Alexander Titov

Lecturer in Modern European History, @QUBelfast: everything about Russia, its history, politics & foreign policy. An ounce of history is worth a pound of logic.

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

Some thoughts on Putin's motives behind the invasion of Ukraine.

There's a well-established pattern here. It looks irrational only if you value economy and well-being over great power nationalism and security.

The Kremlin has different priorities.

https://t.co/34KH79Rk0W

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

My interview about the G7 summit and Russia. The question was why the Europeans weren't at the negotiating table. The reason is simple - they don't really want to negotiate but want the Kremlin to accept their and Ukraine's demands. The rest is just noise.
https://t.co/fZ1zjtmktc

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

La mia intervista sul Fatto Quotidiano

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

I'm in Beijing for a couple of weeks now which overlapped with both Trump's and Putin’s visits here.
Some thoughts on the Sino-Russian relations and what multipolar world actually means in practice.
https://t.co/ikNFlSYMfY

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

Takes like this betray a complete misunderstaning of Russia's foreign policy priorities.
The only country Moscow would fight to save is Belarus - an absolutely essential, strategic ally.
Distant second is Kazakhstan but this would depend on circumstances - their relations are important but not as close.
Even the rest of ex-Soviet republics are not its top priorities. To talk of 'losing' Venezuala or Cuba as a humiliation for Russia is totally misguided - they are a nice accidental partners, but hardly essential.
Iran is more important as a strategically independent anti-Western power, but only if it is capable of remaining a great power itself. Moscow knows it cannot keep Iran a great power through aid alone, but can only provide marginal support.

As Trump Out-Putins Putin, Russia’s Global Influence Erodes https://t.co/JQ7SxuxdLj

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

Just published my take on the fourth anniversary of the war in Ukraine: after four years of war, exhaustion on both sides is the main hope for peace
https://t.co/KZTeo8cYY9
via @ConversationUK

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

Some more thoughts on the war anniversary, this time in a TV interview format
https://t.co/51CeK2JBOq via @YouTube

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

Just published my take on the fourth anniversary of the war in Ukraine: after four years of war, exhaustion on both sides is the main hope for peace
https://t.co/KZTeo8cYY9
via @ConversationUK

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

Some thoughts on negotiators from Russia, Ukraine, US begin talks in UAE https://t.co/6CU8tkL9Hu

Bottom line, I'm very sceptical that any real breakthrough is possible, because neither Russia nor Ukraine is in a bad enough position to accept a deal they don't like.

[Queen's University Belfast 🎓 @QUBelfast]

Happy birthday everyone! We’re 180 today.

In 1845, Queen’s College Belfast was founded by Queen Victoria, alongside our sister colleges in Cork and Galway.

By 1849, we had 3 administration staff, 20 professors and 195 students.

In 1908, Queen's College Belfast became Queen's University Belfast and we’ve come a long way since then.

Now we have over 4,500 staff and over 26,000 students from more than 120 countries.

Plus, we’re the 2nd oldest university in Ireland and the 9th oldest university in the UK.

So, thank you to all our students, staff, alumni and friends of Queen’s who have made this the special place we all know and love today.

Here’s to the next 180 years!

Check out even more fascinating and historic moments in our timeline: https://t.co/uwcTyUoS5F

#LoveQUB | #LoveQUB180 | #NorthernIreland | #Ireland | #Belfast | #Galway | #Cork

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

Quick update on the peace negotiations with Ukraine, which are apparently '90% ready'.

https://t.co/Cx5dq6ayw9

Even without the question of territories, I very much doubt that key issues have actually been resolved. The devil is always in the detail, and, for example, the Europeans, Ukrainians and Russians have profoundly different ideas about what they have 'agreed to' with the Americans on things like security guarantees.
Ukraine wants the US and its allies to go to war with Russia if it attacks again; Moscow, however, is adamant that Ukraine stays neutral, with no foreign troops or weapons being supplied to Ukraine.

