Swalfro

Amateur Layman

[Swalfro @Swalfro]

ELCA is asscheeks

[Dogma 🦢 @Dogmaticist]

QUESTION I
The first question proceeds as follows. It seems that the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are two changes. Proof: generation and corruption are two changes on account of four terms, namely two privations and two forms; but the remission of guilt is the corruption of the sin that was present, and the infusion of grace is a certain generation into gratuitous being; therefore the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are two distinct changes.
To the contrary: distinct changes have some order of priority and posteriority; but the expulsion of guilt and the infusion of grace do not have such an order of priority and posteriority; therefore they are not two distinct changes. The minor is proved thus: if the expulsion of guilt were prior in nature to the infusion of grace, it would follow that in that prior moment the sinner would be both a friend and not a friend, since he would not yet have the grace without which no one is a friend.
On this question different things are said, but I state what I understand to be better, and I set forth three conclusions. The first conclusion is that the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are not one change. The second is that the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are not two real changes. The third is that the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt stand to one another as a relation of reason stands to a real action.
The first conclusion is proved as follows. First, the same thing simply cannot both be multiplied and not be multiplied; but the remissions of sins are many, or can be many, even when there is only one infusion of grace. Second, the same thing is not separated from the same thing, or from itself, since then the same thing would at once be and not be; but the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace can be separated from one another; therefore they are not one change. The minor is proved thus: in the state of innocence, in the human race (and this indeed happened in the case of the angels who did not sin), grace could be infused without the remission of any guilt; likewise guilt could be remitted without grace being infused, for God, by his absolute power, could create a man in pure nature, without guilt and without grace. Third, there is not one change from term to term unless those terms are formally repugnant to one another; but guilt and grace are not formally repugnant; therefore the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are not one change. The minor is proved thus: when things are formally repugnant, whatever has power over the one has power over the other, whether effectively or defectively; but the created will has power, whether effectively or defectively, over guilt; therefore, if grace and guilt were formally repugnant, the will could have effective power over grace, which is false. Fourth, one change tends toward a positive form only from that form's own proper privation; but guilt is not the proper privation of grace, since a single grace has only a single privation, whereas guilts are many in this way, as was said in the first argument; therefore the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are not one change.
The second conclusion, namely that the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are not two real changes, is proved thus. The infusion of grace is a real change, but the remission of guilt is not a real change; therefore they are not two real changes. The minor is proved thus: the obligation to punishment for guilt committed is not something real in the soul after the past act has occurred, but is only a relation of reason in the object as willed, insofar as it is willed. Therefore the remission which passes from that obligation to the absence of obligation is not a real change. The antecedent was shown above, as was said in Distinction 14, question 1, article 1. The inference is explained by the fact that there is no real change except toward a real positive term and a real privation.
Against this it is objected that there is no passage from one contradictory to the other without some change; but when guilt is remitted to a sinner, there is a passage from one contradictory to the other; therefore there is a true change there. The major is evident, because if there were no change, there would be no reason why one part of the contradiction should be true rather than the other.
The response is that I grant the major when transition is taken in the proper sense, but here there is no transition properly speaking. Rather, the will of God, for the instant at which this man sins, wills that he be punished, while for another instant it wills that he not be punished, the same immovable will remaining throughout.
The third conclusion is that the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace stand to one another as a relation of reason stands to a real action. This conclusion is evident from the two preceding conclusions, for it is established that the infusion of grace is a real action, whether it belongs to the genus of quality or to the genus of relation, as different thinkers hold in different ways; and from the preceding conclusion it is established that the remission of guilt is a relation of reason.
To the argument raised to the contrary, I say that the case of the corruption of a form is not similar to that of the remission of guilt, as is evident from what has been said.

— Peter de Aquilla, Sent. Lib. I, D. XVI-XVII, Q. 1.

[Swalfro @Swalfro]

@GerhardsGhost I need this🥹

[Swalfro @Swalfro]

@MimiSchizo so true

[Dogma 🦢 @Dogmaticist]

“I say that for a sin to be blotted out is not for some absolute or relative thing to be removed or separated from the sinner, but rather for the act committed or omitted not to be imputed to punishment; and this can happen either through the mere passage of time (as if God ordained that whoever committed such an act, if found to have committed it at time A, would be ordained to eternal punishment, but if not found to have committed it at the following time B, would not be ordained to that punishment but to eternal life; then if he were found to have committed that act at both times, he would be a sinner at time A but not at time B, and consequently sin could thus be blotted out by the mere passage of time, without any new act, habit, or relation), or it can happen through some new act in the sinner on account of which God ordains that sin not to be imputed to eternal punishment (just as God now in fact remits mortal sin), or through a new act in someone other than the sinner on account of which God remits that sin (as if he remitted our sins on account of the works of Christ); it need not be that there is necessarily some new act, either in the sinner or in anyone else, for the sin to be remitted.”
— Bl. William of Ockham, Sent. Bk. IV, Q. 11.

