Siciid Moumin

Citizen of Somaliland Nation - Politic Analyst Horn Africa - Career in Technology and Economic

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

This has no bearing on technical or customer service problems.

1. Arabsiyo News on https://t.co/ibKCrcyoLR channel is under a full political malicious attack by the Somalia Authority. Both the Somalia government and its people have launched a full cyber attack against Arabsiyo News because the TV News promotes Somaliland as an independent country.

2. For the past seven years, as an IT professional, I have been aware at distance of their ongoing attacks against Arabsiyo News by the Somalia diaspora.

Hence, I believe no technician can fully resolve the conflicts between two countries engaged like Somalia cyber attacks and Somaliland in defense mode.

Only https://t.co/8XqB6auxIB can resolve this issues like google already done, that the Arabsiyo News is under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Somaliland.

Even with their resources, US and European companies are unable to end the 35-year warfare between Somaliland and Somalia.

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

Somaliland’s older generations indoctrination experienced a multi-layered and dimensional brainwashing that was so pervasive and multifaceted left them subservient to Somalia propaganda between 1960 and 1990.

Politicians Somaliland between 1991 and 2026 find it difficult to ignore the residual propaganda originating from 1960 to 1990.

Throughout their service with Somalia from 1960 to 1980, Somalia propaganda mentally influenced even Bihi and his SNM freedom fighters regarding Somaliland’s legality and its historical existence on the international stage.

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

He can’t even speak the Somali language with the correct pronunciation, and yet he wants to attack Somaliland country.

Are you aware that if you show this video clip to children aged 6 to 12 in Somaliland, a country with a population of 7 million, none of them will understand it?

And yet, he want to conquer Somaliland country.

1. I have always wondered why Somalia divided their country into 4.5 power sharing until I noticed:

a) Somalia in terms of Somali language learning is at a 4.5 generations population-wide level (averaging 15 to 30 years per generation).

In conclusion, Somalia primary language was Swahili (Kiswahili) around 80% and the rest 20% Bantu languages over the last 900 years, and who knows before that.

a) During the late 1800s, Italy bought Somalia from the Sultan of Zanzibar, which the Italian colonists envisaged as a stepping stone for the conquest of the whole Horn of Africa.

The Italian colonists concocting a Machiavellian project of 100 year, which they told the leaders Reer Xamar by teaching the total primitive Swahili and Bantu in Mogadishu and its surrounding regions to learn the Somali language to imitate the Somaliland country and the Somali population inside the current Ethiopian frontier.

b) Somalia by nature were NOT expansionist until the Italian conquest in Somalia in 1892.

c) When Somalia was born under Italian rule and conquest and bought from Zanzibar Sultan,

Somaliland was already a thousand-year-old, fully established nation, having been part of several empires and having endured a millennium of holy wars in the Horn of Africa.

[khalif Hagoog; SL FIRST @nuur1_nuur]

Somaliland in aan dagaal ku qaadno ayaan soo jeedihaa 👇

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

Are you aware that the Dhulbahante have a history of repeating their killings? As Siad Barre, the bloody ruthless dictator, was departing from Mogadishu, the Dhulbahante were the ones killing all the citizens of Xamar regardless of their tribes.

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

My preliminary analysis indicates that the young intellectuals of Somaliland are fully prepared against Somalia.

The 1960 Somalia dual contract fraud case.

Somalilanders have the courage to examine the past, specifically what went wrong in 1960 and the enduring consequences for Somaliland from that year through 2026.

One aspect that fills me with pride is the honesty of Somaliland’s youth. They are open to considering viewpoints that differ from Somaliland’s legal stance concerning Somalia. This stands in contrast to the elders who appear trapped in a past influenced by propaganda against the people of Somaliland.

In conclusion, there will be many things to say about this discussions. But so far, like some of the panelists, I don’t want to divulge all the secrets already on the process.

They think Somalia has suffer but they haven’t yet taste Somaliland reckoning against Somalia people.

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

A comprehensive study of the current East Sool situation demands consideration of the past, present, and future.

All supporters of Waddani from the eastern regions of Somaliland are feeling guilty when they couldn’t differentiate between tribal identity (loyalty based on tribe, emotional, deep rooted, and often supersedes Somaliland state boundary) and civil identity (Loyalty based on the legal contract with the state, constitutional oaths, and the rule of law) during the state emergency of Bixi administration.

The issue of state building and divided loyalties in Somaliland shows that the western regions are more loyal to the government than the eastern regions combined.
For instance, during the Cigaal administration, JB and Samarone clashed over certain districts in the western regions, but Cigaal ended the conflict in under three weeks, and JB complied with the State and the rule of law. Despite efforts, the Somaliland government has spent years attempting to broker peace between tribal conflicts in eastern regions, from Ceel Afweyn to Sanaag and Togdheer, and generally throughout Sool.

Let’s come back about this Faqashini MP in Somaliland. The current parliament where the majority are Waddani party, several Isaaq MPs (Habr Jeclo and Habr Yonis from the eastern regions) choose openly to promote their community over the State of Somaliland during an uprising. Those politicians views themselves as a delegate for their sub-tribe identity rather than a custodian of the national sovereign state.

By failing to differentiate between the two, the MP rejects the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force held by the state, prioritizing tribal or communal survival over the abstract legal framework of the country.

Their main aims was to show the international community Bixi administration as an aggressor ruler but instead they demonstrated that Somaliland is a weak state integration.

