I look for cheap, ignored and unpopular stocks, ideally trading below BV or Net-nets, like Walter Schloss & young Warren Buffett did | Not investment advice
$PEW was a net-net in June. Then it went shopping.
GrabAGun just spent $34M in cash, a third of its pile, on a wholesale distributor.
And it told us nothing about its profits.
The numbers now
· Price: $1.77
· Market cap: ~$52M
· Pro forma net cash: ~$54M ($1.83/share)
· In June: $3.35/share
Q3 in short
– Revenue -4.7% to $21.2M
– Units sold -14%
– Gross margin 14.4% vs 9.6%
– Net loss $3.0M
– Zero buybacks. $8.7M of the program expired unused
Still below net cash, but barely.
This is no longer a cash story.
It's a bet on management's execution
Full article below
Something I've learned this year:
Never chase the price.
Find the stock you want to buy, and if it is not cheap enough yet, keep it on your watchlist.
Sooner or later, the market will give you the chance to buy at the right price.
Good quarterly results from Grifols.
$GRF Q3 2026:
· Revenue: €2,040M (+9.4% reported, +8.4% at constant currency)
· Adj. EBITDA: €538M (+9.8% cc), a 26.4% margin
· Net profit: €162M (+27.9%)
· Free cash flow pre-M&A: €208M in Q3, €298M in 9 months (+€110M)
· Net leverage: 3.98x, down from 4.2x a year ago
What’s driving it:
– Immunoglobulins +11.3%, with subcutaneous +40.3%
– US + Canada revenue +17.3% at constant currency
– Gross margin up to 39.6% in Q3, from 37.6% in Q2
– Capex down to €222M in 9 months (vs €281M)
What’s still weak:
– Albumin -13.2%, hit by Chinese regulation and high distributor inventories
– €332M of interest paid in 9 months, vs €298M of FCF
– Currency cut 9M revenue by €180M (-3.1%)
– A possible non-cash write-down of some R&D projects in Q4
Also: a €0.15 interim dividend, a possible US IPO of the Biopharma business still under evaluation, no significant debt maturities until Q4 2028, and €2.14bn of liquidity.
It is my top position.
@PrivateSamyFund Wow, yep, you're right, thanks for checking.
£15.1M − £2.4M capex − £5.8M lease payments ≈ £6.9M FCF.
So FCF is ~15% of EV, not ~23%.
My mistake was using the company's KPI "operating cash flow less lease payments" (£12.7M), which is calculated before tax.
Appreciate it.
Under 5x EBIT.
No debt.
21% fewer shares than a year ago.
That’s it, that’s the pitch.
$CFX Colefax Group designs luxury furnishing fabrics, wallpapers and trimmings under five brands: Colefax and Fowler, Cowtan and Tout, Jane Churchill, Manuel Canovas and Larsen.
It designs new collections every year, but makes nothing itself. Production is outsourced to 120+ mills, mainly in Italy, India, Belgium and the UK.
It sells to interior designers and fabric shops through its own showrooms and through agents and distributors elsewhere.
Fabrics are 90% of sales, and 63% of fabric sales come from the US.
Why it’s a good business:
– 57% gross margin. It owns the designs and the brands, and the mills do the making.
– Asset-light: capex (£2.4M) is roughly equal to depreciation.
– Cash conversion above 100%: £10.3M of free cash flow vs £7.75M of net profit.
– No bank debt, and the cash goes back to shareholders through buybacks.
At 1,320p per share:
· Market cap: £61.9M
· Cash: ~£16.4M, no bank debt (after the latest tender)
· EV: ~£45.5M
· EBIT after all lease costs (FY26): £9.9M
· EV/EBIT: ~4.6x
· Net profit: £7.75M
· P/E: ~8.0x
· Free cash flow after lease payments and capex: ~£10.3M, or ~23% of EV
Three buybacks in a year:
– Oct 2025: 11.7% of the shares at 880p
– June 2026: 3.2% at 1,300p
– Oct 2026: 7.3% at 1,350p
The numbers:
– Revenue +5.4% to £115.9M
– Pre-tax profit +18%, and the pre-tax margin rose to 9.1% (from 8.1%).
