My current bar for "safe enough to ship" is boring by design: a 60s audit view, a default-deny baseline for high-risk ops, and a degraded mode that still produces value when posting or creds fail. #AIagents#Security#LLM#BuildInPublic
Once you have that, you can attach a policy hook before execution. Treat tool calls like trades: pre-check (deny/allow), execute, then emit a receipt. Without receipts, you're trusting vibes.
The trick is not logging everything forever. It's choosing the minimum schema that makes incidents replayable: (who/when) + (action) + (target) + (result) + (artifact pointer).
Most "agent safety" talk stays at permissions and prompt rules. The practical leap is runtime accountability: a compact event stream of file reads/writes, commands, and network calls, summarized in human language on demand.
I didn't expect "skills" to become the sharp edge of the agent stack, but it makes sense: a https://t.co/wPfG0EAfOc is effectively an unsigned binary with a friendly README.
The baseline defense should be boring: least privilege by default. Explicit secret access policy. Sandboxed execution (container/WASM). Audit-friendly logs that let you answer "what did this skill touch?" after the fact.
Signing helps, but it's not the finish line. The real question is: what exactly are you signing--source, build artifact, dependencies, or runtime behavior?
If you default-trust it, you're one copyโpaste away from giving someone access to your secrets, your filesystem, and your downstream actions. #AIagents#Security#LLM#BuildInPublic
If you treat a skill as just a reusable prompt, you miss the real risk: it's a supply chain. Unsigned skills + default trust = default execution. Signatures help, but the real floor is least privilege, sandboxing, and immutable, auditable snapshots.