Today, adhi cadeeye event demonstrate not only the Irro administration failed to do anything about it but the supporter of Waddani party and its ruling party is crying in national TV and their actions as a country is Million Time below than Bixi administration what a state ruling party is.

They said what goes around comes around.

One thing that Somaliland population and its government never understood is you breach the rule of law. You will pay one way or another. And the high treason committed during Bixi administration, all the MPs of Waddani are paying with blood for their transgression against the State of Somaliland.

What did they expect? Somaliland flag has the highest everything living or dead on the planet or elsewhere to go against it, or you will pay the supreme punishment in this world.

This Faqashini MP supported a community that actively takes up arms or acts illegally against the government generally triggers the legal definition of treason or sedition.

Supporting Breach of Oath: MPs take an explicit oath of allegiance to the constitution and the state. Supporting an illegal uprising is a direct, actionable breach of that solemn oath.

Former Speaker of the Somaliland House of Representatives Dhulbahante Abdirisak Khalif Ahmed provides material support (money, weapons, intelligence) to the insurgent Sool community, it meets the standard legal threshold for high treason in almost all jurisdictions.

However, this Faqashini MP was more ideological treason by supporting the Sool uprising with pure rhetorical, it may be protected under free speech in Somaliland democracy, but in a crisis context, it is analysed as subversion, using a state-funded platform (parliament) to dismantle the state itself during Bixi Administration.

In conclusion, when the same MP politician returns three years later to beg the government for protection against a rival community.

1.The Paradox of the Sovereign: The MP’s request is an involuntary admission that their Sool community cannot provide ultimate security. They are forced to acknowledge the very state legitimacy they previously tried to undermine, proving that the state remains the ultimate guarantor of safety

2. Strategic Contradiction: The MP is trying to privatise the benefits of the state (using the Somaliland military for protection) while socialising the costs (refusing to obey state laws when it suits them).

3. Instrumental Politics: Somaliland MPs pure political opportunism. The politician does not love the state; they view the state’s security apparatus as a tool to be used when their primordial group is losing, and discarded when their group feels strong enough to revolt.

Somaliland Laws: The Penal Code Standard: Article 184

Under Article 184 of the Penal Code used by Somaliland, any act deemed an “attack on the integrity, independence, or unity of the State” constitutes high treason.

The Penalty: High treason carries a mandatory death penalty.

Collateral Crimes: If an MP supports a community uprising, prosecutors additionally bundle charges under Article 231 (public incitement), Article 320 (incitement to commit a crime), and Article 321 (incitement to disobey laws), which carry separate multi-year prison sentences.

Impeachment & Immunity: Articles 50 and 96

An active Member of Parliament possesses political immunity. To prosecute an MP for treason:

Article 50: The House of Representatives must vote to strip the MP of immunity by a distinct majority.

Article 96 (High Treason by Officials): If the politician holds a ministerial or senior executive role, the parliament must table a motion (supported by at least one-third of the members) and pass an impeachment vote via a two-thirds majority to refer them to the High Court of Justice.

2. Political Analysis: Traditional Clans vs. Modern Statehood

In Somaliland, the clan operates as an unwritten, ancestral insurance policy (Xeer). When an MP’s community revolts against the central government, the politician faces immense social pressure. Refusing to back the clan is locally branded as an existential betrayal. The politician effectively calculates that governments are temporary, but the clan is permanent. This scenario highlights the tension of a hybrid political system.

The Failure of the Social Contract

The 3-year reversal highlights the tragedy of Somaliland democracy. By abandoning the state during the uprising under Bixi Administration, the MP actively worked to diminish the government’s territorial authority. When a rival community subsequently attacks them, the MP undergoes an immediate reality check: clans cannot field standing armies, provide air support, or legally command heavy artillery.

When a crisis forces an MP to choose between state legality and a clan uprising, Somaliland analysts in twitter identify two distinct systemic failures:

Traditional Clans vs. Modern Statehood

The MPs politician’s sudden plea for help forces them to acknowledge that only a recognised monopoly on violence (the Somaliland State Military) can guarantee absolute survival. Period!

[Allow dhawr SL @hargeisa234]

Shalay markii somaliland weerarka lagu soo qaaday, sawkii cabdirisaq Khaliif ku faraxsanaa inuu somaliland dhibaatadeeda kala shaqeeyey, imikana wuxuu ka hadlayaaba maamul.

[SiciidG1825 @siciidSL]

The owner of what will later be called “somalia” The then Sultan of Zanzibar Ali binu Said first leased on August 12 1892 and then his Successors sold on January 13 1905 to a Italian company owned by by Italian Consul Vincenzo Filonardi

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

The mentality of Somalia desired of illegal and non-existence union came to mind when I encountered this post. Shall I elaborate on why?

Someone with a Faqash mindset tends to think exclusively like that.

The author of the post presented a simplified explanation of Somaliland’s recognition as a country by fusion the past in the role of SNM (Somali National Movement) that led to the downfall of Siad Barre, Somalia’s genocidal dictator in the Horn of Africa.

1. Somalia launched two wars against its neighbours between 1960 and 1977, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Somaliland citizens.

2. Between 1960 and 1990, Somalia engaged in political conflict targeting Somaliland citizens, resulting in the imprisonment or forced exile of all Somaliland politicians.

3. From 1960 to 1990, Somalia launched economic warfare against Somaliland by restricting imports and hindering the development of its cities and towns across all aspects of human progress.