Regarding money, the EU is in a difficult position regardless of what it does with the frozen Russian funds. If it spends Russian money now, it will still have to spend hundreds of billions of euros on rebuilding and maintaining Ukraine after the war. And if it doesn't want to spend its own money during the war, it may find it more difficult to justify doing so afterwards, especially if Eurosceptic parties gain power in France and elsewhere.

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

A few thoughts on Trump's Ukraine-Russia deal. https://t.co/GLFT9neDM2

Ultimately, battlefield realities will be decisive in determining which 'national security interests' are prioritised in any settlement.

It's very hard to negotiate successfully when there's deep discord in Kyiv due to corruption and the frontline is crumbling, and when your biggest backer, the US, is no longer willing to support you.

The only hope for Ukraine is that the Russian economy suddenly collapses - a very long shot indeed. Dum gramen crescit, equus in moriendo quiescit: While the grass grows, the horse starves.

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

My brief interview about the latest peace proposals from the US for Ukraine. https://t.co/HGtNhF1ebw

Although it comes at the most difficult moment for Ukraine — the front is collapsing in places, Zelensky has been severely weakened by the corruption scandal, and Europe has no money to support Kyiv in the long term — it is not desperate enough to agree to a plan it does not really like.

Europe still supports Zelensky, and the Ukrainian army can retreat much further if necessary. Plus, the hope that sanctions will finally break the Russian economy keeps alive the hope of a better deal later on.

This is extremely unlikely, but that's the strategy of Ukraine and the EU — slowly retreating and hoping for a Russian economic collapse. I imagine they will try to delay the US plan by making changes that Moscow will find unacceptable, which would take everyone back to square one.

This would probably work; otherwise, the US would be forced to suspend military aid to Ukraine and accept responsibility for its defeat. In any case, if a deal on these points were to be formally agreed — which would be highly favourable to Russia — there would be plenty of opportunities to derail it during the implementation phase.

Therefore, the base scenario is for the war to continue until Moscow takes over the rest of Donbass and some other territories, which would take at least six months to a year.

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

I gave a quick update on the latest state of play in the war in an interview the other day.

https://t.co/RhyZTdsvjE

Trump has adopted the US's default policy on Russia: sanctions and threats to force Moscow to end the war on Western terms. This policy is limited by the potential impact on the oil market: if Russia is forced to sell significantly less oil, the price will rise accordingly. However, now is a very good time for that, given the current supply glut and low oil prices. It is also limited by how much the US is willing to jeopardise its relations with other powers, such as China and India, for the sake of Ukraine. For example, the US could stop all trade with China by imposing tariffs on its purchase of Russian oil, but would that really be worth it? Trump tried to use this as an excuse with India to pressure it into agreeing to a trade deal that India does not want, but so far, to no avail.

However, the biggest change Trump made was to stop US funding for Ukraine, and this policy is still in place. This puts enormous pressure on the Europeans, who are unable to replace the lost US funding with their own money without facing significant political issues at home. The British case is indicative of this problem: despite being the loudest supporter of Ukraine, the UK has not given Kyiv more than the £3.5 billion it had previously earmarked per year. This is not surprising, given that the increasingly unpopular Labour government is looking to fill a £20 billion hole in next month's budget with tax increases and welfare cuts. France cannot pass any budget at all, and I doubt Italy's coalition would survive if Meloni agreed to spend Italian money on buying weapons for Ukraine, as this would lead to the League quitting the government (and spending Italian money on weapons for Ukraine is incredibly unpopular in Italy). The Germans have already committed more than anyone else to Ukraine and cannot be the sole source of funding for Kyiv. Smaller countries such as Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands have already given an additional $2 billion to the PURL programme, which was set up to purchase US weapons using European funds.