– US fabric sales +15.9% at constant currency.
The risks:
– Over-reliance on the US, with tariffs in the mix.
– The UK is still tough, and Decorating swung to a small loss.
– £31.6M of showroom lease liabilities, which are treated as rent in the figures above.
– The chairman and CEO sold 137,637 shares in the latest tender (he still owns 16.6%).
No position. NFA.
A Polish tool brand you’ve probably never heard of sells in 120+ countries and trades at ~8x earnings.
Credits to @HolyFinance for this idea.
$TOA TOYA distributes hand tools, power tools and kitchen and garden products from its own brands, led by YATO (86% of sales). It has 14,000 products, sells to 7,600 B2B customers in 120+ countries, and has its own sourcing companies in China.
At PLN 11.44 per share:
· Market cap: PLN 747M (excluding the 8.75M treasury shares bought in July; PLN 847M including them)
· Net debt: ~PLN 88M (after the July buyback, before the warehouse payment)
· EV: ~PLN 834M
· EBITDA, last 12 months: ~PLN 134M
· EV/EBITDA: ~6.2x
· Net profit, last 12 months: PLN 89M
· P/E: ~8.4x
The numbers:
– Revenue has grown from PLN 151M in H1 2016 to PLN 522M in H1 2026 (3.5x).
– H1 2026: revenue +13%, gross margin 35.3% (vs 33.7%), net profit +4% to PLN 52M. Q2 net profit was +17%.
– FY25: revenue +11%, net profit +27%.
Capital allocation:
– In July it bought 8.75M shares (11.7% of capital) at PLN 10.00 in a tender, for PLN 87.5M.
– In August it cancelled another 1.0M shares from a 2025 buyback.
– In October it completed the purchase of its own 57,800 m² warehouse for €41.6M, to cut rental costs.
The risks:
– Inventory-heavy: PLN 466M of stock, ~62% of the market cap.
– The buyback and the warehouse take net debt from ~zero to roughly PLN 200M+.
– Romania was -7% in H1, on a weak local economy.
– The founders own ~50%, so the free float is limited.
No position. NFA.
A French net-net with half its market cap in net cash, and a new CEO since July.
$ALDUB Encres Dubuit makes technical inks for screen, pad and digital printing, used in packaging, cosmetics, automotive and electronics. It sells in ~50 countries.
At €1.86 per share:
· Market cap: €5.8M
· Net cash: €2.9M (€0.93 per share, half the price)
· EV: ~€2.9M
· P/NCAV 0.77x
· P/BV 0.40x
Why it’s this cheap:
– 2025 revenue fell 12% to €17.7M. Asia was -21%, North America -42%.
– Operating loss of €2.2M before one-offs.
– It burned ~€1M in 2025 (-€0.4M operating cash flow, €0.65M capex).
– No dividend since 2022.
Signs of a turn:
– Gross margin rose to 64.3% from 58.0%.
– The company says Q1 2026 was back to operating profit, with growth in France, Europe and Asia.
– A new CEO, Jérôme Bracichowicz, was appointed in July. He has 25+ years in general management and transforming industrial companies.
– The founder, Jean-Louis Dubuit, stays as chairman, and a buyback of up to 10% of shares is authorized.
The risks:
– Still loss-making on a full-year basis, and cash keeps shrinking.
– Two CEO changes in two months.
– Tiny: €5.8M market cap.
No position. NFA.
Today’s idea is Ferrari.
No, not the one you’re thinking of.
This Ferrari doesn’t build supercars, it moves luxury goods around the world.
$FERGR Ferrari Group is an Italian logistics company founded in 1959 and built around luxury goods: freight forwarding, customs, transport, warehousing, and even red-carpet event security.
It IPO’d at €8.60 in Feb 2025. Today it’s 10% lower, even though EBITDA and the dividend have grown since.
Why is it a good business?
Brands don’t pick the cheapest carrier for a €2M necklace, they pick the one they trust.
Think about it.
Pricing is linked to the value of the goods, and when shipping costs 1% of that value, price doesn’t matter.
