Naomi

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@NkirukaNistoran The SW is running a regional agenda which is largely tribalistic.
All these Obi supporters Dey play say North no go chase its own agenda in 2027.
Obi can win SE and stay there. AA will chase a Northern agenda.

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@idofoi This one dey comment ?
Just yesterday he was Atiku’s unofficial spokesperson.
This one craves attention to have attention!
Shior!

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@ishaqsamaila5 Clearly . Parawo !!

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@oMoTonsore Prince Adeyemi sef dey dance . 😹

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@oMoTonsore We prefer Better Life for Rural Women .

Carry your IYa back to the State!

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@oMoTonsore Atikulate here !
😹😹😹😹

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@OlayinkaLere He appoints defamers !
In fact the quickest way into his Government is to defame him, break laws , steal and learn 419.
Beni !

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@dmightyangel We went from better life for rural women to this bush mentality and mess.
Carry your IYA back the State abeg!

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@KemPatriot All the bandits are in Aso rock !

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

* Payments are still reactive, not fully systematic
* Many pensioners depend on periodic “clearing exercises”
* State-level pension arrears remain a structural crisis
* Inflation means arrears often lose real value by the time they are paid

ELECTIONS Koh ?

Tinubu must go !!!!
It’s urgent !

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@abdullahayofel

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@jibreelKhalil APC must go !!!

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

Photo operations go tire una .

Here is a critical, balanced appraisal of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and its current impact (as of mid-2026).

⸻

1. Core reality: ECOWAS today

ECOWAS is a regional integration bloc of 15 West African states originally designed in 1975 to promote:

* economic integration
* free movement of people and goods
* regional peace and security cooperation

But in practice today, it is increasingly split between:

* integration ambition (economic union model)
* fragmentation pressures (security crises + coups + exit threats)

⸻

2. Economic impact (mixed performance)

Positive contributions

A. Free movement of people

* ECOWAS protocol still allows visa-free or simplified travel
* This has significantly improved:
* informal cross-border trade
* labour mobility (Nigeria–Ghana–Benin corridor especially)

👉 This remains ECOWAS’s strongest functioning achievement

⸻

B. Trade facilitation (partial success)

* Reduction of tariffs in some corridors
* ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS)
* Growth of regional trade networks in:
* agriculture
* cement
* telecoms
* informal markets

⸻

Limitations

A. Low intra-regional trade

* Intra-ECOWAS trade remains ~10–15% of total trade
* Compare:
* EU: ~60%
* ASEAN: ~25–30%

👉 ECOWAS is still structurally under-integrated

⸻

B. Infrastructure bottlenecks

* Poor rail/road integration
* Border delays and corruption checkpoints
* Energy and logistics fragmentation

👉 Economic integration is policy-declared but infrastructure-constrained

⸻

3. Political impact (declining cohesion)

A. Rise of military governments (major disruption)

Recent coups and instability in:

* Mali
* Burkina Faso
* Niger

have seriously weakened ECOWAS authority.

Key consequence:

* ECOWAS is no longer seen as a fully unified political authority

⸻

B. Withdrawal of Sahel states

Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have:

* announced withdrawal or suspension from ECOWAS frameworks
* formed alternative bloc: AES (Alliance of Sahel States)

👉 This is the biggest structural fracture in ECOWAS history

⸻

C. Sanctions policy backlash

ECOWAS has used:

* sanctions
* border closures
* diplomatic isolation

But results are mixed:

* short-term pressure sometimes works
* long-term resentment is growing
* populations often suffer more than elites

⸻

4. Security impact (partial effectiveness)

A. Peacekeeping role

ECOWAS has deployed forces in:

* Liberia (historic success)
* Sierra Leone
* The Gambia (2017 intervention against Jammeh)

👉 These remain major success stories

⸻

B. Current security crisis: Sahel insurgency

Today ECOWAS struggles with:

* jihadist expansion (ISIS-Sahel, JNIM)
* weak state control in rural zones
* border insecurity spillovers into coastal states

Problem:

* ECOWAS has no standing unified army
* relies on ad-hoc coalitions

⸻

5. Institutional weaknesses (core critique)

A. Over-dependence on Nigeria

* Nigeria provides the bulk of:
* funding
* military weight
* political influence

👉 This creates imbalance and resentment

⸻

B. Enforcement gap

ECOWAS has:

* strong legal frameworks
* weak enforcement capacity

Example:

* election monitoring reports often lack consequences
* court rulings sometimes ignored

⸻

C. Elite-driven integration

ECOWAS is often:

* state-centric
* elite-negotiated
* weakly connected to grassroots economies

⸻

6. Strategic appraisal (big picture)

ECOWAS strengths

* One of Africa’s oldest regional blocs
* Strong free movement framework
* Proven peace intervention history
* Important diplomatic platform

⸻

ECOWAS weaknesses

* Fragmenting political unity
* Weak trade integration outcomes
* Rising security fragmentation (Sahel split)
* Dependence on Nigeria
* Limited institutional enforcement power

⸻

ECOWAS trajectory (2026 reality)

ECOWAS is currently in a transition stress phase:

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@Tenoverten101 APC must go !

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

Here’s a clear breakdown of the three issues you asked about regarding Nigeria’s Nasarawa lithium processing plant (Diamond New Energy project):

⸻

1. Who owns and financed the plant?

The plant is owned and developed by Diamond New Energy Company Ltd.

Ownership structure (what reports consistently show)

* Lead operator: Diamond New Energy (private company)
* Key investors: Chinese-linked battery and materials firms are strongly associated with the project (through equipment supply, technical partnership, and financing arrangements)
* Government role: Nasarawa State Government provided support in land access and enabling environment

Financing reality

Most reporting indicates a foreign-led financing model, typically:

* Chinese industrial capital (battery supply chain firms)
* Private equity / corporate mining investment
* Nigerian state facilitation rather than majority funding

👉 In practical terms, this is part of a broader pattern in Africa’s lithium sector:

Chinese firms often fund and build processing plants close to mining sites to secure battery supply chains.

⸻

2. Does Nigeria have enough lithium to sustain the plant?

Short answer: Nigeria has lithium, but supply is uncertain at this scale.

Nigeria does have confirmed lithium deposits in:

* Nasarawa
* Kwara
* Kogi
* Ekiti
* Osun
* Kaduna

However, key constraints are:

(a) Most deposits are not fully quantified

* Nigeria has identified deposits, not fully proven large-scale reserves
* Geological surveys are still incomplete in many regions

(b) Artisanal mining dominates supply

* Much lithium is currently mined by small-scale informal miners
* Supply is inconsistent and difficult to regulate (and sometimes illegal)

(c) Infrastructure gap

* Processing plants require:
* steady ore supply
* reliable electricity
* transport logistics
These are still developing in mining regions

👉 So while Nigeria has lithium potential, experts generally see a risk of feedstock shortage if industrial mining doesn’t scale quickly.

⸻

3. Is it truly the largest lithium processing plant in West Africa?

According to government and multiple reports:

Yes — it is described as:

* Nigeria’s largest lithium processing plant
* and “one of the largest in West Africa” or “West Africa’s largest”

But there’s an important nuance:

* The 6,000 metric tonnes per day capacity figure is what drives the “largest” claim
* However:
* West Africa has few comparable industrial lithium processing facilities currently operating
* Some other projects in Ghana, Mali, and Zimbabwe-linked supply chains exist, but are not directly comparable at full scale processing level

👉 So the claim is plausible but marketing-sensitive:

* It is likely among the largest installed or commissioned plants
* But “largest” depends on whether you compare:
* installed capacity vs actual production
* processing plant vs mining-only operations

⸻

Bottom line

* Ownership: Diamond New Energy with strong Chinese industrial investment influence
* Supply: Nigeria has lithium, but not yet proven at the scale needed for full continuous operation
* Scale claim: Likely one of the largest in West Africa, but benchmarking is not fully transparent yet

⸻

If you want, I can break down something more interesting next:

*  how China’s battery giants quietly structure these deals in Africa
* or  whether Nigeria could realistically become a lithium-to-battery exporter like Chile or Indonesia

Just tell me.

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

Maryam Babangida (born Maria Ndidi Okogwu) was Nigeria’s First Lady from 1985 to 1993, during the military administration of her husband, Ibrahim Babangida. She is widely regarded as the person who transformed the role of Nigeria’s First Lady from a largely ceremonial position into one with an active public policy and social development agenda.

Early life

* Born on 1 November 1948 in Asaba.
* Her father was an Igbo from Asaba, while her mother was of Hausa heritage from present-day Niger State.
* She attended Queen Amina College in Kaduna and later obtained qualifications in secretarial studies and computer science, including a diploma from La Salle Extension University in Chicago.

