What's better on a Friday afternoon than dropping a blog about the use of HAADJ and how it fits into "Modern Management"?
https://t.co/GRouba3jET
#MSIntune#HAADJ#Autopilot#CloudNative
Massive Security win! You can now manage policies for #VSCode in #Intune!
As of the #Windows June Preview Update (26200.8524), MS have unblocked the VSCode ADMX registry path, meaning that uploading the ADMX shipped with a VSCode install allows you to create a policy to deploy allowed extensions (either by publisher or individually), as well as things like control chat capabilities and MCP servers - All of which have been proven as a serious supply chain attack or data exfiltration risks!
VSCode policy docs: https://t.co/A2Ceq6etFE
@AdamGell Nah. First it's imported ADMX which adds all sorts of nightmares. Even if it were in Settings Catalog, it's an additional app install, and who am I to say what extensions your company should trust?
@KiPos_info I agree the next step is having these just native in Settings Catalog and will be moaning ad nauseum to this effect... But you gotta start somewhere!
@SasStu@NathanMcNulty Also this.
I tried to update my OIB M365 Apps policies to the latest baseline with my latest release but noticed some settings were still MIA. Frustrating indeed.
3.10.3 Released. Added Win32 app Install/Uninstall script support and Windows Quality Update Policies. Fixed category import, JSON property order for Git tracking + multiple documentation fixes. See https://t.co/fFctA4XZkj for more info
So that's basically the entire point of the OIBID I've added. If the GUID in the description matches, it doesn't matter what the policy name is (which was my first crude implementation).
The only thing I'm not doing (cos it's much harder to do) is per-policy settings checks.
🚨#OIB#Windows v3.8 & #OIBDeployer updates!
I've just released v3.8 of the Windows OIB, which adds some cool things, as well as squashing a bunch of #community submitted bugs! Most importantly, I'm adding policy tracking through unique "OIBID"s, meaning much more flexible options when it comes to policy management through my OIB Deployer tool!
Speaking of which, I've updated that too! A small face-lift (including dark mode!), API call improvements, and the functionality to support the new OIBID checks.
Full Windows v3.8 Changelog here: https://t.co/Y6XDkjCNJy
Deploy or Update it in your tenant here: https://t.co/UIOdOJhO9g
To everyone that continues to provide support, feedback, and trust in this little project that's gotten way bigger than I ever thought it would - Thank you. 💛
@marrrkkkuuu@Mister_MDM Much easier to just deploy a Local Group Management policy to remove anything you don't specifically want in that group out of it anyway rather than relying on compliance.
@snr_boost@JenMsft I mean there's plenty of awful things I've seen IT teams do...
That's definitely not the behaviour I'd expect to get though. Any colleagues seeing the same thing?
I'm going to go against the grain here and say that the the knee-jerk reaction happening after the #Stryker incident is stupid.
All of a sudden I'm seeing tons of security people now shouting that #Intune Multi Admin Approval needs to be deployed, yet for years they've not even considered that a device management platform is a core part of an orgs security posture.
What's worse is from my personal experience presenting topics on this exact issue, they've been actively gatekeeping security from your endpoint management teams, creating a horrible siloed culture.
Stryker wasn't a critical failure in the endpoint management platform, it was just another Identity-driven attack where the proper attention to controls around least privilege, Conditional Access and authentication enforcement had been poorly implemented.
Intune RBAC and Multi Admin Approval provide strong additional layers of security, but both come at a significant cost to day-to-day operational overhead that many orgs are just NOT prepared or set up to deal with.
While I'm glad that it's making security folk realise that Device Management IS Security (something I've been banging on about for years at this point), you don't get to suddenly demand implementation of a thing just because you read something on the internet when you haven't done your part in shoring up security gaps.
Stop living in a silo, collaborate, engage. Security is everyone's responsibility, and only working together will provide positive outcomes.
@RustySowers That's such dated thinking. The "all eggs in one basket" isn't a problem. It's the siloed nature of properly implementing the tools available that causes breaches.
Good luck adequately reducing security gaps in a bunch of products that struggle to talk to each other properly.
Reduce your Intune Admins and use intune rbac and restricted admin units. Segregate device management into groups to decrease the blast radius. Treat Intune Admins like Global Admins. Require PIM with approvals. I've been saying this since before it was popular.
As unpopular as this may sound right now, Microsoft is not to blame. They wrote about how to do all this in their documentation, but nobody does it.
You have to keep in mind that it could have been a Global Admin too. In that case, the situation is even more dire.
The vast majority of orgs are still hybrid. If the compromise was of the on-prem AD, not much you can do because you can pivot to an Intune Admin's device and use the APIs. This is why your EDR should be throwing high alerts when admin machines stop checking in and you should validate visibility on those machines. Managing admin machines is really really hard. Admins write code, run scripts, and look like they are compromised all the time when they're not.
An employer making a decision that you have to enrol BYOD are clueless that BYOD is a service they're providing.
If anyone tried to force me to enrol a device for the pleasure of getting bugged in my own time, I'd tell them where to swivel. Everyone else should too.