Here's the powerful reaction of a British man living in India to the sharp and exponential rise in racist attacks against Indians in the United Kingdom over the past few years.
As a British man living in India, here this guy tells the uncomfortable truth to racists d1pshits back home in United Kingdom.
He says -
The people whose country was colonized, looted, and starved
treat me with more dignity
than many British people treat brown citizens in their own country
No abuse.
No hatred.
No “go back to where you came from.”
Meanwhile in Britain — brown skin is still enough to trigger rage, paranoia, and racist fantasies about “invasions” and “replacement.”
That contrast should be embarrassing.
It should be studied.
It should end conversations — but it won’t.
Because empire didn’t just steal land and wealth.
It trained people to punch down
and call it patriotism.
Watch.
Sit with the discomfort.
Then tell me who really needs to “move on.”
You created them. Every single one of those NEETs is a product of your former party's choices. The ones you made while you were in Cabinet.
Adult education and apprenticeship spending: 25% lower in 2024-25 than when your former party took office (IFS, Nuffield Foundation).
Publicly funded adult further education courses: fell from 5.4 million in 2004 to 1.7 million by the time you left office. A 70% reduction, the majority of it on your watch (IFS, January 2026).
College funding per student: 11% lower in real terms than 2010. Sixth-form funding per student: 23% lower (IFS, January 2025).
Adults taking qualifications at GCSE level and below: down 50%. At A-level equivalent: down 33% (IFS, Nuffield Foundation).
Intermediate apprenticeship starts, the entry-level route for young people without degrees: collapsed from 200,000 in 2010 to fewer than 50,000 by 2020. Your government did that (IFS).
Youth services: cut by 70% since 2010 (Mind, Big Mental Health Report 2025) .
You had 14 years to invest in British young people. You cut adult education by 25%. You cut FE courses by 70%. You cut college funding. You cut sixth-form funding. You cut apprenticeships for the people who needed them most. You cut youth services. Then you left office and started tweeting bollocks about NEETs as though they materialised from thin air.
The £5,000 Reeves is offering is a reimbursement of the Immigration Skills Charge, a levy your own government introduced in 2017 to fund domestic skills training. You created the charge. You collected the money. And you still cut the training budget by 25%.
And these visas are for high-skilled workers: doctors, engineers, specialists in fields where your 14 years of cuts left a workforce gap so deep that British employers cannot fill it domestically. They are not competing with NEETs. They are filling holes your government drilled.
You were Home Secretary. You were Attorney General. You sat in Cabinet while all of this happened. You do not get to set the house on fire and then complain about the smoke.
Sources:
Adult education and apprenticeship spending 25% below 2010 levels: Institute for Fiscal Studies / Nuffield Foundation, October 2022 (https://t.co/ptZIX5c4b8)
Adult FE courses fell from 5.4 million to 1.7 million (70% reduction): Institute for Fiscal Studies, January 2026 (https://t.co/ViEuIX7qIj)
College funding per student 11% lower, sixth-form funding 23% lower: Institute for Fiscal Studies, Annual Report on Education Spending in England, January 2025, cited in House of Commons Library (https://t.co/c6qLKyCyjA)
Adults taking Level 2 qualifications down 50%, Level 3 down 33%: Institute for Fiscal Studies / Nuffield Foundation (https://t.co/1veNy8CJcY)
Intermediate apprenticeship starts collapsed from 200,000 to fewer than 50,000: Institute for Fiscal Studies / Nuffield Foundation, same source as above
Youth services cut by 70% since 2010: Mind, Big Mental Health Report 2025 (https://t.co/zTQbfpIdQq)
Immigration Skills Charge Regulations 2017: (https://t.co/IcciQZPTer)
Skills policy and apprenticeship data: House of Commons Library (https://t.co/trQjEw6FEZ)
Immigration Skills Charge parliamentary debate: Hansard, 21 March 2017 (https://t.co/yD8OvAthBl)
Nigel Farage took £585,000 from GB News. His MPs declared another £770,000. Four billionaires have spent £170 million building the media machine putting Reform in your living room every night.
Today the Guardian exposed them and what they expect in return. This is a political project funded from the top.
#ReformUK #NigelFarage #GBNews
@Steve_Laws_ Voters should remember Kemi & Nigel couldn’t wait to commit our soldiers to keep the senile orange happy, no matter their backtracking once they saw public sentiment.
Three weeks into the war with Iran, a number of observations as someone who spent years war-gaming this scenario.
