Apparently, if 1-of-N to be honest is not required, the deposits wont be safe, since the N-of-N would collude to take the BTCs away. The 1-of-N liveness is something to avoid waiting for your request to be fulfilled.
1 of N is a misnomer. bitvm doesn’t require 1 of N to be *honest*, it requires 1 of N to be *liquid*, and able to front withdrawals in large amounts.
for example, if ethereum’s WBTC was a bitvm bridge, you’d need a 1 of N that is able to front $60m USD for the last 2 week period of real-world WBTC withdrawals.
if none of the 1-of-N can front that liquidity for that time period, users can’t withdraw. so even if 1-of-N is honest, that’s not enough, they also need to be very liquid
6. What was exposed in the process is only the ZKP in this condition, so how does the slash mechanism work with this? A PoW chain with the same condition would cost plenty of mining power at least. Thus it could be a critical drawback of PoS chains. 🤑
5. With a valid ZKP solution, we can ensure the deposit was successfully finalized on Ethereum. But what will happen if 2 ⁄ 3 validators want to be malicious now to unlock USDTs on Fantom by including another private transaction and generating a valid ZKP.
Operators should move the funds to their peg wallet on the Bitcoin chain with the preimage provided within RL2. Here, the RL2 must be much less than the RL1. The preimage can be some random bytes or a signature on it from the requester.
Last Sunday, I wrapped my research on some existing 2-way BTC peg solutions into a paper, and thought of a new way to make such a system fully decentralized, so now desiring reviews on my proposal. #Bitcoin#Layer2#review https://t.co/Nom3O5n2v1
If such a mint transaction is prepared, the user can either release the minted token by providing the pre-image to the bridge contract within time duration RL2, or cancel this request and release the funds on the Bitcoin chain after RL1 elapses.
So that, the liquidation will still be fulfilled as the pool will compensate for the loss of the possible profits of arbitrators. After fulfilled, the new peg-ins can continue and the system will resume even when the price of layer 2 tokens is still lower than before.
However, it's still unacceptable for such a peg to suffer this. An extra insurance should be setup to hold the bottom of these peg-BTC. A funding pool of layer 2 token can be reserved by the governance of the layer 2 chain to achieve this
Last Sunday, I wrapped my research on some existing 2-way BTC peg solutions into a paper, and thought of a new way to make such a system fully decentralized, so now desiring reviews on my proposal. #Bitcoin#Layer2#review https://t.co/Nom3O5n2v1