4. The genocidal conflict waged by Somalia against Somaliland has led to the loss of millions of Somaliland lives.

This guy ignored the genocide in Somaliland and referred to the SNM, the freedom fighters that took control of Somaliland, as rebels. He isn’t entitled to an answer.

He didn’t read the history of Somaliland and yet called himself the professor, and as usual, Reer Somalia gave themselves titles, and preaching with a video clip to demonstrate that the Somali National Movement’s original goals favoured national unity.

They then question why surviving members are hesitant to discuss reunification and announce the beginning of a hypothetical analysis to explore the cause of this discrepancy.

What discrepancy? There is none, the SNM and their children are in ONE.

a) Somaliland is international recognized country with its border in 26 June 1960

b) Somalia doesn’t exist now or never

c) Faqash needs to stay abroad for the rest of their life and Akhiro is waiting for their past deeds.

[Allow dhawr SL @hargeisa234]

waa runtaa goonigoosad umay dagaalamayn, waayo somaliland maba aha goonigoosad.
Somaliland waxay u dagaalantay xoriyad ay heshay 26 June 1960. Faqash is already buried then what is next.

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

Here are the challenges that I see on Twitter:

1. Two boys on Twitter and two women have been in conflict with Habr Awal for the past three months.

2. Two individuals from the diaspora, one claiming to be from Habr Jeclo (identified as GB) and another named Jamal as well, initiated strong opposition towards the Habr Awal tribe.

3. My observation is that they aim to provoke an opposition between the general populace of Habr Jeclo and Habr Awal.

In conclusion, I understand that they were formerly both supporter of the Waddani party. However, their current intention is to elevate Xirsi to prominent leadership positions in Somaliland’s future political landscape, succeeding Irro.

A. There is one flaw in the Twitter propaganda targeting Habr Awal.

1) Habr Awal hate and will not choose to vote for both of those politicians, now or never, except Ina Kahin that is in deep sleep in the wheel of Kulmiye party (virtually death-on-arrival in the chairman of the party)

2) Another scenario is possible, they want to create a deep animosity between Habr Awal and Habr Jeclo so the only door open for Habr Awal is voting for Garxajis. Therefore, that proof, those guys in twitter are agent provocateur working for Xirsi who want to stay in politics as chairman of Waddani party.

a) Most Habr Jeclo are aware the game Xirsi is playing and want to see how far the people he top-up on the twitter will go and the reaction of Habr Awal so they can use it against it in terms of the next election. As they called game-within-a-game of the normal methodology of a dirty agitator in politics.

[Allow dhawr SL @hargeisa234]

Dawladii Siilaanyo AHN dayntii uu xukuumadii muuse ku wareejiyey imisa ayey ahayd? In record above 80 million, lacagihii Somaliland lagu iibsaday 2012 waxay ahayd somaliland waxaa la siiyey 400 million, 1.2 billion one third ayuu qaatay xirsi, xaahi iyo Siilaanyo.

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

Structural Challenges Affecting Somaliland's Security Sector

The reason Somaliland security is suffering with 45% of the total bud, the fat politicians are increasing their salaries while the 6 primary functional branches of the Somaliland military are suffering cause of lack of resources:

1.Somaliland Combat Arms Units are reasonable operational
2.Somaliland Combat Service Support Logistics are below average
3.Somaliland Air Force non-existence
4.Somaliland coastguard but not yet achieved navy capability
5.Somaliland Military intelligence below average or almost non-existence

Despite maintaining relative stability compared with other parts of the Horn of Africa, Somaliland faces significant security sector challenges that threaten its long-term resilience. While frontline combat units remain operationally capable, critical support functions—including logistics, intelligence, air capabilities, and maritime security—remain underdeveloped due to chronic resource constraints.
A major concern is the perceived imbalance between political expenditure and security investment. Public criticism has increasingly focused on the growth of political salaries and administrative costs while essential military capabilities continue to face shortages in funding, equipment, training, and institutional development.

The result is a security architecture that relies heavily on ground combat forces while lacking the enabling capabilities necessary for modern defence operations.
Somaliland's security forces have historically played a central role in preserving internal stability, securing contested territories, and countering insurgent activities. However, evolving security threats—including cross-border instability, clan-based conflicts, insurgent movements, and maritime security challenges—require a more sophisticated and balanced defence structure.

Modern military effectiveness depends not only on combat troops but also on support systems, intelligence networks, logistics, air surveillance, and maritime capabilities.

Current investment patterns suggest that several of these enabling functions remain underdeveloped.
Key Factors Contributing to Security Challenges

1. Budget Prioritisation and Political Expenditure
Public concern has grown regarding the allocation of national resources toward political institutions and administrative expenditures at the expense of defence modernisation.

Critics argue that:
•Increases in salaries and benefits for political officeholders have not been matched by proportional investment in security institutions.

•Defence spending remains focused on immediate operational needs rather than long-term capability development.

•Limited transparency in budget allocation reduces public confidence in national security planning.

•Short-term political priorities often outweigh strategic defence requirements.

Without sustainable investment, military institutions struggle to build professional capabilities beyond basic operational functions.

2. Overreliance on Combat Forces
Somaliland's security model remains heavily dependent on ground forces.

While combat units are essential, modern military operations require integrated support systems. An imbalance between combat and support functions creates vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit.
The absence of key force multipliers limits operational effectiveness, mobility, situational awareness, and sustainability.

Assessment of Core Military Capabilities

1. Combat Arms Units: Operationally Capable
Somaliland's combat units remain the strongest component of the security sector.