All clients care about is that it arrives in perfect condition.
It’s the leader in a fragmented niche, capex is only ~2-3% of revenue, and margins are ~26%.
At €7.64 per share:
· Market cap: €703M
· Net cash: €78M
· EV: €625M
· Adj. EBITDA, last 12 months: €93M
· EV/EBITDA: 6.7x
· EPS, last 12 months: €0.68
· P/E: 11.3x
· Dividend: €0.33, a 4.3% yield (56% payout)
The catches:
– Margins are slipping: 25.5% in H1, vs 26.6%.
– Asia was -10% in H1. China is weak, and it lost a China warehouse contract.
– It depends on luxury demand and is exposed to geopolitics (it has a Gulf presence).
No position, but it’s on my watchlist. NFA.
France had its worst riots in years this weekend: shops looted, banks vandalized and cars burned.
When a shop’s alarm goes off at 3 am, someone has to show up.
Could this tiny French company benefit from it?
$ALAQU $ALAQU.PA Aquila runs a 24/7 platform for alarm response.
When an alarm goes off at one of its ~1.4M protected sites, it dispatches a guard from a network of 300 independent local security firms covering 95% of France’s population.
How it makes money:
– Clients pay per intervention, or a monthly flat fee.
– Aquila pays the local partner and keeps the difference. No guards on payroll, no vans, just the platform and the network.
– H1 2026 revenue mix: alarm response 45%, guarding 44%, patrols 7%, subscriptions 3%.
– After paying partners, it keeps ~16% of revenue.
– Partner turnover is under 3%.
At €3.40 per share:
· Market cap: €5.6M
· Cash: €1.8M, vs a €1.7M bank loan
· EV: ~€5.5M
· Operating profit, last 12 months: €0.58M
· EV/EBIT ~9.5x
· Net profit, last 12 months: €0.53M
· P/E ~10.7x
· Dividend yield 7.4%
What happened:
– 2025 was its worst year in 25 years: revenue -5.2%, net profit -36%. Clients cut guarding and patrols. Alarm response kept growing.
– H1 2026 is a rebound: revenue +3%, operating profit +68%, net profit +76%. Alarm response is up >10%.
Red flags:
– Thin margins: a 2.25% operating margin in H1.
– The dividend was cut to €0.25 from €0.35, and it took ~100% of 2025 profit.
– Related-party dealings: it bought its HQ from its landlord (a regulated related-party agreement), and it lends to SC MARIS, which is co-managed by the CEO.
– Very illiquid.
No position. NFA.
Mont Blanc is one of the most famous mountains on earth.
The company that runs its lifts is worth €227M.
$MLCMB.PA Compagnie du Mont-Blanc operates 6 ski areas around Chamonix and Megève, plus the Aiguille du Midi and the Mont-Blanc Tramway.
At €252 (figures for the year to May 2025):
· Market cap: €227M
· Net debt: €48M (€150M cash, €198M debt)
· EV: €276M
· EBITDA: €52.5M (34% margin), so EV/EBITDA 5.2x
· EBIT: €30.2M, so EV/EBIT 9.1x
· EPS: €21.50, so P/E 11.7x
· Dividend: €8.50, a 3.4% yield
Who owns it: Compagnie des Alpes 37.5%, Chamonix Développement (a local public-private company) 18%, the Seydoux family 18%, employees 4%.
The free float is ~20%.
The good:
– Revenue +6.6% to €153.9M, EBITDA +6.1%.
– The Chamonix ski areas concession runs to 2053.
The catches:
– Heavy capex: €49.7M last year, vs €35.4M of operating cash flow. The Chamonix contract commits €743M of investment, including €149.5M to rebuild Grands Montets (full reopening delayed to Dec 2027).
– The Aiguille du Midi agreement ends on 31 Dec 2028.
FY26 results are due around November.
No position. NFA.
@CapitalValor Not their entire business, since skiing accounts for half of the revenue, but I agree. Even if they receive compensation for losing the concession (107 million for Tignes), the terminal value is at risk.
Today’s idea: ski resorts and leisure parks at ~4.2x EV/EBITDA, with a ~6% dividend yield.