This leaves the frozen Russian funds held in Belgium, which should provide enough funding for Ukraine for 18 months to two years. However, this option also carries costs in terms of the euro's international credibility and ultimate liability to Russia's legal claims. As there don't seem to be any alternatives, this will happen at some point. However, this would only allow Ukraine to continue for a couple more years, and it's unclear what would happen after that. This essentially sets a deadline for Ukraine and the West to achieve a breakthrough in the war or to settle it on Moscow's terms. Incidentally, this also raises the question of where the money for Ukraine will come from when the war is over. Previously, the frozen Russian funds were earmarked for Ukraine's reconstruction; now they'll be spent on the war, Europeans will also have to fund Ukraine's post-war economy and reconstruction.

As far as Moscow is concerned, it can respond to US pressure in two ways: adapting to sanctions and increasing military and economic pressure on Ukraine. Its greatest leverage remains on the battlefield, and even though progress has been slow, Russia has a plausible path to achieving its minimal war aim of seizing the rest of Donbass. The best Ukraine and the West can hope for is to freeze the conflict along the current lines of control.

With several deadlines looming, it does look like the war is in its final stretch.
Will Russia be able to defeat Ukraine militarily, or at least take over the rest of Donbass, before the sanctions have an unsustainable impact on its economy? Can Ukraine maintain the front line before it runs out of money, manpower and Western support? Either way, there's at least another year of this war left, if not more.

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

Some thoughts on the current state of the war in Ukraine: the two sides are so far apart that no compromise is possible. Ramping up serious economic pressure on Russia would mean a major trade war with China and India. It's not clear that Ukraine is worth it, even for the EU, let alone the US.

Real negotiations can only begin if and when Moscow captures the whole of Donbass, its key war aim. Ukraine thinks it can exhaust Russia before that happens, Moscow is confident of winning on the battle field regardless. Nothing will shift until one side is proven wrong.

https://t.co/6VCbmu6PLK via @YouTube

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

So, the two core issues emerging from Trump's talks with Putin and Zelensky/Europeans are territory in Donbas and security guarantees for Ukraine.

Politically and psychologically, it would be easier for Zelensky to lose control of the remaining part of Donbas in a military defeat than to give it up voluntarily. Conversely, Putin cannot end the war without securing the entire Donbas region. Whatever happens, the fighting there will continue.

Regarding security guarantees, the Europeans and Zelensky are proposing a de facto military alliance with Ukraine involving the US. They call this a 'light' version of Article 5, but this is essentially an oxymoron (Article 5 of the NATO treaty is supposed to mean an automatic military response from all NATO members if one of them is under attack). However, if the response is not automatic, as implied by the 'light' adjective, it becomes a political decision on whether and to what extent to get involved if Ukraine is attacked. If it's a political decision, it's no different to the current situation — nothing is stopping the 'coalition of the willing' from sending troops into Ukraine right now. Nothing except the fear of direct military conflict with Russia. If they're afraid now, why wouldn't they be in the future? As for US involvement, it has been clear and consistent policy of every US administration, including Biden's, that there would be no direct military clash with Russia over Ukraine. It's hard to imagine this changing now. Without US protection, the Europeans are too afraid to enter Ukraine alone.

Finally, this doesn't even address Moscow's concerns. They have consistently said that any troops from NATO member states would be unacceptable. There is no reason for Moscow to abandon its core war aim of preventing NATO from expanding into Ukraine. Instead, Moscow has suggested that China could be one of the security guarantors for Ukraine, essentially reviving the Istanbul draft from 2022 which contained similar ideas. This would essentially be akin to the Budapest Memorandum, which neither Ukraine nor the Europeans are willing to accept.

Negotiations may continue, and a trilateral meeting is even possible, though I doubt Putin would agree to this without first securing Donbas. However, these two fundamental issues make any deal highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.

https://t.co/R7OOy6cV91

[Alexander Titov @TitovAlexander]

I was in good company on Al Jazeera's Inside Story, where we discussed the upcoming Trump-Putin summit.
https://t.co/f5YG7Lw4wE

There’s so much noise and speculation in the media about it that it’s probably not worth commenting on the details, but some structural elements are clear. The four main parties involved in this conflict are Ukraine, the Europeans (i.e. the key EU countries and the UK), the US and Russia.