Strengths include:

•Extensive experience in local terrain and operating environments.

•Strong community ties and local knowledge.

•Established command structures.

•Proven ability to respond to conventional and irregular threats.

However, operational effectiveness depends increasingly on capabilities that support combat units.

2. Combat Service Support and Logistics: Below Average

Logistics remains one of the most significant weaknesses.

Challenges include:
•Limited transportation assets.
•Inadequate maintenance systems.
•Insufficient supply chain management.
•Shortages of fuel, spare parts, communications equipment, and medical support.
•Weak infrastructure for sustained deployments.
Poor logistics reduces operational readiness and limits the military's ability to conduct prolonged operations.

3. Air Force Capability: Non-Existent

Somaliland currently lacks a functional air force.
The absence of air capabilities creates major limitations:
•No aerial reconnaissance or surveillance.
•Limited rapid-response capability.
•No air mobility for personnel or equipment.
•Dependence on ground-based intelligence collection.

Even a modest investment in drones, surveillance aircraft, and air support infrastructure could significantly enhance security operations.

4. Coast Guard: Developing but Not Yet a Naval Capability

Although Somaliland maintains a coast guard presence, it has not yet developed a comprehensive maritime security capability.
Key limitations include:
•Insufficient patrol assets.
•Limited maritime surveillance systems.
•Inadequate coastal radar coverage.
•Restricted search-and-rescue capacity.
•Limited ability to counter smuggling, illegal fishing, and maritime infiltration.

Given Somaliland's strategic location along the Gulf of Aden, strengthening maritime security should be considered a national priority.

5. Military Intelligence: Below Average
Effective intelligence is essential for countering insurgencies and preventing security threats.

Current challenges include:
•Limited intelligence collection capabilities.
•Weak analytical capacity.
•Inadequate technological resources.
•Poor integration between intelligence and operational units.
•Insufficient investment in training and specialised personnel.

Without reliable intelligence, security forces remain reactive rather than proactive.

6. Command, Control, Communications, and Cyber Capabilities: Underdeveloped

Modern security institutions require robust command and communications systems.
Existing weaknesses include:
•Outdated communications infrastructure.
•Limited digital capabilities.
•Inadequate information-sharing mechanisms.
•Weak cybersecurity measures.
•Insufficient data management systems.

Improving command and control structures would significantly increase operational effectiveness across all branches.

Strategic Implications
Failure to address these capability gaps could result in:
•Reduced ability to respond to insurgent threats.
•Increased vulnerability along maritime borders.
•Slower operational response times.
•Higher operational costs due to inefficient logistics.
•Reduced deterrence against external threats.
•Greater dependence on informal security arrangements.

An effective military cannot rely solely on combat forces; it requires a balanced ecosystem of support, intelligence, logistics, and technology.

Recommendations

To improve national security outcomes, Somaliland should consider the following priorities:
1.Increase transparency in defence budgeting and expenditure.
2.Rebalance national spending to prioritise security sector development.
3.Modernise logistics and maintenance systems.
4.Develop affordable aerial surveillance capabilities, including unmanned systems.
5.Expand coast guard infrastructure and maritime domain awareness.
6.Professionalise military intelligence through specialised training and technology.
7.Strengthen command, control, communications, and cybersecurity capabilities.
8.Establish long-term strategic defence planning with measurable objectives.
9.Enhance parliamentary oversight of defence spending.
10.Pursue partnerships focused on training, institutional development, and technical assistance.

Conclusion

Somaliland's security challenges are not primarily caused by shortcomings in frontline combat units. Instead, they stem from structural weaknesses in resource allocation, institutional development, and strategic planning.

Combat forces can provide immediate security, but long-term stability depends on investment in logistics, intelligence, air capabilities, maritime security, and command systems.

Sustainable security requires a comprehensive approach that aligns political priorities with national defence needs and ensures that critical military institutions receive the resources necessary to meet current and future threats.

The additional budget information substantially changes the analysis and suggests that the challenge may not be the absolute size of defence spending, but rather how resources are allocated and managed.

With a total national budget of approximately $500 million and reported security expenditures of $175 million in 2024, Somaliland allocated roughly 45% of total government spending to security-related institutions.

A security allocation of 45% is considerable for a developing economy with substantial demands across healthcare, education, infrastructure, water, and public services.

Therefore, the central question shifts from "Is Somaliland spending enough on security?" to "Is Somaliland spending security resources effectively?"
Revised Assessment

Budget Size Versus Capability Development
Despite substantial security spending, capability gaps remain evident in several critical areas:
•Combat service support and logistics remain underdeveloped.
•Air capabilities are effectively non-existent.
•Maritime capabilities are limited to coast guard functions.
•Intelligence capabilities require significant enhancement.
•Communications and surveillance systems remain inadequate.
These gaps suggest potential challenges related to:
•Resource distribution across security institutions.
•High personnel and administrative costs.
•Limited investment in capital equipment and technology.
•Insufficient long-term strategic planning.
•Weak procurement and maintenance systems.
Possible Structural Constraints

Several factors may explain the disparity between spending levels and operational capabilities.

1. Personnel Costs Dominate Expenditures
In many developing security sectors, salaries, allowances, pensions, and operational stipends consume the majority of defence budgets.

If a large proportion of Somaliland's $175 million security allocation supports recurring personnel costs, fewer resources remain for:
•Equipment acquisition.
•Infrastructure development.
•Training programs.
•Maintenance and logistics.
•Intelligence systems.

