My prediction for 8/8 Tesla Event
CyberCab AutoBot & TRoN
1. Tesla introduces Cybercab production begins 2026.
2. Introduces next gen vehicle, AutoBot 🚗🤖.
AutoBot production begins 2025Q1 on existing lines.
3. Tesla announces the launch of
Tesla Robot Network (TRoN) using FSD(supervised) & it will begin 2025Q1 or earlier.
4. Tesla’s pricing structure for TRoN:
$5 + $2/mi without membership
$1.50/mi with $99/month membership
To operate your car on the public network Tesla receives:
45-50% if you do not subscribe to FSD
25-30% if you subscribe to FSD
15-20% if you bought FSD outright
@FutureAZA Although he sold his Cybertruck after 10/10 in 2024, why @MKBHD think Tesla would want his opinion after he went full retard after suffering from a tough spell of EDS. He’s not biased? 😂
Delaware, we have a problem.
All ten NVIDIA directors who decided Jensen Huang’s fate are defendants in a lawsuit over how they handled him, and keeping him out helps them defend it, whether or not it is best for the company and its shareholders for him to be exiled. That is what we call a conflict of interest. Directors with a personal stake in the answer should not be the ones deciding it. The answer these directors have already given, full exile for Jensen, therefore deserves no deference.
The board must immediately call a special shareholder meeting, create new seats, and let shareholders nominate and elect independent directors to fill them, as NVIDIA’s charter and bylaws allow. Acting as a special committee with counsel of their own choosing, the new directors should receive the findings of the board’s investigation and decide afresh whether Jensen should return, in what role, and under what safeguards.
On November 11, a lawsuit named all of the outside directors as defendants, faulting the board, among other things, for keeping Jensen in charge while it investigated him. By the end of that day, Jensen was out.
As Reuters noted, Jensen’s removal stands to help the directors’ defense “by showing directors took action.” It answers the complaint’s charge that the board overly “deferred to Mr. Huang”: it creates evidence that they can say no to Jensen. Allowing Jensen to return, even in a safeguarded or circumscribed way, would undercut both personal benefits, even though it may be what is best for the company and its shareholders.
Any director deciding whether Jensen should return must ask what a return would mean for the company and its shareholders. These directors, however, must also ask what it would mean for them personally as defendants. Shareholders deserve a decision made by directors who have only the first question to answer. There is no shame in feeling the force of both questions; the directors are only human. The shame would lie in thinking they are above the law and refusing to step aside when they have such an obvious conflict.
Neither indemnification nor insurance removes the conflict. A declaration that the directors breached their duties to NVIDIA is among the relief the complaint seeks. An insurer can pay a judgment; it cannot erase that finding. As then–Vice Chancellor Strine put it: “No judgment in a fraud or other reputation-implicating case is cost-free.”
Delaware courts have accordingly refused to defer to directors whose decisions stand to shield them from adverse judgment for their own earlier conduct, and the case for recusal here is at least as strong. In Fitbit, the Court of Chancery explained that a director could not impartially consider whether the company should pursue claims against others when the company’s positions “would likely compromise his defenses” in a pending suit against him. The same is true here: reinstating Jensen is a position the company would take, and it would detract from these directors’ defenses.
In AmTrust, three directors facing a pending shareholder suit approved a buyout that would effectively end the claims against them. They had bargained for seven weeks and won the approval of two-thirds of the public shareholders. Yet the court still concluded that shareholders a material personal interest in the decision, that precludes deference. Here, far from taking their time and consulting shareholders, NVIDIA’s directors acted the same day they were sued and despite overwhelming evidence of shareholder disapproval.
Finally, in Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court faulted a board for a decision that it said had, as a side effect, “to protect the directors against a perceived threat of personal liability” for their earlier choices. Revlon’s directors faced only a threat of suit. NVIDIA’s have already been sued. Thus, concerns of partiality are all the more salient here.
The directors may be right about Jensen. They may be wrong. What they cannot be is impartial. A decision this important deserves a process no one has reason to doubt. The board has failed to provide that. Jensen is not above the law. But neither is the board. The fix is simple: a special meeting, new independent directors chosen by the shareholders, and a fresh decision on Jensen from people who can make that decision without having to weigh both how it will affect the company and them personally.
HOLY —
So the NVIDIA board fired Jensen THE DAY AFTER they were sued for allowing him to remain in place as CEO while his behavior was being investigated? When doing that directly benefitted themselves in that litigation, creating a clear conflict of interest under MD precedent?
@AlexanderKr He’s not a smart one. Only thing he’s good at is yelling over people. He pushes out of context generalities where he can be vague but ran away as soon as an actual lawyer explained the meaning of a few sentences he was hinging his thesis on. 😂
Edmonton!
I love Canada and Canadians
I was surprised, I thought Edmonton might be a smaller place, like many cities in Wisconsin
However, from this view; it looked a bit like NYC…
Turns out 1.4M people and Fairmont is 5-Star Hotel
@nick_hellmuth busted me!
#POSITIVITY