фоне театральности Трампа.

[Élite russe @Russ_Elite]

2. Испытывая проблемы с сокращением партнеров, Путину важно максимально тесно сохранять контакты с Китаем. Это позволяет ему манипулировать собственно Трампом, так и демонстрировать стратегический союз России и Китая, хотя такой в реальности отсутствует.

[Élite russe @Russ_Elite]

Magyar, who won the election, appears to be an acceptable partner for the Kremlin, although not as flexible and omnivorous as Orbán. But the Kremlin knows how to work with its partners, even at a low level. Therefore, Orbán's defeat shouldn't be overstated – it's likely more painful for Trump and Wiens, who have gained a full understanding of their negative ratings in Europe.

[Élite russe @Russ_Elite]

4. Our sources say the Kremlin has been extremely cautious in Orbán's campaign, and much evidence of "Moscow's hand" is more likely the fabricated manipulations of Russia's opponents. This doesn't mean Moscow isn't promoting its interests or fighting to preserve them. It does mean that Moscow is more subtle and sophisticated in creating and managing conflicts, seeking its own advantage by trying to sell them effectively.

[Élite russe @Russ_Elite]

3. The Kremlin will certainly exploit Trump-Wences' resentment of the Hungarians, demonstrating the ingratitude and manipulative tactics of its EU bosses. By fueling Trump's resentment and his desire to draw Washington into further conflict, Moscow is laying the groundwork, among other things, for a future compromise with Europe. It is demonstrating that it hasn't interfered in any significant way, and that all the problems are caused by the internal conflicts of the Western world.

[Élite russe @Russ_Elite]

2. Magyar, who won the election, appears to be an acceptable partner for the Kremlin, although not as flexible and omnivorous as Orbán. But the Kremlin knows how to work with its partners, even at a low level. Therefore, Orbán's defeat shouldn't be overstated – it's likely more painful for Trump and Wiens, who have gained a full understanding of their negative ratings in Europe.

[Élite russe @Russ_Elite]

1. The electoral defeat of Orbán's party in Hungary is not a direct loss for Vladimir Putin and his allies. The Kremlin, if it participated in the elections, did so indirectly. Orbán's primary support came from American foundations associated with MAGA. This is significant: the Kremlin wants to keep Hungarian elites within Russia's sphere of influence by ensuring that Hungarian interests are respected in energy deals.

[Élite russe @Russ_Elite]

Наши источники говорят, что Кремль был крайне осторожным в кампании Орбана и многие доказательства "руки Москвы" скорее придуманные манипуляции оппонентов России. Это не значит, что Москва не насаждает свои интересы или не борется за их сохранение. Это означает, что Москва более тонко и технологично создает конфликты и управляет ими, находя собственную выгоду в стремлении удачно ее продать.

[Élite russe @Russ_Elite]

Кремль обязательно будет разыгрывать обиду Трампа-Венса на венгров, демонстрируя неблагодарность и манипулятивные технологии со стороны боссов из ЕС. Разжигая обиду Трампа и стремление вовлекать Вашингтон в дальнейший конфликт, Москва создает базис,в том числе, и для будущего компромисса с Европой. Показывая, что она никуда особо не вмешивалась, а все проблемы вызваны внутренними конфликтами западного мира.

[Élite russe @Russ_Elite]

Мадьяр выглядит для Кремля приемлемым партнером, хотя не таким гибким и всеядным как Орбан. Но Кремль умеет работать со своими партнерами даже на низкой позиции. Поэтому не стоит переоценивать проигрыш Орбана - он скорее болезненнее для Трампа-Венса, которые получили полное представление о своем антирейтинге в Европе.

[Élite russe @Russ_Elite]

Проигрыш на выборах партии Орбана в Венгрии не является прямым проигрышем Владимира Путина и его людей. Кремль,если участвовал в выборах, то опосредственно. Основная помощь Орбану шла от американских фондов, связанных с MAGA. Это су��ественный момент: Кремлю важно удержать венгерские элиты в сфере российских интересов, обеспечивая соблюдения венгерских интересов в энергетических сделках.

[Martin Varsavsky @martinvars]

Péter Magyar is not the anti-Orbán. He is running on a platform that is Orbán without the corruption.

As Orban, Magyar opposes the EU migration pact. He voted against the loan to Ukraine. He wants strong borders and has no plans to reverse Hungary’s energy ties with Russia before 2035. On every substantive question that defines the European left-right divide, Magyar sits exactly where Orbán sits.

What he promises to change is governance, not ideology. Anti-corruption reforms, rule of law, meritocratic appointments, unlocking frozen EU funds. A voter who backed Orbán for border security and national sovereignty can vote for Magyar without abandoning a single conviction. The only thing that voter has to abandon is tolerance for theft.

Orbán did not lose the argument. He lost the trust.