2. Broad Definition of Security Spending
The reported $175 million covers multiple institutions:
•Military forces.
•Police services.
•Border monitoring units.
•Internal security agencies.

Consequently, the amount available exclusively for military modernization may be substantially lower.
For example, if security funding is distributed evenly across institutions, only a fraction may support defence capabilities.

3. Immediate Operational Demands
Persistent security pressures, including border disputes, local conflicts, and internal security operations, may force the government to prioritize short-term readiness over long-term modernization.
This often results in:
•Fuel purchases instead of infrastructure investment.
•Emergency deployments instead of training.
•Personnel expansion instead of technological upgrades.

4. Limited Economies of Scale
Smaller states face disproportionately higher costs when establishing advanced military capabilities.
Building even modest air and maritime capabilities requires significant investment in:

•Training pipelines.
•Maintenance facilities.
•Specialized personnel.
•Procurement systems.
•Command-and-control infrastructure.

A functional air force or navy can consume a substantial share of a small national budget.

Updated Capability Assessment
Capability AreaCurrent AssessmentPrimary Challenge
Combat Arms UnitsOperationally capableSustainment and modernization
Logistics and SupportBelow averageInfrastructure and supply systems
Air CapabilityNon-existentHigh acquisition and operating costs
Coast GuardDevelopingLimited maritime surveillance and patrol assets
IntelligenceBelow averagePersonnel, technology, and coordination
Communications and Command SystemsUnderdevelopedTechnology and integration
Governance and Accountability Considerations

Claims regarding increases in political salaries should be examined within the broader context of public expenditure transparency.

The key issue is not necessarily whether political salaries have increased, but whether:
•Defence spending aligns with strategic priorities.
•Security budgets are transparently reported.
•Procurement processes are efficient.
•Oversight mechanisms ensure accountability.
•Resources reach operational units effectively.

Without detailed public budget data, it is difficult to determine whether capability shortfalls result from insufficient funding, inefficient allocation, or institutional limitations.

Conclusion

A 45% allocation of total government spending to security demonstrates a clear commitment to national defence and public safety.

However, current capability gaps suggest that Somaliland faces a classic challenge confronting many developing security sectors: balancing immediate operational needs with long-term force development.
Future reforms should focus on improving efficiency, transparency, and strategic investment rather than simply increasing expenditure.

The objective should be to transition from a security force centered primarily on personnel and ground operations toward a more balanced system supported by logistics, intelligence, surveillance, communications, and maritime capabilities.

1. Security Spending Covers Multiple Institutions
The $175.5 million allocation is not dedicated exclusively to the military. It likely funds:

•Armed forces
•Police services
•Coast guard
•Border monitoring units
•Intelligence agencies
•Correctional services
•Internal security operations

As a result, the portion available for military may be relatively limited.

2. High Personnel Costs

Security budgets in developing countries often allocate most resources to:
•Salaries
•Food and rations
•Housing allowances
•Fuel
•Routine operations

This leaves limited funding for:
•Aircraft
•Maritime assets
•Intelligence technology
•Communications systems
•Logistics infrastructure

3. Operational Pressures

Ongoing territorial disputes and internal security challenges may force decision-makers to prioritize immediate readiness over long-term capability development.

Consequently:
•Combat units remain functional.
•Support functions lag behind.
•Strategic modernization is delayed.

4. Cost of Advanced Capabilities
Building and sustaining an air force, navy, or sophisticated intelligence network requires significant recurring investment.

For a government with a total annual budget of $500 million, maintaining these capabilities presents substantial financial challenges.

Revised Conclusion
A security allocation of approximately 45% demonstrates that Somaliland places a high priority on defence and internal security.

The evidence suggests that the principal challenge is not necessarily a lack of political commitment or inadequate overall funding, but rather:

•The distribution of resources within the security sector
•Heavy dependence on personnel expenditures
•Limited investment in force multipliers
•The high cost of advanced military capabilities
•Constraints associated with a small national budget

A more balanced security architecture would require prioritizing investments in:

1.Logistics and sustainment systems
2.Intelligence collection and analysis
3.Communications infrastructure
4.Unmanned aerial surveillance
5.Maritime domain awareness
6.Professional training and institutional development

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

In my opinion, this is the worst social trend on Earth.

1. Why does the government allow this!

2. Burco, a city with a population nearing one million, boasts a significant intellectual community both within its borders and internationally. Despite this, they are permitting such a madness situation to unfold in their city.

I frequently question whether the people of Burco city have a profound hatred for each other. This explains why their animosity has extended to other Somaliland cities.

[Allow dhawr SL @hargeisa234]

Burco waxaa lagu maydhaa ayuu yidhi taydha ilays, reer burco markii ay mudahaaradayeen ee la haayeen absame ayaa loo diiday burco, ma waxay moodayeen in hayadadii WFP laga celiyey.

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

Somaliland monitoring against Dhulbahante insurgence from Laascaanood & Buuhodle districts:

- Caynabo build large prison that can hold over 5k prisoners Dhulbahante

a) Dhulbahante nomad that penetrated the security zone of Somaliland

b) Transfer combatant fighters Dhulabahante to Saxiil prison, only designed for Combatants

- Marginalising the Dhulbahante insurgents until their movements die out

a) Encirclement strategy of their districts

b) Separate combatants and civilians with refugee camp

c) Increased every town deep in Sool of Habr Jeclo with 50 soldier’s units operated as police officers and trained to fight against 150 guerrillas until backup arrived (addresses underlying political or economic grievances and security of Habr Jeclo frontline civilians)

- Mobile Patrolling: Counter guerrillas by using their own tactics; conduct small-unit patrols and hit-and-run ambushes to keep insurgents on the defensive.