$CDA.PA Compagnie des Alpes at €16.56, using the latest reported figures (31 March 2026):
· Market cap: €842M (50.8M shares)
· Net debt, excl. leases: €691M (1.9x EBITDA)
· EV, excl. leases: €1.53bn
· EBITDA excl. leases, last 12 months: ~€368M
· EV/EBITDA, excl. leases: ~4.2x
· Net income, last 12 months: €117M, so P/E 7.2x
· Dividend: €1.10 per share, paid in March.
Why is it down about a third this year?
– April: Q2 revenue missed expectations (€594M vs €613M consensus). The stock fell 6%.
– July: a wet May and record heatwaves in June and July hit the parks. Q3 revenue was -1.4% (parks -4.1%), and the company cut its EBITDA (incl. leases) growth outlook to 2-5% from ~10%. The stock fell 10%.
– Tignes: the ski area concession ended on 31 May. CDA gets ~€107M for its share, but loses the area’s yearly profit.
Meanwhile, the business keeps growing:
– FY25 (to 30 Sept 2025): EBITDA excl. leases +15% to €353M, net income +16%
– H1 FY26 (to 31 March): revenue +3.9%, EBITDA incl. leases +5%, net income €145M (+8%)
– Skiing had a strong season: 9-month revenue +5.7%
The catch is that it must reinvest ~20% of sales every year in lifts and rides. That spending is planned years ahead, so even if a summer goes badly, it’s the cash left for shareholders that shrinks.
No position, but it’s on my watchlist. NFA.
Down 67% from its high, Build-A-Bear trades at 6.3x earnings and keeps buying back its own stock.
$BBW runs 674 make-your-own teddy bear stores in 37 countries.
At $25.18 per share:
· Market cap: ~$315M
· Cash: $14M, no debt
· FY25 EBITDA: $81M, so EV/EBITDA ~3.7x
· FY25 free cash flow: $39.5M, or 13% of EV
· P/E: 6.3x on FY25, ~7-8x on FY26 guidance
· Dividend: $0.92 a year, a 3.7% yield
It returned $49M to shareholders in the last 12 months (~16% of the market cap).
Why it’s down:
– Revenue is falling: Q2 -7.2%, e-commerce -15.6%.
– Guidance was cut twice this year. Revenue is now $500-525M, and pre-tax income $60-68M.
– Tariffs cost ~$10-11M this year, and 51% of its goods come from China.
– Commercial revenue is now guided flat, from +20% before.
– Cash fell to $14M as capex rose to ~$25M and buybacks continued.
– About a third of revenue is tied to birthdays and parties, so it’s discretionary spending.
No position. NFA.
People who are afraid to invest because of the risk of losing the money they've worked so hard to earn
Do you know what I'm afraid of?
Working my whole life in an office from 9 to 6, while my money loses 4% a year in my bank account
Investing is mandatory
99.5% of its revenue is recurring.
68% of the market cap is cash.
The rest of the business is priced at ~5x operating profit.
$ARC.L Arcontech sells software for banks’ market-data and trading infrastructure (its CityVision platform).
At 82p:
· Market cap: £11.0M
· Cash: £7.5M, no debt (56p per share)
· EV: £3.5M
· Operating profit (FY26): £0.70M, so EV/EBIT 5.0x
· Free cash flow, excl. interest: £0.57M, or 16% of EV
· P/E: 13.2x (EPS 6.25p)
· Dividend: 4.0p, a ~4.8% yield
Why so cheap?
It lost a large, long-standing customer to a competitor. FY26 revenue fell 11.5% to £2.75M, and profit before tax fell 11% to £0.88M.
What could turn it:
– A new 3-year, ~£800k contract with a major European bank. Revenue starts in Q3 2026.
– The board is “comfortable” that next year will see a return to growth, with recurring revenue back to last year’s run rate.
– Management says interest in its products is the highest in some time.
The catches:
– Tiny: £11M market cap.
– Lumpy: losing one client cut revenue by 11.5%. Customer concentration isn’t disclosed.
No position, but it’s on my watchlist. NFA.