Steel and Sovereignty

Complex Conflict - Made Simple.

On X we make it easy to understand:
- How Warfare Works
- Weapons of Warfare
- Geopolitics
- Disinformation

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@M_Simonyan When are you and him debating one on one?

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

Note the Ratio:

[WarTranslated @wartranslated]

Russians: posting about how they’re saying goodbye to their "hero."

Meanwhile, Ukrainian soldiers in the comments:

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@Zagonel85 Just space lasers 😂

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@GabeZZOZZ Funny… what happened to the protesting youth in Moscow today?

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

In Moscow yesterday (10 August 2026), hundreds of mostly young people — students and other youth — gathered outside the Supreme Court in support of the liberal Yabloko party after the court barred it from the September State Duma elections.
Yabloko was the only remaining registered party openly opposing the war in Ukraine.

The Supreme Court granted a lawsuit brought by the small pro-Kremlin nationalist party Rodina.

The stated reasons were alleged violations of election rules: receiving funding through third parties linked to foreign sources (Rosfinmonitoring cited money flows involving dozens of individuals from countries including the US, Germany, India, Azerbaijan and Georgia), and copyright breaches in campaign materials (use of texts, images, videos and songs without permission).

Yabloko denied the allegations, called the case an attack on free political thought, and said it would appeal.

After the ruling, supporters outside the court chanted “Shame!” and “Yabloko.” Police gave the crowd a very short window — reports quote an officer over a loudspeaker saying “You have two minutes to leave” — and added a clear threat: those who stayed would face consequences at the military enlistment offices, with the implication that no one would help them afterwards.

This is a familiar intimidation tactic in Russia: treat residual public dissent as a recruitment opportunity.

Removing the only anti-war party from the ballot further shrinks the already tightly controlled space for legal opposition. It is consistent with years of pressure on Yabloko (individual candidates barred, activists prosecuted for “discrediting the army,” etc.) and with the broader pattern of managed elections under the current system.

The mobilisation threat directed at young people who simply turned up to watch a court hearing is a blunt reminder of the tools the authorities are willing to use.

Russia is not a country in which open political disagreement about the war is safe or treated as normal civic activity.

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@Maks_NAFO_FELLA What is it that found? Moskva?

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@Alex_Oloyede2 Amazing how you can tell that’s what happened based on an image that far away. 😱

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@WarMonitor3 His political decisions seem to be tanking hard.

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@Maks_NAFO_FELLA The real question is why is Ukraine timing this with the launch of the stalker 2 dlc

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

Deals pitched by Kirill Dmitriev carry high risk for a Trump administration
Kirill Dmitriev, CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and a Kremlin-appointed economic envoy, has long served as a polished Western-facing dealmaker. He has pitched large-scale U.S.-Russia projects—energy, Arctic development, rare earths, infrastructure—sometimes citing portfolios in the trillions of dollars, often linked to sanctions relief or broader political settlements.

RDIF was created to attract foreign co-investment but has operated as a state vehicle closely aligned with Kremlin priorities. It has been opaque about returns and investments; U.S. authorities previously described it in sanctions contexts as functioning in part as a “slush fund.” Dmitriev and the fund were sanctioned after 2022.

The problem is structural, not personal. Any commercial arrangement with Russian state-linked entities is subordinate to political and strategic decisions made in Moscow. The post-1991 record shows repeated willingness to rewrite terms, force exits at depressed valuations, impose capital controls, or place assets under temporary administration when interests diverge—whether over taxes, “national security,” sanctions retaliation, or war-related needs. Courts lack independence, and exit rights can be constrained by decree.

Dmitriev’s pitches may offer genuine commercial upside on paper and align with short-term deal-making incentives. History indicates those upsides can evaporate or turn into large write-downs once political conditions shift. Trusting the durability of such deals requires assuming Russia will treat commercial commitments as binding even when they conflict with higher state priorities—an assumption the post-Soviet track record does not support.

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[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

Kiril Dmitriev, Trump, Witkoff and Kushner have repeatedly discussed business deals.

Here is why making any deal with Russia would be extremely unwise.

After the Soviet collapse, Russia privatized many assets and courted foreign capital in the 1990s. From the early 2000s the state systematically reasserted control over strategic sectors, often using tax claims, environmental rules, regulatory pressure, or later explicit “temporary administration” and forced sales. Foreign investors repeatedly lost value or control when politics intervened.

Key cases:
• Yukos (2003–2007): Aggressive tax assessments and legal actions dismantled the company. Assets were transferred largely to state-controlled Rosneft. Foreign shareholders (including major Western funds) suffered heavy losses. International arbitration later ordered Russia to pay tens of billions; enforcement has been minimal.

• Sakhalin projects: In the mid-2000s, Shell and partners in Sakhalin-2 faced sustained regulatory and environmental pressure that facilitated Gazprom taking a controlling stake on unfavorable terms. After 2022, presidential decrees restructured Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, transferring operations to new Russian entities. ExxonMobil and Shell effectively lost or were forced to exit stakes (Exxon wrote down over $4 billion on Sakhalin-1). Foreign shareholders were given limited time to claim interests in the new vehicles under government discretion; many exited with steep discounts or write-downs.

• Post-2014 and especially post-February 2022 wave: Russia designated many Western countries “unfriendly.” Tools included temporary state management of foreign assets, court-ordered nationalizations, bans on sales of stakes in key energy and banking assets, forced sales at deep discounts to Russian buyers (often state-linked or politically connected), and restrictions on capital repatriation. Hundreds of companies were affected. Examples include Uniper/Fortum energy assets, Danone, Renault’s majority stake in AvtoVAZ (sold for a symbolic sum with limited buy-back rights), and numerous others in energy, manufacturing, and retail. The process was frequently framed as retaliation for Western sanctions and asset freezes.

The consistent pattern is that commercial contracts and property rights in strategic or politically sensitive areas remain conditional. When state or geopolitical priorities change, legal pretexts or decrees can override them. International arbitration awards have often proven difficult or impossible to collect.

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[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@hotoke_shinei How about Motor Sich or Ivchenko-Progress?

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@GabeZZOZZ Then go to Crimea and take some photos. If you can get internet or power that is?

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@Alex_Oloyede2 The rate of HIV in Russia is 1.5-2.5 times that in Ukraine. Please explain?

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@SukritGanesh @NotWoofers IRIS-T is also Air to Air. So it’s not only air defence but on multiple nato aircraft. Germany is ramping it up however.

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@Zagonel85 Here is a video of one narrowly missing your soldiers at an airfield in Kursk. Good Luck.

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@Zagonel85 What’s actually funny is how much you cope.

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@Frialum So they can just shut the fuck up and charge a markup for any international sales under the licence… Job done or are these businessmen as stupid as Trump.

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@T_90_M_2024 To be fair the Sgt York Targeted the shithouse and the politician. It is literally Optimus Based.

[Steel and Sovereignty @SteelSovereignt]

@stparabellum Tank Pubes