- Long term solution: restricting the movement of weapons and supplies inside Somaliland, neutralise the Dhulbahante financial streams (operating in Somalia capital) by cooperating with US & Israel intelligence communities.

a) Data gathering: human-based intelligence and modern surveillance

b) Habr Jeclo towns deep in Eastern Sool control: prevent Dhulbahante insurgents from resting, regrouping, or receiving external funding, weapons in Laascaanood & Buuhoodle districts as well as Somalia foreign fighters against Somaliland.

c) Allow Habr Jeclo civilians to carried weapons (local militias) : Arm and train local community defense forces who know the terrain, any sneak Dhulbahante attack, making it more difficult for insurgents to move freely in Habr Jeclo villages.

d) Protect the Habr Jeclo population in Sool & Sanaag and establish security (Clear, Hold and Build fortified police station in 90% of every Habr Jeclo town in Sool (focus militarise police officers resources on securing populate areas first, establishing every 100km a military bases (each hold 5k troops) that provide physical safety for civilians.

[Allow dhawr SL @hargeisa234]

Oday @siciidSL casharadan in badan ayaad bixisay, maxadawaynuhu si fiican ayuu u qaatay casharadii.
Maalintii uu waraysiga bixiyey ee uu joogay imaaratka carabta iyo qatarba wixii uu ku hadlay maanta wuu saxay.

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

Speculative Reer Bari stated there were many international communities working and only 1 UN org in Burco last 30 years.

I’ll inform them that the GB of Gabiley are way better than Reer Bari put together. I’ll show you how. The GB are better organised than those Twitter guys who just wake-up.

For 30 years, GB worldwide has been sending thousands of containers each year to support their community and stays in touch with the UN organisations in Geneva to work with Gabiley hospital and other parts of Gabiley in Somaliland.

There are no limits to jealousy from Reer Bari.

Reer Bari lack of knowledge who does hastily judges a situation before evaluating the actual facts. Like the red zone, combine all three eastern regions together versus Gabiley and Berbera.

Let’s analysis, how many tribal fights occurred in Togdheer put together versus Gabiley and Berbera since 1991 up to 2026. Sool is the worst red zone for the next 100 years, as for Sanaag fighting is still going on between tribes. Togdheer south, Habr Yonis and Ciise Muuse fight regularly. And they wonder why we are red zones?

Reer Bari put together paid less tax:

- Sool paid less than 0.5%

- Sanaag entire region paid less tax than Gabiley. And they have the nerve to call themselves the large region in Somaliland and the Horn of Africa. Either, you are corrupt to the core or you don't know how to collect tax. Therefore, let Reer Galbeed rule you next 1000 years.

- Burco whole Togdheer paid less tax than Hargeisa city

In conclusion, Reer Bari will not get the tax of Reer Galbeed. Period!

Burco city, capital of Ictisaam in the Horn of Africa, who fight against local population progress.

[Tayasir Ehlu Saddah @Haamay25]

https://t.co/WVFihlsXfG

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

Somalia's population and its politicians are proving presumptuous people by nature in general

1. He claimed the Isaaq population is confined to Berbera, Hargeisa, and Burco, totaling less than 6 million. Therefore, Somalia is vomiting the propaganda of Hawiye & Darood without proof. What if I told him I’m Isaaq and I don’t live in any of those places he listed? That disproved his claim.

2. Somalia illegal union cover-ups: Beledweyne Electoral fraud, ballot-rigging, vote counting manipulation, voter suppression, and gerrymandering. During the 1961 constitutional referendum (associated with the illegal post-union political disputes beginning in 1960), Somalia politicians and administrators have done severe voter turnout inflation and vote-counting fraud in the southern town of Beledweyne to artificially overpower the totality of population of Somaliland’s rejection of the illegal union. How can one small town be bigger than an entire country? That’s the mentality Somaliland population are fighting against Somalia inbred population mentality.

3. What’s his endgame in trying to reduce the population of Somaliland to less than 7 million? If we follow his assertion, he wants to imitate the Beledweyne political scandal all over again. Is he aware Ethiopia tried this methodology in the 1800s against Somaliland and the international community rejected it? In conclusion, he tells you the mentality of Somalia, an expansionist people. This land (Somaliland) was never theirs, but they want it.

4. Is Somalia aware, Somaliland is by history and geography, was never part of Somalia, except with the illegal union of 1960-1990 which was militarily occupied and ejected by the Somaliland population 18-May-1991 (Restoration Day of Somaliland Independence of 26 June 1960).

[Allow dhawr SL @hargeisa234]

Mar baynu siganay xirsi, hunguri ayaa meel kasta galiyey.
Ninkaa cuqubadu ku dhacday ayuu hoos cararay.

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

The Somaliland next military investment:

Bihi (Ex-President) invested: 2017-2024
1. Human input (training more Somaliland soldiers: national service)
2. Imported hundred logistics military transportation for the Somaliland military
3. Signed military training with Taiwan (Somaliland military officers)
4. Build more infrastructure training military base

President Irro investment should be: 2024-2030

1. Oog town as central command for the eastern regions
2. Invest more drones import (attack & surveillance drones)
3. Signed military training with foreign countries (no more officers but Somaliland units who can operated deep in the enemy cities and towns)
4. Redesign Somaliland military as offensive capabilities than defensive mode

Somaliland Oog military base logo against guerrillas or insurgents fighters from Somalia against Somaliland.