Marriage and family

She married Ibrahim Babangida in 1969, before he rose to become Nigeria’s military ruler. They had four children: Mohammed, Aminu, Aisha, and Halima. According to Babangida’s 2025 autobiography, their relationship began in Kaduna, and he later described her as “the pillar” of his personal and professional life.

Better Life Programme

Maryam Babangida’s most enduring legacy is the Better Life Programme for Rural Women, launched in 1987.

The programme aimed to:

* Improve rural women’s access to education and skills.
* Promote agricultural cooperatives.
* Support small businesses and cottage industries.
* Increase access to healthcare and social services.
* Encourage women’s participation in community development.

The initiative inspired thousands of women’s cooperatives across Nigeria and later evolved into the Better Life Program for the African Rural Woman, which continues today under new leadership.

Changing the role of First Lady

Maryam Babangida established a model that many later Nigerian First Ladies followed. She:

* Launched nationwide social programmes.
* Represented Nigeria at international events.
* Mobilized support for women’s development.
* Helped establish the Maryam Babangida National Centre for Women’s Development in Abuja in 1993.

Fashion and public image

She became one of Nigeria’s most recognizable public figures. Newspapers referred to the “Maryam Phenomenon” because of her influence on:

* Fashion.
* Public speaking.
* Charity work.
* The public visibility of First Ladies.

Many credit her with making the office of First Lady a prominent institution in Nigerian public life.

Criticisms

Her legacy is also debated.

Critics argue that:

* Her public programmes helped improve the image of the Babangida military government during a period marked by economic hardship under structural adjustment policies.
* The Better Life Programme emphasized women’s roles as wives and mothers rather than advocating broader feminist reforms.
* Some scholars viewed the programme as too closely associated with the government and the First Lady’s public image.

Supporters, however, contend that the programme delivered tangible benefits through literacy initiatives, health programmes, agricultural support, and income-generating opportunities for rural women.

Death

Maryam Babangida died on 27 December 2009 in Los Angeles after complications from ovarian cancer. She was 61 years old. Her death prompted tributes across Nigeria, where she is still remembered as one of the country’s most influential First Ladies.

Overall, Maryam Babangida remains a significant figure in Nigerian history. Admirers credit her with advancing rural women’s development and redefining the public role of the First Lady, while critics argue that her initiatives should be understood within the broader political context of the Babangida military era.

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@oMoTonsore We miss Maryam Abacha
Maryam Babangida

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@Big_marvis Fraudsters 😹
Bandits 😹
Na your Papa be this his oh eeee

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

@itstiigii The aesthetics is hardly presidential . Yuc !

[Naomi @UpandAbout771]

Reno Omokri’s position on Bola Tinubu’s Chicago issues has changed over time, and it’s useful to distinguish between what he said before 2023 and after.

Before the 2023 election

Reno Omokri was one of Tinubu’s strongest critics. He said he had visited Chicago State University and claimed the university confirmed that:

* Tinubu attended and graduated from the university.
* Therefore, allegations that Tinubu never attended CSU were false.
* However, Omokri argued that questions remained about the certificate submitted to Nigeria’s electoral commission (INEC) and that those questions should be investigated.

He repeatedly argued that there was a distinction between:

* Attendance and graduation (which he accepted), and
* The authenticity of the certificate presented to INEC, which he questioned.

On the 1993 Chicago forfeiture case

Before later aligning politically with Tinubu, Omokri frequently cited the U.S. civil forfeiture case involving about US$460,000, arguing it reflected negatively on Tinubu’s fitness for office. He referred to court documents and criticized Tinubu over the issue in speeches and social media posts. Those statements have since been widely recirculated in political debates.

After Tinubu became President

Reno Omokri’s public stance shifted significantly. He became supportive of Tinubu on many policy issues and later accepted appointment as one of Nigeria’s ambassadors under Tinubu’s administration. This change has led critics to point to his earlier statements and question the consistency of his views.

In summary

Reno Omokri has expressed both of these positions at different times:

* He said Tinubu did attend and graduate from Chicago State University, based on his inquiries there.
* He also argued that the certificate controversy and the 1993 U.S. civil forfeiture case raised serious questions about Tinubu before the 2023 election.

His subsequent support for Tinubu has made these earlier statements a recurring subject of political debate in Nigeria.