1. The U.S. and Israel may have produced regime transition in the worst possible way.
Ali Khamenei was 86 and had survived multiple bouts of prostate cancer. His death in the coming years would likely have triggered a real internal reckoning in Iran, potentially opening the door to somewhat more pragmatic leadership, especially after the protests and crackdown last month. Instead, the regime made its most consequential decision under existential external threat giving the hardliners a clear upperhand. Now we appear to have a successor who is 30 years younger, deeply tied to the IRGC, and radicalized by the war itself – including the killing of family members. Disastrous.
2. About seven years ago at CNAS, I helped convene a group of security, energy, and economic experts to walk through scenarios for a U.S.--Iran war and the implications for global oil prices. What we’re seeing now was considered one of the least likely but worst outcomes. The modeling assumed the Strait of Hormuz could close for 4–10 weeks, with 1–3 years required to restore oil production once you factored in infrastructure damage. Prices could spike from around $65 to $175–$200 per barrel, before eventually settling in the $80–$100 range a year later in a new normal.
3. One surprising development: Iran is still moving oil through the Strait of Hormuz while disrupting everyone else. In most war games I participated in, we assumed Iran couldn’t close the Strait and still use it themselves. That would have made the move extremely self-defeating. But Iran appears capable of harassing global shipping while still pushing some of its own exports through. That changes the calculus.
4. The U.S. now finds itself in the naval and air equivalent of the dynamic we faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It’s a recipe for a quagmire where we win every battle and lose the war. We have overwhelming military dominance and are exacting a tremendous cost. But Iran doesn’t need to win battles. They just need occasional successes. A small boat hitting a tanker. A drone slipping through defenses in the Gulf. A strike on a hotel or oil facility. Each incident creates insecurity and drives costs up while remind everyone that the regime is surviving and fighting.
5. The deeper problem is that U.S. objectives were set far too high. Once “regime change” becomes the implicit or explicit goal, the bar for American success becomes enormous. Iran’s bar is simple: survive and keep causing disruption.
6. The options for ending this war now are all bad. You can try to secure the entire Gulf and Middle East indefinitely – extremely expensive and maybe impossible. You can invade Iran and replace the regime, but nobody is seriously going to do that. Costs are astronomical. You can try to destabilize the regime by supporting separatist groups. It probably won’t work and if it does you’ll most likely spark a civil war producing years of bloody chaos the U.S. will get blamed for. None of these are good outcomes.
7. The other escalatory options being discussed are taking the nuclear material out of Esfahan or taking Kargh Island. Esfahan is not really workable. Huge risk. You’d have been on the ground for a LONG time to safely dig in and get the nuclear material out in the middle of the country giving Iran time to reinforce from all over and over run the American position.
8. Kharg Island can be appealing to Trump. He’d love to take Iran’s ability to export oil off the map and try to coerce them to end the war. It’s much easier because it’s not in the middle of IRan. But it’s still a potentially costly ground operation. And again. Again, the Iranian government only has to survive to win and they can probably do that even without Kargh.
9. The least bad option is the classic diplomatic off-ramp. The U.S. declares that Iran’s military capabilities have been significantly degraded, which is how the Pentagon always saw the purpose of the war. Iran declares victory for surviving and demonstrating it can still threaten regional actors. It would feel unsatisfying. But this is the inevitable outcome anyway. Better to stop now than after five or ten more years of escalating costs. Remember in Afghanistan we turned down a deal very early in the war with the Taliban that looked amazing 20 years later. Don’t need to repeat that kind of mistake.
10. The U.S. and Israel are not perfectly aligned here. Trump just needs a limited win and would see long-term instability as a negative whereas for Netanyahu a weak unstable Iran that bogs the U.S. down in the MIddle East is a fine outcome. If President Trump decided he wanted Israel to stop, he likely has the leverage to push it in that direction just as he pressured Netanyahu to take a deal last fall on Gaza.
11. When this is over, the Gulf states will have to rethink their entire security strategy. They are stuck in the absolute worst place. They didn’t start this war and didn’t want it and now they are taking with some of the worst consequences. Neither doubling down with the U.S. and Israel nor placating the Iranians seems overwhelmingly appealing.
12. One clear geopolitical winner so far: Russia. Oil prices are rising. Sanctions are coming off. Western attention and military resources are shifting away from Ukraine. From Moscow’s perspective, this war is a win win win.
13. At some point China may have a role to play here. It is the world’s largest oil importer, and much of that supply comes from the Middle East. Yes they are still getting oil from Iran. But they also buy from the rest of the Middle East, and a prolonged disruption in the Gulf hits Beijing hard. That gives China a real incentive to help push toward an end to the conflict.