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

I suggested it to the Somaliland government a 100 year a realistic military hub against all treat against Somaliland from eastern Sool coming from Somalia.

1. Oog town has to be the next major military spot in Somaliland, right after Hargeisa and Burco suburbs.

a) Somaliland has to spend a few million bucks on a military base, buildings, and surveillance drones to keep an eye out for Somalia sneaking into eastern Sool.

b) Not one Dhulbahante should be in that garrison at Oog military base.

A 50,000-troop hub in Oog would fundamentally stop being a “town garrison” and become a regional military theater command. At that scale, everything shifts from local security thinking to national-level logistics and infrastructure planning.

1. Force Structure (50,000 troops is not one base)
You would not keep all troops in Oog itself. You’d split them into a distributed system:
Main command + HQ (Oog area): ~3,000–5,000 personnel
Operational command center
Intelligence fusion cell
Communications hub
Forward operating bases (FOBs): 6–10 smaller sites in a radius
2,000–5,000 troops each
Positioned along key roads and junctions
Mobile rapid response brigades: ~10,000–15,000
Constantly rotating between Oog–Burco–Sool corridors
Light mechanized units (pickup-based + armored vehicles)
Reserve + training + logistics pool (rear areas, likely near Burco/Hargeisa):
~20,000–25,000
This is where most “50k” actually sits in practice
👉 Oog would never physically “hold” 50k troops. It would anchor a networked system.
2. Logistics Corridor: Hargeisa ↔ Burco ↔ Oog
This is the backbone. Without it, everything collapses.
Main supply route:
Hargeisa → Berbera logistics/air resupply → Burco → Oog
Secondary route: Burco → Caynabo axis support corridors
What you would need:
Fully paved, secured highway segments (or heavily patrolled gravel backup routes)
Fuel depots every ~80–120 km
Hardened convoy rest points (“logistics halts”)
Armored escort doctrine for all resupply convoys
Key vulnerability:
If that corridor is disrupted, Oog becomes isolated within days—not weeks.
So the military priority is: “Keep the road alive, not just the base.”
3. Intelligence & Surveillance System (Oog node)
A realistic setup would look like a sensor + human intelligence hybrid, not just drones.
Components:
A. Aerial surveillance
Medium-altitude drones for corridor monitoring
Short-range quadcopter units for Forward Operating Base perimeter checks
Limited loiter time coverage (not constant full coverage)
B. Ground sensors
Roadside motion sensors on key approaches
Checkpoint ANPR-style vehicle logging (license tracking equivalent systems where possible)
Communication interception stations (radio monitoring)
C. Human intelligence layer
Local liaison officers (critical in Sool region dynamics)
Informant networks along trade and transport routes
Civilian reporting hotlines (if trust exists)
D. Command integration
Oog feeds into Burco regional command
Burco feeds into Hargeisa central defense command
Real-time map fusion of:
troop movement
vehicle movement
alerts from field units
4. What actually makes or breaks the system
The 3 real constraints:
1. Manpower sustainability 50,000 troops requires:
continuous recruitment pipeline
rotation cycles (otherwise fatigue and local capture happen)
continuous payroll burden
2. Local legitimacy
No surveillance system works if Habr Jeclo refused to cooperate with JSL Gov for many reasons:
civilians don’t report threats
continuous payroll burden
3. Mobility > static bases
In that region, the winning model is usually:
fast response units
unpredictable patrol patterns
decentralized Forward Operating Base - FOBs
Not a single “mega base”
5. Strategic reality check
A system like this only works if it’s designed as:
a networked security grid, not a fortress.
Because otherwise:
it becomes expensive to maintain easy to bypass in open terrain vulnerable to supply disruption

[Allow dhawr SL @hargeisa234]

Sool Bari caqli ma yaalo, wuxuu yidhi hargaysa iyo burco ku duuli mayno, haddana wuxuu yidhi maalinta ay soomaali tidhi waanu ku duulaynaa dhinacayaga ayaanu ka galaynaa?
Arrintaa xukumada maxaa uga qorshaysan?

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

I’ve got a few reasons for not getting into the legal side of Somaliland frontier.

1. The Somaliland President is trapped.

a) The Somaliland sultans, called Kofiyad Balcad, said no to a full military strike on Eastern Sool.

b) I notice Somaliland people tend to be forgetful. Do you remember what happened to Bixi, the ex-president?

- Do you believed like many Waddani party supporter, Bixi was a frontline soldier.

Bixi faced pushback from all sides during the state of emergency.

To wrap it up, this is all about the Somaliland President using his constitutional powers. No full-on attack is planned against Dhulbahante. Given that you have advisors with opposing viewpoints and conflicting advice. Just ignore the part about Somaliland closing the frontier without political solution.

The only way to get close to the border is if Somalia attacks with their whole army. Then, the Somaliland president will trigger level 3, the top red alert, which will set off a full military attack beyond Dhulbahante districts. But for now, the politicians in Somaliland say the Dhulbahante are part of Somaliland.

The Somaliland president is stuck until there’s a political agreement.

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

I concur with your statement, Mahamoud.

It appears Xirsi payroll’s social media trolls are targeting western Somaliland. I had known them for a long time. However, why do the fine people of Reer Burco not intercept those social media trolls before they become targets for Somaliland’s frontline forces?

