Terribly sad news. Sergey @Skvern0 left this world. He was one of the best APT hunters, absolutely passioned about fighting cybercrime. His YARA training was always sold out! And he was a GReAT person and friend
Goodnight, mr. Alice. You’ll be missed. Rest in peace my friend 💔
#iosTriangulation’s binary validator and @2igosha telling the most interesting details of investigation. Will we see those four 0days used? 🤔
#TheSAS2023
Our next blogpost on #iOSTriangulation (https://t.co/OnjtckIn5i) is finally out. Today we are ready to share details about the final payload used in the attack, which is a #spyware implant that we dubbed #TriangleDB@bzvr_@2igosha [1/3]
Hey everyone, this is my first tweet! We identified a backdoor we dubbed #Gopuram, the final payload in the #3CX attack. The threat actor (likely to be Lazarus) has deployed it to cryptocurrency companies. More details in this thread and on Securelist (https://t.co/dyR4788HYm)
Besides that we've analyzed how CVE-2022-27228 (Remote Code Execution in Bitrix CMS “Polls, Votes” module) affected ICS computers in Russia, Belarus and Central Asia. Which is also quite interesting
We made a report "Threat landscape for industrial automation systems" in H2 2022.
We decided to show statistical changes in ICS threat landscape for Russia separately from the rest of the world - one of the most interesting data
Here's a full report https://t.co/8iFKQaqr8d
Together with GReAT we've prepared an analysis of various activities that were observed in cyberspace in relation to the military conflict in Ukraine.
Did a cyberwar happen? This is a simple question with a very complicated answer
https://t.co/U0iPgdGNXg
Here are some of the tricks and methods I have seen used to gain that all important initial access to remote systems. Specifically, the unexpected and unusual tricks!
https://t.co/fjRc6YHYbP
We've prepared ICS Cybersecurity predictions for 2023+
Ideologically and politically motivated insiders, degrading communications between law enforcement, failing trust relationships in supply chains for both products and services(including OEM)
https://t.co/OV0K0C3dfY
“Truss’s mobile phone number…was for sale on the internet, along with those of 25 Cabinet Ministers. They could be accessed on a shady US website charging just £6.49 for access to the information”