What’s remarkable is that the previous unity among the West has disappeared. Under Trump, the US is pursuing its own policies on this war, which are not always coordinated with the Europeans or Ukraine. The US's motives seem clear. Firstly, there is the 'Make America Great Again' sentiment adopted by Trump, which is that the US should no longer spend its own money on wars. 'We’re done with funding the war in Ukraine,' as JD Vance said yesterday.

On the other hand, there is the view of the US foreign policy establishment that Russia must be contained or punished. This view is held by people like Lindsey Graham and virtually all media commentators. This view overlaps with Trump’s newly unleashed power to use arbitrary US tariffs to bully the rest of the world.

The first problem was solved when Trump forced the Europeans to start paying for US weapons for Ukraine, which were previously funded by the US themselves. It is very doubtful that the Europeans will ever match this, given that they still have to continue paying their own share of funding Ukraine, which was actually larger than the American contribution. But they had no choice but to agree.

The second issue is the use of secondary sanctions against Russia, which effectively means punishing third countries for doing business with Russia. It’s uncertain whether this will work against India and it certainly won’t work against China (Trump has just signed a 90-day tariff truce with China; it would be strange if he broke it for the sake of Ukraine). In any case, this won’t pressure Moscow into making unilateral concessions as it has adapted too much to the sanctions. However, the temptation to use sanctions is strong in the US.

The Europeans are left clueless and confused by what Trump might do. Their own plan essentially boils down to imposing more sanctions and continuing the war until Russia breaks. This is clearly a futile strategy, as Russia has grown stronger over the past two years, gaining the upper hand on the battlefield despite everything the West could throw at it. However, the problem for the Europeans is that they cannot admit defeat. Unlike Trump, they are committed to the idea of achieving total victory over Russia. The best they can do is push for an unconditional ceasefire, simply because Ukraine is in such dire straits. However, no compromise with Russia is being discussed in terms of territorial recognition, NATO membership or lifting sanctions.

Ukraine is desperate to keep the US on its side and Zelensky’s thinking is similar to that of Europe: increase sanctions pressure on Russia until it breaks and, in the meantime, agree a full, unconditional ceasefire to prevent the Ukrainian army from collapsing.

Moscow is going into these talks with a very strong hand. The momentum on the battlefield is on Moscow’s side; even Zelensky now acknowledges that there is no military path to achieving even the minimal war aim of recovering territories lost since 2022. Against this background, Putin wants to see how much he can achieve through diplomacy with Trump, in terms of gaining more territory, especially in the Donbas region, as well as achieving his other key war aims, such as Ukraine's neutrality, limitations on the army and Russian language rights. The Kremlin would be happy to secure the rest of Donbas through a deal with Trump, but if not, the Russian leadership is confident it can retake it by force.

Ultimately, military pressure is Moscow's only leverage against Kyiv and the West, and it is simply inconceivable that it would give it up without getting most of what it wants first. This is why a ceasefire before serious, irreversible concessions are made by Ukraine and the West is exceptionally unlikely.

Moscow is also reasonably confident that it can withstand further sanctions and continue to trade with China, at the very least, and possibly with other countries too. Higher oil prices would also help. Overall, there is a perception in Moscow that time is on their side and that they can negotiate from a strong position.

This is the big nightmare for Ukraine and the rest of Europe coming true: Russia and the US negotiating the end of the war in Ukraine between themselves. Kyiv and its European allies can do very little to stop this from happening. If Zelensky rejects a deal outright, there is a risk that the US will disengage further, and Kyiv needs military supplies from the US. Europe also needs US security guarantees. They are in a very weak position to insist on anything at the moment.

My bet is that an outline of a deal favourable to Russia will be reached in Alaska, but it won't be implementable due to opposition from Ukraine and Europe. However, it could be revived a few months later when the situation on the front line worsens for Ukraine, forcing it to accept a deal it had previously rejected. At that point, though, Russian demands will most likely harden again.