[Swalfro @Swalfro]

@Jerrsosaved yo you needa stop falling for ts ragebait bro🥹

[Swalfro @Swalfro]

@Dogmaticist @logos_asarkos What’s the context of the quote

[Samuel 🕊️ @logos_asarkos]

"It should not be passed over in silence that there is a certain similarity between the subject of a science and the subject of an operative discipline. For the subject of a science has two parts: one, like matter, called the thing considered; the other, like form, called the manner and mode of consideration. The thing considered is not proper to each science—it can be shared with others—but the mode of consideration is proper to each and restricts the thing considered, which in itself was common. So also in operative disciplines we are accustomed to name the subject as restricted by the end—as when we say the subject in the medical art is the human body as something to be healed. For the subject of an operative discipline seems to correspond by a certain [analogy of] proportion to the thing considered in the contemplative science, while the end of the operative discipline corresponds to the mode of consideration.

Yet together with this similarity there is also dissimilarity, because that mode of consideration of man in the medical art is not something existing to be proposed for cognition, but signifies rather something not existing and proposed to be produced. Hence we do not speak properly when we say that the subject in the medical art is man as to be healed, as if from these two parts as matter and form the subject were constituted; properly speaking, only one part is called the subject—namely the human body—while the other is called not the subject but the end. Since this end is proper to that art, the subject, which is common, is restricted by relation to it—just as in a science the thing considered is restricted by the mode of consideration; but there both parts are proposed as existing and as completing and constituting the subject of the science, while here the mode of consideration signifies something not existing but to be produced."

— Jacopo Zabarella, De Natura Logica (1.15)

[Dogma 🦢 @Dogmaticist]

The Franciscans are the goats of medieval theology.

[Scholastic Lutherans @GerhardsGhost]

The Victorines and Franciscans have already demonstrated why the Trinity and Hypostatic Union not only are philosophically coherent but actually are expected given Classical Theism and Microcosmism.

[Econ @Econotheist]

Some have asked me to show where the Lutherans deny physical premotion. Note that this is obviously not exhaustive. (🧵)

[Samuel 🕊️ @logos_asarkos]

“There comes a heathen and says, ‘I wish to become a Christian, but I know not whom to join: there is much fighting and faction among you, much confusion: which doctrine am I to choose?’ How shall we answer him? ‘Each of you’ (says he) ‘asserts, ‘I speak the truth.’’ No doubt: this is in our favor. For if we told you to be persuaded by arguments, you might well be perplexed: but if we bid you believe the Scriptures, and these are simple and true, the decision is easy for you. If any agree with the Scriptures, he is the Christian; if any fight against them, he is far from this rule. ‘But which am I to believe, knowing as I do nothing at all of the Scriptures? The others also allege the same thing for themselves. What then if the other come, and say that the Scripture has this, and you that it has something different, and you interpret the Scriptures diversely, dragging their sense (each his own way)?’ And you then, I ask, have you no understanding, no judgment? ‘And how should I be able (to decide),’ says he, ‘I who do not even know how to judge of your doctrines? I wish to become a learner, and you are making me immediately a teacher.’ If he say this, what, say you, are we to answer him? How shall we persuade him? Let us ask whether all this be not mere pretence and subterfuge.”

— Bl. John Chrysostom, Homily 33 on Acts (vv. 15:13, 15)

[MimiSchizoRambling @MimiSchizo]

calvinists hate arminians because calvin was turkish and they misread arminian as armenian

[Saul the Calovian @SaultheCalovian]

“And faith, resting with full certainty in the merit of Christ, causes works to please God; for God regards our works not as they are in themselves, according to the strictness of the law, but regards them in the Son.”

— Abraham Calov, On the Essence of Good Works p. 5

[Dogma 🦢 @Dogmaticist]

“First, the Scotists and Nominalists respond that grace does not have from its own nature the power of expelling sin, but expels it in fact from an extrinsic disposition of God decreeing to destroy sin wherever grace is first infused — a grace that otherwise could, with no violence done to it, be conjoined with sin, without any miracle intervening in this conjunction... This was the assertion of the Lutheran heretics, and the Council of Trent condemned it.”

— De Salmanticenses, T. XV, Disp. II, Dub. IV.

[Swalfro @Swalfro]

@averagelutheran happy birthday!

[Swalfro @Swalfro]

LMAOOOO this can’t be serious bro

[. @vertiasluxmea]

"First, the Scotists and Nominalists respond that grace does not have from its own nature the power of expelling sin, but expels it in fact from an extrinsic disposition of God decreeing to destroy sin wherever grace is first infused — a grace that otherwise could, with no violence done to it, be conjoined with sin, without any miracle intervening in this conjunction.

But against this: the doctrine on which this response rests cannot be sustained after the Council of Trent, as we sufficiently showed in (Dubium 1, §3)."—The Salmanticenses

[Samuel 🕊️ @logos_asarkos]

“The other … opinion is that of the Scotists and Nominalists, asserting that justification is not an effect of sanctifying grace of its own nature or physically, but from divine ordination, and morally, whence they say that that supernatural quality which is called habitual grace, considered according to its own nature, does not have for its formal effect to render man holy, a friend of God, an adopted son of God, etc., in the way in which whiteness physically of its own nature renders a man white: but only morally, insofar as God has so ordained through that quality to render man His friend, acceptable, adopted son, holy, etc., so that just as a moral cause is given in the genus of efficient cause causing grace morally, … in the same way a formal moral cause of holiness is given, namely habitual grace, which by its inherence in the soul formally causes those effects from divine ordination;” — Bartholomew Mastrius, Disputationes Theologicae in Secundum Librum Sententiarum (7.1)