הכל "ייסגר" בהורמוז
מיצרי הורמוז נקראים על שמו של אל החוכמה והסדר הקוסמי, בפרס העתיקה. מאזן הכוחות שיתהווה בנקודת החיבור הצרה הזו בין מיתוס היסטורי לגיאוגרפיה, יקבע את תוצאות המלחמה בין ארה"ב לאיראן, וישפיע על היכולת לחלץ מטהראן פשרות בגרעין ועל הסֵדר האזורי והגלובלי.
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רוחות השינוי מנשבות בלבנון... רשת לבנונית מראיינת כתב ישראלי. מזכיר שבלבנון קיים חוק האוסר על מגעים ישירים עם ישראלים.
שאפו גדול ל-@BarakRavid ול-استقلال القرار
ההזדמנות מול לבנון היא הדברים האלה של הנשיא עון, שמשקפים שינוי עמוק בדעת הקהל בלבנון, גם אם הממשלה עדיין לא יכולה לפרק בכוח את חזבאללה. רכיב חשוב לצד פירוק ארגוני טרור מנשק הוא ניתוקם מהאוכלוסיה. חזבאללה כבר נחלש, בעקבות המהלומות שספג, כי בעבר נשיא לבנוני לא היה מעז לומר דברים כאלה.
לחובבי הז'אנר ולא רק, פרק חדש של המוסף #בשכונה_שלנו והפעם על סולטנות עומאן, מלכת הניטרליות במפרץ שבמלחמה עם איראן לקחה את הצד של משטר האייתוללות בטח בכל מה שקשור לגחמותיו במיצר הורמוז והצליחה לעצבן את טראמפ. מסע בעקבות חידת עומאן. צפייה לקראת שבת
A glimmer of hope on the #Lebanon-#Israel front…
After two disastrous days - an unproductive round of mil-mil talks last Friday and the apparent sacrifice of Lebanon on the altar of a US-#Iran deal on Monday — the political track of Lebanon-Israel negotiations ended on an unexpectedly positive note today.
This included:
— a clear, unmistakable commitment of all sides, including the USG, to separate the Leb-Isr track from Iran. This commitment will likely undergo a stress test from Qalibaf and Co, with #Qatar, #Pakistan, and #Turkey sure to audition as best supporting actors, — and it remains to be seen if the @WhiteHouse will hold firm— but the words of today’s final statement were direct and without qualification.
— an equally clear and unmistakable effort to empower the Govt of Lebanon (and not #Hezbollah, Iran or #NabihBerri) as the agent that secured a ceasefire for its people. This is important because it is viewed as a necessary precondition for the Govt of Lebanon to take firm and unprecedented steps on Hezbollah’s disarmament (or what the joint statement calls “the dismantlement of non-state armed groups”).
It is important to note that the proposed ceasefire does not actually restore the status quo ante March 2. The key difference is that Israel today controls a large swath of southern Lebanon, not just the handful of points it held three months ago; moreover, #Jerusalem has made no commitment on a timetable for withdrawal though it has reaffirmed it has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon, only security concerns. Despite this, Hezbollah is bound by the ceasefire to take no action against Israel’s open-ended presence in Lebanon. If Hezbollah keeps this restraint, it would be a huge climbdown for the IRGC proxy group.
Another key element in the ceasefire is the agreement to create agreed “pilot zones” in which the Lebanese Armed Forces would clear territory of all Hezbollah fighters and their arms. This is a hopeful innovation since there is no escaping the fact that disarming and dismantling Hezbollah is, ultimately, a Lebanese responsibility. While it would make sense for #Beirut to be the first such zone, Israel apparently agreed that these still-to-be-defined zones will be in southern Lebanon, a significant concession. How that will operate — and precisely who will provide monitoring and verification of the LAF’s performance — still need to be ironed out.
All in all, an impressively productive two days of work. To be sure, the devil is in the implementation and execution, with a huge question mark on whether the USG will hold firm if/when #Tehran tries to reclaim control of the Lebanon file. But there is no disputing the fact that the despair that hung over this track of diplomacy two days ago has given way to a still-tentative but refreshing sense of hope.
@LBpresidency@nawafsalam@IsraeliPM@SecRubio@BarakRavid
וישראל? נדחקה הצדה ללא השפעה על המו"מ, בזמן שנתניהו הפך "רעיל" בוושינגטון וזוכה להדלפות משפילות משורות הממשל. הדיאלוג והרתימה של הממשל האמריקאי קריטית לביטחון ישראל, וממשלה אחרת, אחרי הבחירות, בוודאי תזכה להרבה יותר קשב בוושינגטון, מהנוכחית.
