Den

Independent researcher specializing in weapons systems, defense industry, energy, and European rearmament

[Den @Supply_Chainer]

6/ We've already seen why this matters.

Russian employment of the R-37M has repeatedly forced Ukrainian pilots to adapt their tactics. Europe needs credible options for very-long-range air combat, and that means investing years before today's missiles become obsolete.

[Den @Supply_Chainer]

1/ I wrote about long-range air combat before, I write about it now, and I'll keep writing about it.

The UK's decision to skip a Meteor mid-life upgrade in favour of a successor matters because Europe is already thinking beyond today's benchmark missile.

[UK Defence Journal @UKDefJournal]

The MOD has dropped the planned Meteor mid-life upgrade, shifting investment to the Future Air Superiority Effectors programme. Click image for more.
https://t.co/EnnSH8ak9s

[Den @Supply_Chainer]

5/ The earlier reporting on FASE also suggested it will sit between the future ASRAAM replacement and the air-to-air mode of STRATUS RS, pointing toward a broader family of effectors rather than a one-for-one Meteor clone.

[Den @Supply_Chainer]

The war in Ukraine has shown that having enough GMLRS rockets is just as important as having HIMARS launchers themselves. Poland appears to have learned that lesson. Preparatory work has now begun on a factory that will produce CGR-080 guided rockets for the Homar-K system.

[Rafał Muczyński 🇵🇱 @Rafal_Ralph1989]

Ruszyły prace przygotowawcze do budowy w Polsce fabryki rakiet CGR-080
https://t.co/giCUU5sI0F

[Den @Supply_Chainer]

8/ A better lexicon would probably focus less on absolute control and more on practical effects.

Can a force protect its own troops from aerial observation? Strike deep targets reliably? Deny the enemy reconnaissance over key sectors? Sustain missile and drone production?

[Den @Supply_Chainer]

1/
The old air-control vocabulary is starting to crack.

For almost a century, military thinkers inherited a language shaped by aircraft, airfields, bombers and fighter sweeps.

[Modern War Institute @WarInstitute]

Air supremacy, air superiority, control of the air—these terms are all doctrinally defined. But in the modern air domain, they increasingly fail to reflect reality. https://t.co/PYjQ9d2NQy

[Den @Supply_Chainer]

7/ The same pattern appears in Ukraine, Myanmar and the Red Sea.

Small drones, commercial electronics, improvised launch systems, cheap navigation, distributed operators and the industrial capacity to replace losses quickly - all this matters.

[War on the Rocks @WarOnTheRocks]

The English and Chinese versions of a major Beijing think tank report on the U.S.-Chinese competition say different things. https://t.co/zb83pJasvk

[Den @Supply_Chainer]

4/ Taken together, these developments point toward armed forces that are more dispersed, more connected and far more dependent on industrial capacity than many analysts expected only a decade ago.

[Den @Supply_Chainer]

1/ This RAND report argues that the modern battlefield has become persistently transparent. Satellites, commercial imagery, drones and low-cost sensors make it increasingly difficult to mass forces or prepare major operations without being detected.

[RAND @RANDCorporation]

The U.S. Department of War is operating in one of the most complex and dangerous security environments the United States has ever faced.

RAND researchers developed a warfighter-centric, strategies-to-tasks approach to linking national security objectives with operational requirements and acquisition decisions.

Download the report: https://t.co/t8g2cE5j8B

[Den @Supply_Chainer]

3/ RAND also argues that many familiar debates are being reframed rather than settled.
Tanks remain relevant, but they operate under constant observation.
Air power remains decisive, yet achieving air superiority has become more difficult.