1. When those social media trolls post something against Reer Galbeed of Somaliland, whether once, twice, or a couple of times, it’s acceptable. However, they’ve opened up an X space room and are continuing their long-term promotion of things like:

The “Hargeisa project” participants believe they’re fighting for Burco, unaware of the social media ramifications. Faqash propaganda asserts Somaliland is an “Isaaq Project” or “Central Clan Project,” diminishing its standing domestically and internationally.

b) the Huwan propaganda and Somalia Faqash are closely connected to those accusations.

Aragtida ama cabashada ku saabsan awood-qeybsiga iyo siyaasadda Somaliland ayaa aad uga duwan dhinaca la eegayo, gaar ahaan hadba qabiilka ama deegaanka uu qofka ka soo jeedo.

Marka laga hadlayo arrimahan, doodaha ugu waaweyn waxay u kala baxaan sidan:

1. Cabashada Beelaha Darifyada (Sida Gadabuursi, Ciise, Dhulbahante, iyo Warsangeli):

Awood-qeybsi la’aan: Waxay ku doodaan in kuraasta ugu sareysa iyo xilalka muhiimka ah ee xukuumadda iyo ciidanka inta badan ay gacanta ku hayaan Beesha Dhexe.

Saamiga: Waxay dareemaan in xaqooda siyaasadeed iyo matalaadooda baarlamaanka aanay u dhigmin tirada ama baaxadda dhulka ay degaan.

Maamulka: Waxaa jira shaqsiyaad ama siyaasiyiin ku dooda in go’aanada masiiriga ah ee dalka iyo dhaqaalaha ay ku kooban yihiin hal jifo (Habr Awal)

2. Aragtiyada Beesha Dhexe (Isaaq):

Xaqiijinta Qarannimada: Doodda dhinacan waxay xoogga saartaa in Beesha Dhexe ay hormuud ka ahayd halgankii SNM iyo dhismaha qaranimada Somaliland.

Dimuqraadiyadda & Nidaamka: Waxay ku doodaan in nidaamka xisbiyada iyo doorashooyinka (sida ku xusan shuruucda dawladda) uu qof walba siinayo fursad uu ku tartamo oo uu ku hanto xilalka dalka.

Midnimada: Waxay aaminsan yihiin in wada-jirka iyo xasiloonida Somaliland ay ku xiran tahay is-afgarad iyo in laga fogaado wax kasta oo daciifin kara qaranimada.

Xaaladda siyaasadeed iyo hanaanka dimuqraadiyadeed ee Somaliland ayaa ah mid u baahan wada-hadal joogto ah si loo xalliyo tabashooyinka jira. Si aad u sii darsatid xaaladda iyo dastuurka dalka, waxaad ka akhrisan kartaa macluumaad dheeraad ah sharciga dalka ee Dastuurka Jamhuuriyadda Somaliland iyo Somaliland Declaration of Independence (Restoration Day 18 May 1991)

To wrap up, those trolls are targeting western regions that have the best intentions for Somaliland’s economic distribution. Unless Reer Burco stops those trolls, the Habr Awal counterattack against Reer Bari will be unstoppable.

[Siciid Moumin @Saed_Moumin]

Here are the questions that emerge:

1. Why are Reer Burco or Eastern regions of Somaliland specifically accusing Gabiley and other Western regions of stealing government funds?

2. What is the reason behind Reer Burco’s designation of the entire western regions as the “Hargeisa project”? What causes those tribalists to be against the other tribes of Somaliland?

3. What is the reason behind Reer Burco starting economic accusations against Somaliland’s Western regions from 2024 to 2026?

4. What Reer Burco is attempting to prove with the X conflict against other Somaliland regions.

In conclusion, Reer Burco display profound tribalism, acting against all other regions. I will offer proof in this context. The Kulmiye party, in both its 1.0 and 2.0 iterations, Reer Burco held a significant position within Somaliland’s ruling elite and was instrumental in its creation. As a result, they could not deploy propaganda campaign in X that targeted their own government’s economic policies in Somaliland.

1. Reer Burco lacked the courage to oppose the Ictisaam when they prevented local businesswomen from establishing businesses in Burco. The question is, who is damaging the Burco city economy? The central government or your worst enemy: Ictisaam.

2. I believe Reer Burco are not angry how beautiful Hargeisa city, the capital of Somaliland compares to other regions as well as the whole Horn of Africa cities. However, they are more upset because the two largest customs regions of Somaliland, Berbera and Gabiley, are beautiful.

a) The beauty of Gabiley and Berbera cities might stem from various factors such as improved leadership or sheer fortune. Who can tell compared to Burco city?

- They can’t comprehend the western regions are compact with less than $10m the development can be seen or shown. Even with a $10 billion government donation, the Eastern Region’s progress will be invisible because its people don’t grasp the region’s true scale.

- Reer Burco appears to misunderstand that Gabiley has historically been the primary gateway to Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa’s largest market, and that Berbera city has served as Somaliland’s maritime trade entry point for over two millennia. Berbera city was operational several millennia before the Burco city urbanisation or human settlement.

[Allow dhawr SL @hargeisa234]

2022, Gabiley waxay kastamyada ka soo saartay $3.74 milyan, Burco-na $47 kun. Dowladda dhexe waxay Gabiley siisay $329 kun, halka Burco heshay $1.18 milyan. Gabiley dakhli badan ayay qaranka u soo xareysaa, balse dib-u-celin yar ayay heshaa; Burco se taageero badan ayay heshaa.