שבת שלום
#פידכדורגל#סקאוטינגליגתהעל#סקאוטעצמאי
סקאוטינג ליגת העל חלק 2 - מגינים
ממשיכים לחפש חיזוקים לליגת העל, הפעם מגינים שה-ai סימן לי לבדיקה ועשיתי עליהם העמקה:
ניתוח עומק של @UEvental על המרכזיות של מיצרי הורמוז במו"מ בין ארה"ב לאיראן והשפעתו על האפשרות לחלץ מאיראן הישגים בתחום הגרעין.
להערכתי, ללא שינוי מהותי בתמונת המצב, ולמרות המכות הקשות שספגה, במישור האסטרטגי הרחב איראן שיפרה את מצבה - הוכיחה את יכולת ההיזק שלה לכלכלה העולמית ולמדינות המפרץ, שרדה מתקפות מצד הצבא החזק בעולם והצבא החזק במזה"ת והצליחה (לפחות לעת עתה) לייצב את שורות המשטר.
יתרה מכך, קשה לראות תרחיש בו איראן מסכימה לוותר על נדבכים משמעותיים בפרויקט הגרעין. גם אם (ויש ספק גדול) יושג הסכם להוצאת/השמדת 440 ק"ג האורניום המועשר ל-60%, צריך לחכות האם ומתי הוא ימומד בפועל.
כפי שטראמפ עצמו אמר, איראן מעולם לא ניצחה מלחמה, אבל מעולם לא הפסידה מו"מ...
הכל "ייסגר" בהורמוז
מיצרי הורמוז נקראים על שמו של אל החוכמה והסדר הקוסמי, בפרס העתיקה. מאזן הכוחות שיתהווה בנקודת החיבור הצרה הזו בין מיתוס היסטורי לגיאוגרפיה, יקבע את תוצאות המלחמה בין ארה"ב לאיראן, וישפיע על היכולת לחלץ מטהראן פשרות בגרעין ועל הסֵדר האזורי והגלובלי.
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It’s Hormuz, stupid
The Strait of Hormuz is named after the god of wisdom and cosmic order in ancient Persia. The balance of power that emerges at this narrow point of connection between historical myth and geography will determine the outcome of the war between the United States and Iran, and will affect the ability to extract nuclear concessions from Tehran, as well as the regional and global order.
The interim agreement, an achievement for Iran
The emerging agreement between the United States and Iran is divided into two main stages. In the first, the mutual blockade is supposed to be lifted - Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the American blockade of Iran’s ports - and freedom of navigation is to be restored. In the second, a 60-day window for negotiations on the nuclear issue will open.
The agreement demonstrates that Iran’s asymmetric use of the blockade of Hormuz and its fire on energy infrastructure in the Gulf states achieved its goal: stopping the war without making substantial political concessions to the United States, and without negotiating under fire.
Beyond the nuclear issue, the war aims that the United States and Israel loaded onto it - toppling the Iranian regime, imposing restrictions on Iran’s missile program, and ending Iran’s support for its proxies in the Middle East - were unrealistic or unnecessary, and are included neither in the interim agreement nor in the negotiations that will follow.
Regime change in Iran was not only wishful thinking, setting it as a war aim caused significant damage: it allowed the Iranian regime to claim victory simply by remaining on its feet; it pushed the regime into an existential-war mode, with its back against the wall, while undermining its trust in negotiations to end the war; it tied down intelligence and firepower resources during the campaign; and, most problematic, it damaged Israel’s standing in the United States - already at a low point in American public opinion - against the backdrop of claims that Israel dragged America into a war based on an illusion.
Forcing restrictions on Iran’s missile array is about as unrealistic as demanding that Israel give up its air force, or limit the range of its aircraft. Ending Iran’s support for its proxies is a goal that is difficult to measure and monitor, and is less urgent after we have already demonstrated the ability to strike them severely and reduce the threat they pose.
So what remains? The nuclear issue. That is indeed a critical objective, and one worth fighting for. It is not surprising that preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons became President Trump’s central objective in the war, after a brief "flirtation" with the idea of regime change. But the depth of the concessions that can be extracted from Iran on the nuclear issue has become dependent on... Hormuz.
The hand on the valve
The asymmetric move Iran initiated to block the Strait of Hormuz, in an attempt to offset the military superiority of the United States and Israel, succeeded far beyond what it had expected. After three months, it became clear that control of Hormuz is equivalent to having a hand on the valve of the global economy.
Without the ability to supply the global market, through bypass routes and increased production, with a substitute for more than half of the 20 million barrels of oil that normally passed through Hormuz every day, global oil reserves are gradually being depleted. This could shake the global economy and lead, within a short time, to a non-linear rise in oil and gas prices.
Iran has realized that it holds a powerful lever of pressure, and it does not intend to give it up or return to the status quo ante in the Strait of Hormuz. Such control would enable Iran to hold the Gulf states hostage, as they depend on the strait for energy exports, while also threatening the Asian and European countries that consume that energy.
Moreover, such a reality would shake the norms of freedom of navigation in international waters, and could have ripple effects on maritime "chokepoints" from Bab al-Mandab to the Strait of Malacca. The United States would lose the credit it has gained as the dominant superpower in the Middle East over the past two years, in a way that could embolden China vis-à-vis Taiwan and Russia vis-à-vis Europe.
Under these circumstances, control of Hormuz would turn Iran into a force that must be reckoned with at the regional and global levels, and it would be very difficult to extract substantial nuclear concessions from it. Iran will be able to translate control of the strait into major revenues, making it harder to pressure it economically, especially after the war also demonstrated the complexity of the military lever.
The Hormuz test
The central test for the United States in implementing the interim agreement will be its ability to remove Iran’s hand from the Hormuz valve. In the short term, the parallel blockade imposed by the United States on Iran hurts the regime, probably more than the global economy. That is one of the reasons the regime insisted on resolving this issue already in the initial agreement.
If traffic in the international waters of Hormuz resumes without disruption and without Iranian oversight (which will not happen immediately), let alone the collection of "protection fees," Iran will effectively lose its leverage, after the United States enforced the equation that "if Iran shuts things down, Iran itself will be shut down." But it is not as simple as it sounds...
Because it is much easier to disrupt maritime traffic in the strait than to reopen it, the United States, preferably at the head of an international coalition, will be required to keep a large naval force in the area. That force will have to ensure that Iran cannot shut down the strait every other day, and that the failure that allowed Iran to close it in the first place during the war does not repeat itself.
If Iran insists on exercising a certain degree of sovereignty over the straits, the United States will face a decision on whether to enforce passage through them by force. This is already happening, as most of the incidents violating the ceasefire between Iran and the United States are taking place in the maritime arena, around freedom of navigation in Hormuz.
A scenario of armed confrontation in Hormuz could bring back the Iranian threat against energy infrastructure in the Gulf states, and here another equation is needed: an attack on energy facilities in the Gulf = an attack on energy facilities in Iran. This, too, of course, is not as simple as it sounds...
Bottom line
The interim agreement is supposed to launch negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program for a period of 60 days, which will likely be extended and push the crisis beyond the U.S. elections [November]. In practice, before the parties enter into bargaining over the nuclear issue, they will be busy shaping the rules of the game in Hormuz.
The United States will struggle to achieve gains in the nuclear negotiations in the face of Iran’s rigid positions, but the chances for success will certainly plummet if it allows Iran to manage maritime traffic in the strait. In such a situation, it will also lose its dominance in the region and its deterrence power in the world, and Trump will only be able to dream of normalization in the Middle East.
And Israel? It was pushed aside, with no influence over the negotiations, while Netanyahu has become "toxic" in Washington and is the target of humiliating leaks from within the administration. Dialogue with the United States and the ability to mobilize its support are critical to Israel’s security, and a different government, after the elections, would certainly receive far greater attention in Washington than the current one.
Shabbat Shalom
וישראל? נדחקה הצדה ללא השפעה על המו"מ, בזמן שנתניהו הפך "רעיל" בוושינגטון וזוכה להדלפות משפילות משורות הממשל. הדיאלוג והרתימה של הממשל האמריקאי קריטית לביטחון ישראל, וממשלה אחרת, אחרי הבחירות, בוודאי תזכה להרבה יותר קשב בוושינגטון, מהנוכחית.
שבת שלום
הכל "ייסגר" בהורמוז
מיצרי הורמוז נקראים על שמו של אל החוכמה והסדר הקוסמי, בפרס העתיקה. מאזן הכוחות שיתהווה בנקודת החיבור הצרה הזו בין מיתוס היסטורי לגיאוגרפיה, יקבע את תוצאות המלחמה בין ארה"ב לאיראן, וישפיע על היכולת לחלץ מטהראן פשרות בגרעין ועל הסֵדר האזורי והגלובלי.
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ארה"ב תתקשה לגרוף הישגים במו"מ על הגרעין, בצל עמדותיה הנוקשות של איראן, אבל הסיכוי לכך בוודאי יצנח אם תאפשר לאיראן לנהל את התנועה הימית במיצרים. במצב כזה, היא גם תאבד גם את הדומיננטיות שלה באזור, ואת כושר ההרתעה שלה בעולם, וטראמפ יוכל רק לחלום על נורמליזציה במזה"ת.
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